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ABSTRACT
FROM HERE TO MATERNITY:
MOTHERHOOD, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY
FEBRUARY 1998
MARSHA V. MAROTTA, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI COLUMBIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Patricia J. Mills
This dissertation considers the problem that maternal
difference represents inequality and inferiority -- either a
stigma as mothers are forced to compete on abstractly
equal terms with others (as if they were the same as
others)
,
or seen to represent a special condition in need of
protection. It argues that maternal difference is the result
of cultural representations of mothers as nurturing,
selfless, and always available to whoever needs them. These
images are crucial aspects of the process by which mothers
constitute their selves and their lives and come to
establish goals, aspirations, and relationships. Using the
work of Michel Foucault and Luce Irigaray, the dissertation
shows that these goals and aspirations may appear necessary,
natural, and personal, but in fact are constructed by the
symbolic meanings and values that create and regulate
society and culture, and so are contestable. It is the
symbolic meanings and values that create maternal difference
as inequality and inferiority.
IV
The dissertation distinguishes three body concepts: the
sexual' the pregnant, and the nonpregnant/maternal body with
daily responsibilities for children. It focuses on the third
body concept to show how "experts" shape the habits,
behaviors, and attitudes of mothers by disciplining mothers
and imposing cultural scripts on them that shape the
material practices of mothers, the series of practices
through which mothers are governed and come to govern
themselves. When mothers try to match the prescriptive
ideals of self-control, self- discipline, and
self-sacrifice, they follow rules and regulations that make
them socially adapted and useful. This changes the way they
and others think about their bodies and their possibilities.
Feminist, black, and lesbian mothers offer models of
practices and attitudes that challenge the hegemonic norms
of motherhood when they refuse many of the disciplinary
practices of motherhood and establish such practices as
cooperative and collective rather than privatized mothering,
or egalitarian parenting. Future challenges involve
reinventing the subject positions of mothers, in part by
reconceiving notions of time and space to take into account
the material variety of embodiment among mothers as well as
new relationships between mothers and others.
v
PREFACE
This project started with my interest in women in the
family, and with my realization that our culture blames
families — which means mothers — for just about anything
that goes wrong in society writ small or large. An example
of this as I finish this project concerns a Massachusetts
mother who with her husband hired an au pair to take care of
their two children. The au pair was charged and then
convicted of killing the infant, but it was the infant's
mother who was vilified — either for the possibility that
she hurt the child herself, or for leaving her children with
a nanny. There was no vilification of the father.
Blaming the mother also endures in theory. In fact, my
interest in this topic also can be traced to my sense that
most of the feminist theory literature on mothers was
written either explicitly or implicitly from the point of
view of daughters. Mothers seemed to be objects, rarely if
ever subjects. I am happy to report that this is less true
as I finish than when I started, because of more interest in
the subjectivities of mothers which has taken place
concurrent with my project.
After I began this work I became a mother, which gave
me lots of rich material to work with. It meant I lived all
the difficulties and complexities I had been observing, and
researching, and linking to the powers involved in social
relations. That added a dimension to my work that would not
vi
otherwise be there. For example, I had the experience of
having had this career, this job that wielded power over
other people and power in the community — and then suddenly
being surrounded by experts and literature telling me I
could not have a baby or bring it up properly without their
intervention. When I looked around I was astounded by the
proliferation of choices and the soaring sales of popular
books and magazines that promised to teach new mothers how
to do it right. This suggested widespread use of such advice
without indication of any critical analysis of it. And no
wonder: the experts were leaving new mothers feeling
incompetent
.
That is where the title comes from: "From Here," which
is where many women are, comfortable with themselves and
their accomplishments — "to Maternity," which is where they
find themselves, uncomfortable with everything about it
because they are told they should be by everyone around
them. As I try very hard to make clear in the pages that
follow, I am not saying that all women are in this position.
But certainly far too many are, and I believe the conditions
I describe affect the lives of all mothers in one way or
another. In fact, I was teaching most of the time I was
writing this, and many of the young women I talked to, from
many different backgrounds, were very clearly on a similar
path. In this culture, at this time, women cannot get From
Here to Maternity very smoothly.
vii
Thus I think of this, in part, as a cultural critique
with culture made up of discourses in tension with one
another, and contestable. I critique the cultural
assumptions about mothers -- how they have been taught to
see themselves, to think of themselves. One goal is to
politicize this by bringing it into explicit reflection. In
its simplest terms, I argue that we may take the practices,
habits, and attitudes of mothers for granted, but they can
be challenged and when they lead to domination or
oppression, they should be transformed.
I hope I have shown that there are other ways to view
maternal difference than as a stigma as mothers are forced
to compete on abstractly "equal" terms with others (as if
they were the same as others)
,
or as a special condition in
need of protection. I hope I have shown that social and
structural changes can be pursued that, instead of assuming
that mothers are unequal and inferior, living with a stigma
or needing to be protected -- which then becomes the
identity of the women -- assume that motherhood is but one
aspect of a woman's identity. I say "hope" here because in
order to try I have had to talk about profound changes in
the way we think about such concepts as space and time,
changes for which we do not even have any words yet.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: MATERNAL BODIES/MATERNAL SUBJECTS
From Image to Practice
The female body in theory, law and culture often is
split into two distinct concepts — the sexual body and the
reproductive body. I am concerned with how women construct a
sense of self while relegated to the status of "mere bodies"
and faced with ambivalent and contradictory claims. To
explore this concern, I make a further distinction which
finds these "mere bodies" divided into three concepts. When
women, once considered sexual bodies, become pregnant, they
are reduced to the maternal function. After they give birth,
they experience a third body concept, the maternal/
nonpregnant body . ^ Focusing on the cultural images and
prescriptions for this third female body concept, I examine
the way in which maternal difference represents inequality
and inferiority either a stigma as mothers are forced to
compete on abstractly "equal" terms with others (as if they
*The three female body concepts I name here — sexual, pregnant, and nonpregnant/
maternal -- are not exhaustive, nor are they stages that every woman goes through.
Female body concepts also include the menopausal body and the post-menopausal body,
for example. Further, not all women become pregnant or give birth, and reproductive
technologies and surrogacy contracts have created new categories of mothers who may
not fit squarely into the three body concepts named in the text. I focus on these three
female body concepts in order to trace the patterns of attention each has received, and to
pause on the last for closer examination of the body of the woman who has daily
responsibilities for children.
2the same as others)
, or seen to represent a special
condition in need of protection — and how motherhood as a
social relation is maintained and reproduced.
From Plato to Descartes to modern Western thinkers,
political theories have associated the body with emotion,
nature and women, separate and distinct from mind, reason,
culture and men. When the focus is on the female body, it is
usually on the woman as object and omits the possibility of
the woman as subject. The effect of women's exile from
subjectivity of their position as the structural "other"
of a dualistic system that equates the masculine with the
universal, or of their position as the "same" as the
masculine but a defective version -- has been to make women
inessential to what is important about human life . 2 The
cultural fear of and disdain for the body, sometimes
perpetuated by feminist theories, has resulted in a
disembodied view of human identity in much of Western
political thought
.
3
From pornography, to mass market romance novels, to the
European tradition of nude oil painting, the female body is
portrayed as a narrowly defined sexual body. These depend
for their appeal on the eroticization of male dominance and
female subordination and on making the female body the
2Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems ofExclusion in Feminist Thought
(Boston: Beacon, 1988).
3 Spelman, Inessential W>oman, p. 127-8.
3object of the male gaze
.
4 Once women become pregnant and
when they have children, they may no longer be sex objects
m the same sense as they were when they were sexual bodies
but they still are objects based on their bodies and
their gender. In addition to being the object of a specific
kind of gaze from both men and women who see them now first
and often only as mothers, they are also the object of the
gaze of "experts" who tell them who to be and how to act as
pregnant women and mothers. Pregnant women are told to say
no to alcohol and drugs, told how much weight to gain, that
they must test their fetuses to determine whether they are
healthy, and so on. After their children are born, the
"experts" continue their prescriptions about diet and
nutrition as well as in expanded areas. They tell mothers
they should be relaxed, upbeat, and clean; they should smile
and cuddle their babies a lot even when they do not feel
like it. Most importantly, they are always supposed to feel
like it. The "expert" advice attempts to impose cultural
scripts on mothers by shaping the series of practices
through which mothers are governed and come to govern
themselves. Cultural scripts organize culturally shared
routines such as learning the meaning of personal feelings,
decoding social situations, and setting limits on responses;
the cultural values, and powerful images that stand for
4Alison Jaggar, Living With Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 147.
4values, are internalized, giving rise to our sense of the
world around us. 5 Through the scripts, the "experts" also
tell everyone else to see mothers and to judge mothers only
according to how well they meet the prescriptive standards
for mothers. Because they have been reduced to their
reproductive bodies, mothers are judged for the most part
for their impact on children and from the perspectives of
now-grown children. They rarely are viewed as subjects or
from the perspectives of mothers.
Just as the sexual body is divided into two opposing
concepts of virgin and whore, the pregnant body and
nonpregnant/maternal body are divided into good mother and
bad mother. The good mother and bad mother each can be
all-powerful or powerless, love too much or not enough or
not in the "right" way. No counterpart of these divisive
concepts can be found for the bodies of men, whose long-term
reproductive capacity is described only in positive terms,
such as virility. While some men may find the concept of
masculinity in the United States in the 1990s narrow and
rigid, it is still for the most part a positive concept in
this culture. Even the terms potent and impotent have more
to do with force, authority and influence than the
reproductive bodies of men. The thousands of infertility
5John H. Gagnon and William Simon, in Sexual Conduct: The Sources ofHuman
Sexuality
,
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1973), argue that nearly all human behavior is
scripted rather than spontaneous. Chapter Three here develops the concept of motherhood
scripts more fully.
5clinics that have opened across the country are associated
with women through their very names, since the adjective
"infertile" is used most often to describe women.
The concepts of female bodies are complicated by race
and class differences
.
6 That is, sexual bodies, pregnant
bodies and nonpregnant/maternal bodies cannot be discussed
m isolation of other differences. Maternal difference is
inextricably linked with other aspects of identity such as
race, class, ethnicity, sexual preference, and age. What
Elizabeth Spelman points out about women also is true for
mothers: that what it means to be a mother depends on what
else is true about oneself and the world in which one lives;
the meaning of being a mother, to her and to others, depends
on other facts about her
.
7 To try to separate maternity from
other parts of mothers' identities is a position which, in
Spelman s view, would maintain white, middle-class privilege
which will thrive as long as there are ways of appearing to
talk about differences among women without really doing so . 8
To examine race and class, she insists, must include both
what is experienced by some women and the way that
experience is described and judged by other women.
6The role of the world economy, the socioeconomic conditions affecting mothers, and the
disparities among mothers, requires more thought and attention than I have been able to
give in this dissertation. These are important factors in any study of the status of mothers.
For example, market forces drive some women to postpone pregnancy in order to have
the perfect baby, and drive teenagers to have babies when they are still children
themselves.
7Spelman, Inessential Woman
, p 102
8Spelman, Inessential Woman
,
p. 166.
6This can be illustrated in a brief example that shows
that the way black female body concepts are portrayed today
reflect the way they were portrayed in southern white
literature in slavery: as a sexualized body of concubine or
conjure woman, or Jezebel; or a maternal body of "Mammy,"
also in forms of Aunt Jemima and Sapphire
.
9 While the
process of reducing women to mere bodies may be similar for
aH
'
the waning and results are not the same. The mammy
mother figure is in direct contrast to the ideal white
woman/mother. Both images depend on each other for their
meaning and effectiveness
.
10 Ideal white women could not be
ornamental and would have to debase themselves if they
nursed and chased children, cooked or scrubbed floors; later
the white mother can have a job outside her home, leaving
cleaning and childcare to the black mother who then has to
neglect her own children in order to do that work. The white
women of a certain class get to deny their reproductive
bodies and remain sexual bodies, beautiful and "weak" enough
to need protection from men; the mammies are physical
^Patricia Hill Collins, “Shifting the Center: Race, class, and Feminist theorizing about
Motherhood” in Bassin et al eds.. Representations ofMotherhood (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994), p. 68-9; K. Sue Jewell, From Mammy to Miss America and
Beyond: Cultural Images and the Shaping of U.S. Social Policy (New York: Routledge,
1993), p. 36; Tania Modleski, Feminism Without Women: culture and Criticism in a
“Postfeminist" Age (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 130; Barbara Christian, Black
Feminist Criticism: Perspectives on Black Women Writers (New York: Pergamon Press,
1985), p. 2.
10Christian, Black Feminist Criticism
;
E. Ann Kaplan, “Sex, work, and Motherhood:
Maternal Subjectivity in Recent visual Culture” in Bassin et al, eds., Representations of
Motherhood.
7presences but because of their exaggerated forms they are
harmless, no rival to the white women because no threat of
sexual attraction to their white men.
Yet despite the consistency of the symbolism of the
images of the female body concepts, real bodies are not
stable or constant, according to Susan Bordo. Rather, real
bodies are constantly in the grip of changing cultural
practices
.
11 That is, the body is constituted by culture.
Bordo, drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, shows how
social practices change the way women experience their
bodies and what they can imagine for themselves. The
cultural manipulation takes place on both the physical or
material body, and on the concrete body as it experiences
daily reality. In the latter case, social practices can
change people s experiences of their bodies and their
possibilities, according to Bordo. For example, in the
practice of dieting, saying "no" to hunger contributes to
the anorexic's sense that hunger is dangerous and therefore
controlling it becomes intoxicating. The cultural
manipulation described by Bordo suggests two important
departure points for a discussion of how maternal difference
is maintained as social inequality and inferiority: the
process by which a culture produces a practice, and the link
between the maternal body and maternal subjectivity.
1
1
Susan Bordo, “Anorexia Nervosa: Psychopathology as the Crystallization of Culture” in
Diamond and Quinby eds., Feminism and Foucault (Boston: Northeastern University
Press, 1988), p. 90.
8In the cases of the three body concepts — the sexual
body, the pregnant body, and the maternal body after
childbirth — a clear link exists between cultural images
and cultural practices. But most of the literature on
cultural images and practices addresses only the sexual
body. For example, authors from de Beauvoir to Foucault to
contemporary feminist theorists have shown how
representations of the body in science, philosophy and
aesthetics form cultural conceptions of the body, which in
turn form a set of practical rules and regulations through
which the body becomes socially adapted and useful
.
12 That
is, to achieve a specific goal, such as a changed physical
appearance, certain practices are required. For example,
when women try to make their bodies match the ideal body of
femininity, they produce a practiced, "painted, " and
subjected body. They produce a body on which an inferior
status has been inscribed because they work under the
assumption that without the practices their bodies are
deficient or defective
.
13
Using Foucault's notions of bodies as including
capacities, gestures, and movements, and disciplinary
practices as found in everyday habits and activities of
12 See, for example, Bordo, “The Body and the Reproduction of Femininity: A Feminist
Appropriation of Foucault” in Jaggar and Bordo eds., Gender/Body Knowledge: Feminist
Reconstructions ofBeing and Knowing (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1989), p. 25-6.
13 Sandra Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power” In
Diamond and Quinby eds.. Feminism and Foucault, p. 71.
9individuals, I argue that prescriptions for what to eat and
drink, as well as how to talk, dress and act as mothers,
shapes mother's bodies and subjectivities. It shapes their
physical appearances and behaviors, which requires a
self-discipline that shapes their thinking about themselves.
I argue that what this means for mothers, in part, is that
when they try to make their bodies, gestures and behaviors
match the ideals of motherhood — self-control,
self
-discipline, and self-sacrifice — they contribute to
their own inferiority because of the tyranny involved in
having to direct so much time and energy to the effort, and
because of the underlying assumption that anything else is
deficient, that they cannot be good mothers unless they meet
these ideals, that they cannot create their own motherhood.
The norms governing motherhood, like the norms governing the
female body, often are impossible to achieve: no human being
is always smiling and selfless, let alone one coping with
the demands of children, role strains, and other details of
her life.
A central goal of this dissertation is to link the
cultural representations of mothers to maternal practices,
to the practical lives of mothers, to show how these
practices change mothers' experiences of their bodies and
their possibilities. These practices entail the physical
care they take of themselves and of their children, and
their demeanor, as well as such "choices" as part-time jobs
or jobs with flexible hours, late nights doing housework.
10
and giving up their own activities when they conflict with
children's schedules or activities. I argue that the
cultural representations of mothers as nurturing, selfless,
always available to whoever needs them, are crucial aspects
of the process by which mothers constitute their selves and
their lives and come to establish goals, aspirations, and
relationships. These goals and aspirations may appear
personal but in fact are shaped by the symbolic meanings and
values that create and regulate society and culture.
That is, one of the reasons mothers are recognized as
mothers is because of the disciplinary practices they adopt
that produce bodies and behaviors that are recognizable by
most people in their contemporary culture, and within their
race and class, as maternal. It is not only the bearing and
rearing of children that categorizes and defines mothers,
but the fact of "being looked at through a particular mode
of knowledge, a particular regime of truth ." 14 That is, the
discourses on motherhood at a particular time and in a
particular place make certain behaviors and attitudes appear
true and necessary at that time and place, attempt to
produce "truths" so that certain choices and certain
practices appear natural, self-evident, required, for a
mother to be categorized as "good." According to the
dominant image of mothers today, these choices insist that
14Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body (New York:
Routledge, 1991), p. 56.
mothers identify their happiness and fulfillment with the
practices of self-control, self-discipline, and
self-sacrifice
.
One of the problems with "being looked at through a
particular mode of knowledge" is that it assumes that the
identities of mothers are singular and fixed, rather than
multiple and changing. A mother's sense of self, her
subjectivity, develops and changes over time as she
interacts with individuals and her culture. Thus a mother's
identity is created through both representation and
experience, complex and often in conflict, defined as they
are by sex, race, and class, and other differences that
contribute to subjectivity. Subjectivity is a process,
involving powers and desires, that takes place on and in the
embodied, situated self. Culture has a strong hold on all
individuals, but mothers are particularly vulnerable because
of their tremendous responsibilities, and their desire to do
the right thing by their babies and children. Because of
this vulnerability, many mothers absorb advice and standards
set forth by experts. They internalize the advice and
standards, and then look at themselves through the
particular mode of knowledge for mothers. This limits how
they can think of themselves as women, as subjects.
For example, mothers internalize representations in
prescriptive texts on motherhood and images in popular
culture. Their socialization teaches them "a way of seeing.
They learn what to eat, how to dress, how to manage their
12
time, how to behave as pregnant women and mothers. They
learn to see that they can make themselves "good" mothers by
heeding "experts" who, in a relationship of power, act on
their bodies and thoughts in a way that shapes their
behaviors and practices. This happens at the level of
ongoing subjugation, at what Foucault calls "the level of
the continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our
bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviors .” 15
The prescribed practices range from diet and exercise
regimens during pregnancy and breastfeeding, to schedules
for feeding, bathing, and sleep for infants and young
children. While diet and exercise are important to healthy
pregnancy, they are used to introduce mothers to the
discipline that will be expected of them in their new role
m areas in which such disciplinary practices could more
easily be contested. For example, as we will see in more
detail in Chapter Three, mothers who breastfeed are
encouraged to count wet and soiled diapers to determine
whether their babies are receiving enough milk. These
elements of surveillance and examination fit Foucault's
model of disciplinary power which entails knowledge and
power over individual bodies, including capacities,
gestures, movements, locations and behavior. The
disciplinary practices that result entail the everyday
1
'Michel Foucault, Power Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p 97
13
activities and habits of mothers, compelled "not through the
threat of violence or force, but rather by creating desires,
attaching individuals to specific identities, and
establishing norms against which individuals and their
behaviors and bodies are judged and against which they
police themselves ." 16
As children get older, mothers are bombarded with
advice on how to develop good eating and sleeping habits and
model behavior in their children by disciplining the
mothers' own behavior and responses to their children.
Again, examples of such prescriptive advice will be examined
m detail m Chapter Three. The point to be made here is
that when mothers engage in these techniques they recreate
themselves, redefine who they are, from sexual to pregnant
to maternal/nonpregnant bodies and subjects. When they
chase, feed, and comfort children all at the same time,
carry their children and everything they need with them
everywhere, put their children's needs first -- they define
themselves for themselves and for the world as mothers. If
they do not engage in the prescribed practices, they often
feel guilt, anxiety, and disappointment as they and their
children do not meet the standards to be categorized as
"good." Others feel compelled to justify their rejection.
That is, the measure of agency available to them is limited:
they are fit mothers if they conform to the normative ideal.
16Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault, p 68
14
or unfit mothers if they do not. The images and
prescriptions for mothers incite and channel desires to
achieve certain bodily forms, behaviors, and relationships.
The desires include having healthy, well-behaved children,
loving those children unconditionally, combating
infertility, and so on. Although mothers acquire skills and
develop competencies which enhance them in what many
consider a central aspect of their identity, at the same
time they lose power by being subjugated by these
techniques
.
Again, the details of this vary by race and class. K.
Sue Jewell points out, for example, that African American
women often ignore or resist the normative ideal presented
by American culture writ large, and instead define
themselves according to their own microculture
.
17 But not
all African American women reject all western cultural
images of womanhood, according to Jewell, since some want to
obtain the rewards that result from conforming to cultural
images. In addition, women who come into contact with the
macroculture through government agencies or other "experts"
may have no choice but to conform if certain behaviors are
required in order to receive benefits or entitlements, such
as Aid to Families with Dependent Children or Food Stamps.
17Jewell, From Mammy, p. 68
18Jewell, From Mammy, p. 69
15
The problem arises when the representations of mothers
compress who mothers can be and what they can do into narrow
strictures. Despite the varying meanings of motherhood based
on the other aspects of mothers' identities, despite the
important differences among the contexts in which women
experience motherhood, contemporary Western society produces
and disseminates a dominant, hegemonic image of a white,
middle-class mother. This dominant image, or standardized
ideal, attempts to erase such differences as race and class.
It attempts to set the rules governing the construction of
contemporary motherhood. But rather than focus on the
beliefs such an ideology produces, I follow Foucault in
emphasizing the practices such an ideology produces that
train and shape maternal bodies and behaviors to fit
prevailing historical forms of motherhood. I examine the
dominant image or ideal of motherhood, whose powerful
definitions white, middle - class women most identify with and
therefore are most vulnerable and least resistant to. Then I
move on to some less dominant discourses such as those among
some feminist mothers, African American mothers, and lesbian
mothers. By examining both dominant and subjugated
discourses and the diversity of practices they entail, we
can avoid universalizing the concept of maternity and get a
closer look at existing symbolic meanings of motherhood, and
the possibilities for expanding those symbolic meanings
based on the knowledge of existing resistance and struggle.
16
Rather than tell mothers who they are or who they
should be, the goal is to show how they come to think of
themselves as they do, and to tell them who they do not have
to be. As Jana Sawicki points out, Foucault’s theories do
not tell us what to do. Instead, they tell us "how some of
our ways of thinking and doing are historically linked to
particular forms of power and social control ." 19 At issue
here is not whether women should or should not become
particular kinds of mothers, but the definitions of mother's
needs and how they should be satisfied.
Foucault identifies two meanings of the word subject:
subject to control of others, and self-controlled and active
subjects
.
20 Both are important to the way that mothers
construct a sense of self, as others influence them and as
they struggle with their own agency. Foucault made it clear
that when he defines the exercise of power as action on the
action of others, he assumes a freedom on the part of the
subj ect
.
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only
insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual
or collective subjects who are faced with a field of
possibilities in which several ways of behaving,
several reactions and diverse comportments may be
realized . 21
19Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault, p. 47.
20Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics. An Overview ofWork in Progress” in Dreyfus
and Rabinow eds., Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 212.
21 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” p. 221.
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For
of power,
Foucault
'
Foucault, freedom is the condition for the exercise
its precondition, and its permanent support. Thus
s work can be used to support the feminist goal of
making real choices about motherhood available to women, and
opening up space for self-creation. He told an interviewer
that people are freer than they feel, that "people accept as
truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at
a certain moment during history, and that this so-called
evidence can be criticized and destroyed ." 22 Mothers may be
freer than they feel to create their own motherhoods.
The Dominant Image
The dominant image of white, middle-class motherhood is
produced in symbolic representations which carry messages
that say mothers are nurturing, caring, sacrificing and,
although heterosexual, they are asexual. Mothers are
responsible for their children and the men in their lives.
This means they are easy targets for blame when anything
goes wrong and for the burden of making the sacrifices to
make everything right
.
23 This precludes thinking of mothers
22Rux Martin, “Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault” in L. Martin,
Gutman, Hutton eds.. Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p. 10.
23A contemporary example of this is the attention given to the family to solve the ills of
society, an attention which blames women for what is wrong and burdens them with
making it right. A number of feminist and other scholars have traced the changing image
and expectations of mothers’ roles in the family. See Stephanie Coontz, The Way We
Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap
,
(New York: Basic Books,
1992); Steven Mintz and Susan Kellog, Domestic Revolution: A Social History of
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as subjects with multiple and complex sets of experiences,
as women with needs and interests that go beyond children
h.0 1 0 2TO S 0XL13. 1 fsitlllv 1 1 -i-'uy / and thus subjugates and
subordinates mothers. Their pregnant, and nonpregnant/
maternal bodies, like their sexual bodies before maternity,
are lowered in status from persons to objects, and to moral
subordinates
.
24
It is in their daily practices that many mothers try,
and sometimes fail, to measure up to the ideals of
motherhood. In Bartky’s description, women internalize
patriarchal standards of bodily acceptability, despite the
fact that they are impossible to achieve completely since
they run counter to nature. Mothers construct their bodies
and behaviors according to cultural standards — but like
many of the women who fail to be feminine enough, many
American Family Life, (New York: Free Press, 1988); and Barbara Ehrenreich and
Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts ' Advice to Women
,
(New
York: Anchor Books, 1978). For more on the blaming and burdening aspect of the
contemporary attention to family values, see Marotta, “Family Matters: Blaming and
Burdening Mothers,” unpublished manuscript, presented to the Northeastern Political
Science Association 1993 Annual Meeting.
24Linda Lemoncheck in “What’s Wrong with Being a Sex Object?” (in Jaggar ed.. Living
With C ontradictions) describes sexual objectification as “occurring only when women are
regarded an inanimate objects, bodies or animals, where their status as the moral equals of
persons has been demeaned or degraded (p.202). But she argues that “dehumanization”
may be a more accurate description for this process than “objectification,” because she
believes one can treat a woman as sexually attractive without treating her as a sex object,
by treating her as a sexually attractive moral equal or person. So while a woman may be
complimented for her sexy body, or regarded as an erotic bedmate, she need not
automatically be construed as a sex object (p. 205-6). This suggests it is possible for
women to be admired for their maternal practices and their results, for example, without
being reduced to their reproductive bodies.
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mothers feel deficient and "hence a tighter control of the
body has gained a new kind of hold over the mind. 25 In
addition, all the time and energy mothers invest in trying
to meet the cultural standards, the normative ideal, is
taken away from development of their own identities and from
social achievement. 26 Note Bartky's description of women who
succeed in achieving cultural standards of femininity:
To succeed m the provision of a beautiful or sexybody gams a woman attention and some admiration butittle real respect and rarely any social power. A
woman's effort to master feminine body discipline
will lack importance just because she does it: her
activity partakes of the general depreciation of
everything female. In spite of unrelenting pressure
to "make the most of what she has," women are
ridiculed and dismissed for their interest in such
trivial" things as clothes and makeup. Further, the
narrow identification of woman with sexuality and
the body in a society that has for centuries
displayed profound suspicion toward both does little
to raise her status. 27
Women cannot win: they are ridiculed when they try to
conform to the cultural standards, rejected or marginalized
when they do not. The implication for mothers is that they
are trivialized when they follow the cultural scripts, the
expert" advice, and put their children first, such as
mothers who in a variety of ways make their children a
higher priority than paid work and thus risk jobs,
25Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity,” p. 80-81.
26Bordo, “Anorexia Nervosa,” p. 105.
27Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity,” p. 73.
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promotions or careers;
not put their children
and they are condemned when they do
first. Mothers may win some attention
and admiration when they place their children first, but it
is unlikely they will win respect or
not to equate raising children with
social power. This is
applying make-up, but to
show the similarities in the process through which cultural
images produce cultural practices. The "depreciation of
everything female" colors both attention to one's body and
attention to one's children. This is borne out in many ways,
not the least of which is the extremely low wages paid to
child care workers.
Cultural representations of the dominant image come in
many forms, from books and magazines to movies, television
and art. Feminists have shown that these social
representations have long carried some version of the
dichotomous message that mothers either sacrifice for their
children or are evil whores
.
28 But even more positive views
of mothers, in recent films for example, reflect an
unconscious unease regarding the mother" which has resulted
in displacing the mother into the horror film (for example,
"Alien" in which the belligerent alien of the title is an
28 See, for example, Modleski, Feminism Without Women
;
Suzanna Danuta Walters, Lives
together/Worlds Apart: Mothers and Daughters in Popular Culture
,
(Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1992); Marianne Hirsch, “Maternity and Rememory: Toni Morrison’s
Beloved ’ in Bassin et al eds., Representations ofMotherhood, E. Ann Kaplan,
Motherhood and Representation: The Mother in Popular Culture andMelodrama, (New
York: Routledge, 1992), and “Sex, Work, and Motherhood”; and Therese Litchtenstein,
“Images of the Maternal: An Interview with Barbara Kruger” in Bassin et al eds.
Representations ofMotherhood.
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overbearing mother; and "Fatal Attraction" in which the
"good" mother may have a version of domestic bliss and the
"bad" potential mother who wreaks havoc with her life has a
career and a wild sex life, but neither can have both) ; the
new emphasis on fathers as parents ("Kramer vs. Kramer" in
which a divorced father gets custody of his son; and "Three
Men and a Baby" in which a father and his two male friends
raise the baby); or the new fetal images that threaten to
displace the mother as subject ("Look Who's Talking" and
"Look Who's Talking Too" in which the story is told in the
baby's voice and from the baby's perspective). 29 So while
the image of mother as subject emerged in films in the last
15 years, she already is threatened with being made into a
monster or marginalized by new roles of fathers and
fetuses/babies
.
30
Messages about the maternal body are presented and
mediated by symbolic representations of mothers, and these
images are defined by power relations in a specific society
at a specific time. As Bordo has shown in her analysis of
anorexia nervosa, social manipulation of the female body has
been a central strategy in the maintenance of power
relations between the sexes over the last 100 years. 31 But
according to Bordo, physical manipulation and external
29Kaplan, “Sex, Work, and Motherhood,” p. 257, 268-9
In addition, all of the films named here are about white, middle class mothers, and
privilege the biological nuclear family, according to Kaplan, “Sex, Work, and
Motherhood,” p. 269.
31 Bordo, “Anorexia Nervosa,” p. 91.
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control of the body -- such
and removal of rib bones to
a minor role in maintaining
with the role played by the
as clitoridectomy, footbinding,
fit into tight corsets -- played
gender power relations compared
voluntary efforts of women who
"have mutilated themselves internally to attain" an ideal
femininity
.
32
Disciplinary practices are both imposed on subjects,
and voluntarily sought in order to gain the rewards such
practices bring — such as the label "good" mother. When
mothers adopt practices that earn them the label of "good,"
their subordination is in part voluntary through
self-normalization. According to Bordo, normalization —
modes of acculturation which set up standards or norms
against which individuals measure and shape their behavior
"is still the dominant order of the day, even in a
postmodern context, and especially with regard to the
politics of women's bodies ." 33 Her work shows how even the
rhetoric of resistance is made to serve normalization. For
example, contemporary disciplines such as dieting and
exercising train the female body in docility and obedience
to cultural demands. These disciplines can be experienced in
terms of power and control, and can result in personal
liberation or cultural transformation, according to Bordo —
such as when women become physically stronger and are better
32Bordo, “Anorexia nervosa,” p. 107.
33Bordo, “Feminism, Foucault,” p. 183.
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able to defend and help themselves. But when they result in
eating disorders such as anorexia, this and other protests
such as hysteria and agoraphobia "actually function as if in
collusion with the cultural conditions that produced
them. " 34
The disciplinary power that inscribes the cultural
standards on bodies is everywhere and nowhere, in everyone
and no one in particular . 35 This point comes frQm Foucault , s
view that power is impersonal; it cannot be held by anyone.
This view has met criticism from some feminists who argue
that men holding power over women has been the cause of
female oppression. But Foucault's position can be
interpreted, as it is by Bordo, to mean that even though
power is impersonal that does not mean "there are no
dominant positions, social structures or ideologies emerging
from the play of forces." 36 That is, to say that power is
not held by anyone is not to say that it is equally held by
all, nor that all are positioned the same within it.
What this disciplinary model of power means for the
third female body concept, the maternal body as experienced,
and the mind of many mothers in contemporary United States
is that just as they lose control over their bellies during
pregnancy, they lose control over their identities during
34Bordo, “Anorexia Nervosa,” p. 105.
35Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity,” p. 74
36Bordo, “Feminism, Foucault, and the Politics of the Body,” in Caroline Ramazanoglu
ed.. Up Against Foucault, (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 191.
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motherhood. They lose control over their bellies because
strangers touch them without permission, as though they own
that part of them, as though this public "display" makes
them public property. There is no mistaking the eighth or
ninth month of pregnancy, no performing it away or
pretending it is not there. Women lose their identities in
two ways: the unwritten sign "MOTHER" marches ahead of them
wherever they go when they are pregnant, and drags behind
them after the births (or adoptions), forcing these "bodies"
to do multiple duty and obscuring other aspects of their
identities
.
This multiple duty involves an array of problems and
tasks, from child-care to second shifts, which most of the
rest of society refuses to recognize except to hold against
mothers -- both at home where they are held responsible for
childcare and housework, and at paid labor where they have
to measure up to the male standard or be relegated to
women's jobs" such as clerical and part-time work, or to
"mommy tracks" in which their jobs offer flexibility for the
duties of motherhood but put them on a path that does not
include promotions and big pay raises. Mothers are forced to
pay a psychological and physical price, not exacted from
fathers, as they carry these responsibilities. Despite lip
service to changing attitudes, studies show women in
heterosexual relationships do more than 60 percent of the
childcare, and yard and home maintenance; more than 75
percent of the cooking, cleaning, dishwashing, and laundry;
25
and nearly 75 percent of grocery shopping and paperwork
associated with family finances - all in addition to the
other duties they have associated with other aspects of
their identities as persons, workers, friends, lovers, and
so on.” When mothers try to fulfill these duties, or when
they decide not to, they often find that even forceful
aspects of their identities that used to command attention
are set aside, and they forfeit rights and status they had
earned. Women thus are objectified, transformed into the
symbolic function of mother, and so lose control of the "I"
they had been creating for themselves over a period of time.
Although for most women, the "I" had been constantly
changing, most of the changes were of their own making. For
many mothers, even though their bellies shrink back to their
normal size, even though they continue to be a site of
multiple, complex and potentially contradictory sets of
experiences, defined by the overlapping variables of sex,
37Daphne Spain and Suzanne M. Bianchi, Balancing Act: Motherhood\ Marriage , and
Employment Among American Women
,
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996), p
169. The authors report that in juggling home and work, women’s family roles tend to
intrude on their work roles, while men s work roles tend to intrude on their family time (p
171). They conclude that as long as men have fewer family responsibilities and women
have many more, the potential exists for women to choose or accept lower occupational
status and earnings, which in turn lowers their bargaining power within the marriage (p.
171). See also Arlie Hochschild, The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution
at Home
,
(London: The Penguin Group, 1989). In addition, we have only to look at what
our society means by “to father” — to provide the sperm to fertilize the egg — compared
with what it means by “to mother” in order to see on whom most of the responsibilities of
parenthood rest. Only “to mother” reduces the individual involved to an ongoing function
that consumes her body, and tells volumes about how she spends her time and energy.
This suggests the definition of father also is in need of expansion of its symbolic meaning.
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race, and class - it is impossible to avoid being
identified first or foremost as "mother."
Ambivalent Motherhood
One aspect of contemporary social representations
categorizes mothers as either magical or impotent. Belief in
the all-powerful mother is belief that mothers can fix
everything. But this is accompanied by a tendency to blame
mothers when anything goes wrong, or to believe in their
perfectibility
.
38 This burdens mothers with keeping or
making things right
.
39 in addition, we are constantly faced
with examples of society and its representatives, usually in
the form of judges and social service professionals,
declaring mothers impotent. In the case of child custody,
laws construct mothers according to outdated codes of
conduct that they cannot meet without giving up sex and all
other interests beyond their children
.
40 Either mothers put
8Nancy Chodorow and Susan Contralto, “The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother” in Barrie
Thome and Marilyn Yalom eds., Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions
,
(New
York: Longman, 1982), p. 55.
9If construction of the all-powerful mother did not begin with Freud, he certainly is
responsible for its modern public entrenchment. Freud asserts that we all have ambivalent
relationships with our mothers. Because they are the source of everything we want, fear,
and need, we both love and hate them. For the boy or girl child to develop into a
heterosexual adult — the goal, according to Freud -- an early identification with the mother
must be replaced by an allegiance to the father. In other worlds, although the mother is
all-powerful in the eyes of the child and necessary for “normal” psychosexual
development, without the father the mother’s power becomes too complete. The child
become psychotic if the mother-child bond is not broken by the entry of the father. Hence,
the father represents salvation for the children.
40Phyllis Chesler, Mothers on Trial: The Battlefor Children and Custody
,
(New York:
McGraw Hill, 1986).
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their children first as defined by these codes, or they risk
losing them. Or recent changes in some laws announce women
are equal to men, then make them compete on economic terms
their children. This is a competition women can almost
never win because in general women earn less even for the
same work, and often give up education and career
opportunities to have their children. Yet mothers often are
forced to either meet the requirement of equality or risk
losing their children.
In the case of new reproductive technologies, readily
available for those with enough cash or medical insurance,
some women are forced into "choosing" these procedures
rather than adopt or go childless, or deliver a baby with
chromosomal abnormalities. Here the medical profession
applies its "power" to the mother-wannabes' "powerlessness"
to produce a (socially acceptable) baby. But questions
remain as to whether this gives women more or less power
over their bodies and their lives. Either women produce
babies free of defects, or fail as women. Even radical
feminist analysis offers only an either/or scenario for the
new reproductive technologies: either reject them entirely
or collaborate in your own domination
.
42
41 Chesler, Mothers on Trial, Zillah Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988); Carol Smart and Selma Sevenhuijen, Child Custody
and the Politics ofGender
,
(New York: Routledge, 1989).
42 Sawicki
,
Disciplining Foucault, p 14.
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In the cases of discrimination in employment, mothers
have been judged powerless to protect their fetuses from
environmental hazards, for example, prompting moves to
"protect" mothers out of jobs that threaten their
reproductive capacities.« As in the other cases, women
either make the sacrifice of trying to prove they are
"powerful" or risk being declared powerless.
The either/or choices have resulted in an ambivalence
about motherhood which, as Ann Ferguson points out, has left
feminists, like contemporary American mothers, wondering
whether motherhood is good or bad for women
.
44 Historically,
the ambivalence about motherhood is illustrated in the two
distinct ways in which feminist theories recently have
viewed mothers. The first, as Adrienne Rich observed,
constituted a recoiling from female biology. In this view
(for example, de Beauvoir, Firestone), mothers are seen as
reduced to the maternal function in a male-dominated
society, thus motherhood is seen only as a source of women's
oppression. Here, difference and femininity are negative.
One goal was to eliminate gender difference in order to make
everyone universal subjects. Here mothers were seen for the
most part as powerless. Some radical feminists, like
Firestone, called for "artificial" births, relieving women
of the responsibility of reproduction. Although this call
43 See, for example. International Union, UAWv. Johnson Controls
,
49 US 187 (1991).
44Ann Ferguson, Blood at the Root: Motherhood, Sexuality andMale Dominance,
(London. Pandora, 1989), p. 169.
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may have appeared absurd to some thirty years ago, it is
much closer to reality today because of advances in
reproductive technologies. But rather than representing a
radical alternative controlled by women, as "artificial"
births were envisioned in the 1960s, today's new
reproductive technologies remain in the hands of the medical
establishment where they are, for the most part, controlled
by men and administered to women whose feelings and concerns
are individualized and marginalized. Some of the
technologies
, such as surrogacy, have called into question
the definition of mother, a woman whose contribution to the
child may be one or more of egg, womb, childrearer.
The reaction of Rich and others to the recoiling from
female reproductive biology led to a revaluing of difference
and femininity, privileging women's differences and making
femininity positive, in what Iris Young calls "gynocentric
feminism." 45 Thus the second view of feminist theories
toward motherhood the full embracing of female biology,
which later led to feminist mothering theories, such as
Nancy Chodorow's Reproduction of Mothering and Sara
Ruddick's Maternal Thinking, in which maternal difference is
privileged. "Gynocentric feminism" found strength in the
idea that all women shared a gender identity. This move
often treated the maternal as the ultimate paradigm for
45
Iris Young, “Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist Politics” in Hypatia (3, 1985).
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transforming social relations.
all~powerful
.
In this view, mothers are
The appeal of the idea that women and mothers are
all-powerful has led many feminist theorists (for example,
Chodorow in The Reproduction of Mothering) to exhort women
to teach men how to parent like women by tapping their
repressed relational and nurturing feelings, or (like Susan
Moller Okin in Justice, Gender, and the Family to change
how they teach children so that the children can be
"gender- just" or "genderless." Chodorow and other
psychoanalytic feminist theorists have had a strong
influence on feminist theories since the 1970s. But although
Chodorow and Okin, a feminist legal theorist, are among
theorists viewed as respecting mothers, they also burden
mothers. In both, the responsibility for improvement is
thrust on women, both in identifying the problem and
solution and in seeing that the improvements are carried
out. Dorothy Dinnerstein goes so far as to conclude that
mother-dominated infancy has a disastrous impact on sons,
daughters and society as a whole. 48 This ends up blaming the
mother, then burdening mothers with making the changes to
solve the problem.
46Chodorow, The Reproduction ofMothering, (Berkeley: University of California Press
1978).
47Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family
,
(New York: Basic Books, 1989).
8Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaidand the Minotaur, (New York Harper and Row
1976).
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The blaming and burdening in these theories continues
the placing of responsibilities on mothers, and provides
another example of categorizing and defining mothers and
their possibilities according to their reproductive
function. This influences how mothers experience their
bodies and their lives, and what practices they engage in as
they struggle to fulfill yet another ideal.
Other examples in which mothers are seen as especially
powerful come from Rich, Carol Gilligan, and Sara Ruddick
.
49
Rich idealizes mothers in her vision of the potential power
of women’s maternal bodies which she believes enable women
to transform society as they nurture themselves and each
other. Ruddick argues that although assimilating men into
childcare is good, it should not be the primary social goal
of mothers
. Instead, she wants to bring what she calls
maternal thinking" into the public realm as the basis for a
new public ethic. Ruddick concludes we can construe mothers
as thinking if we construe mothering as work or practice —
rather than identity or fixed biological or legal
relationship -- and reason as arising out of that practice.
Gilligan makes a correlation between gender and the
different ways in which men and women think about moral
dilemmas. She and Ruddick conclude that women are more
49Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution, (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1976); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory
and Women’s Development, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), Sara Ruddick,
Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics ofPeace, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989).
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nurturing and caring than men, suggesting that women are
m°re MkelY t0 be Pacifis ts, and through that can transform
society. Ruddick claims the conventional and symbolic
association between women and peace has its basis in
maternal practice, and it is out of maternal practices that
a distinctive kind of thinking arises that is incompatible
with military strategy but compatible with nonviolence
.
50
It should be noted that "gynocentric feminism" prompted
critiques by women of color, lesbians and others who
rejected its tendency to a white, middle class, heterosexual
point of view grounded in essentialism. Now we are more
likely to hear about the plurals "identities" and
differences," the vocabulary of anti-essentialists
. Yet
these writers, some of whom renew attention to the body,
virtually ignore motherhood.
Both the recoiling response of "humanist feminism" and
the embracing response of "gynocentric feminism"
essentialize women, and the embracing response idealizes
mothers. Many contemporary mothers do not see themselves as
fitting squarely in either model; no wonder they are
ambivalent. Ann Dally shed some light on that ambivalence
when, more than a decade ago, she warned of a crisis in
motherhood because the idealization of the mother had
50Ruddick, Maternal Thinking” in Joyce Trebilcot ed., Mothering: Essays in Feminist
Theory
,
(Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allenheld, 1983), p. 233. But as Ann Ferguson has
pointed out, mothers have shown they are capable of violence against their children or in
defense of their children (Ferguson, Blood
, p, 171).
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reached what she termed unprecedented proportions, while the
idealization of women and wives had not kept up. 5 ' Dally
defines idealization as a means of tolerating an intolerable
situation without having to face up to it or recognize it
for what it is
.
52 This prevents understanding and insight,
she insists. At the same time that the importance of mothers
is emphasized, according to Dally, "little is being done to
help them and they are used shamelessly by governments,
local authorities, schools and male chauvinists as public
and private conveniences and cheap sources of labor ." 53 Many
of Daily's observations remain for the most part accurate.
The crisis of which she warned has not been resolved.
Mothers continue to be disciplined by governments, schools.
and men; they continue to be "looked at through a particular
mode of knowledge" which, though it varies historically as
described in Chapter Three, is consistent in its containment
of mothers in certain behaviors and practices.
The Maternal Body and Subjectivity
While not all women are mothers, it is crucial that
mothers -- because of their very real and unavoidable ties
to their bodies be included in an effort to represent
women as more than "mere bodies." Yet despite the increasing
^
* Ann Dally, Inventing Motherhood: The Consequences ofan Ideal
,
(New York:
Schocken Books, 1982), p. 17.
^ 2
Dally, Inventing Motherhood, p. 21.
33 Dally, Inventing Motherhood, p 18
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attention to the body in feminist literature, and to the
ways in which women's bodies have functioned in
e-<riominated society, few i f am? +-kY/ r ny of these accounts attempt
to deal with the pregnant body, the first stage of
motherhood. Few attempt to deal with the body of the mother,
subject as it is to the demands of children and others as
they, in the words of Rich, live in the rhythms of other
lives
.
54
But the maternal body is important for an examination
of the social status of mothers because of its location as
an object and a site of power, and because of its link with
subjectivity. "When speaking of subjectivity," according to
Rosi Braidotti, "one must begin with the idea of
embodiment ." 55 From Rich, who emphasized the embodied nature
of the subject, to l'ecriture feminine, the body has been
central to radical feminist philosophies of the subject. "In
a new form of 'corporeal materialism,' the body is seen as
an interface, a threshold, a field of intersection of
material and symbolic forces; it is a surface where multiple
3
Iris Young’s Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social
Theory
,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), and Sara Ruddick’s “Thinking
Mothers/Conceiving Birth” (in Bassin et al eds.. Representations ofMotherhood) are
exceptions to this in their very different approaches to attention to the maternal body. The
most notable example of not accounting for pregnant or maternal bodies can be found in
Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion ofIdeality, (New York.
Routledge, 1990), and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”, (New
York: Routledge, 1993).
55Rosi Braidotti, Patterns ofDissonance: A Study of Women in Contemporary
Philosophy, (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 218.
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codes of power and knowledge are inscribed. " 5<> Thus,
according to Braidotti, strategies of repossessing the body
often aim at elaborating alternative forms of knowledge and
representation of the subject. It is through the embodied
nature of subjectivity that the radical subversion of the
cultural scripts may be attempted.
In fact, perhaps the most crucial way in which the
maternal body is important is in its link to the process by
which subjects are constituted. Foucault found "bodies" and
what he called "mentalities" so closely linked that he
refused to make a distinction between them
.
37 In the first
volume of The History of Sexuality, his purpose was to show
how deployments of power are directly connected to the body.
[F]ar from the body having to be effaced, what is
needed is to make it visible through an analysis in
which the biological and the historical are not
consecutive to one another, as in the evolutionism
of the first sociologists, but are bound together in
an increasingly complex fashion in accordance with
the development of the modern technologies of power
that take life as their objective. Hence I do not
envision a "history of mentalities" that would take
account of bodies only through the manner in which
they have been perceived and given meaning and
but a history of bodies" and the manner in
which what is most material and most vital in them
has been invested .-58
56
Braidotti, Patterns
,
p. 218.
57Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 7, (New York: Random House, 1978) p
151-2.
58Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. 7, p. 152.
36
This suggests that analysis of the maternal body must
go hand-in-hand with an exploration of the construction of
subjectivities of motherhood.
It is through sex - in fact, an imaginary pointdetermined by the deployment of sexuality - that
each individual has to pass in order to have access
^
lntelll(3ibil ity (seeing that it is boththe hidden aspect and the generative principle of
meaning), to the whole of his body (since it is a
real and threatened part of it, while symbolically
constituting the whole), to his identity (since itjoins the force of a drive to the singularity of ahistory). Through a reversal that doubtless had its
surreptitious beginnings long ago ... we have
arrived at the point where we expect our
intelligibility to come from what was for many
centuries thought of as madness; the plenitude of
our body from what was long considered its stigma
and likened to a wound; our identity from what was
perceived as an obscure and nameless urge. 59
When mothers act on and experience their bodies, they
internalize cultural standards of motherhood. These
standards get incorporated into the structure of their
selves, into their modes of perception and self-perception,
which structures not just their bodies but their lives and
their subjectivities.^ It is difficult to do something
other than try to meet the cultural standards because for
many mothers, their sense of self, as a mother and as a
subject, is inextricably linked with these standards. And
59Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. /, p. 155-6
60Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity,” p. 76, 77.
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attempting to meet the standards, again, can both empower
and subjugate mothers.
My exploration of the construction of maternal
subjectivities uses Foucault's later work on
governmentality, which focuses on power and subjectivity, to
conceive of motherhood as a series of practices through
which individuals are governed and come to govern
themselves. I use the concept of motherhood as a series of
practices rather than the term mothering as Sara Ruddick,
motherwork as Patricia Hill Collins, or mothercraft as Elsa
First, in order to insist that the lives of mothers
encompass or can encompass more than childrearing, more than
the mother role or relationships that result from their
reproductive bodies. «' This distinction is especially
important because mothering sometimes is conceived as work
that can be done by men or women. It seems counterproductive
to use mothering as a gender-neutral term, as Ruddick and
others do, in a work aimed at developing a theory of
maternal subjectivity
.
62 Gender-neutral notions of mothering
appear to open up possibilities for men while offering no
clear gains to women. It is for the most part women who, as
mothers, give their bodies, time, and energy to children. In
addition, the concept of motherhood as a series of
6
‘Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, Patricia Hill Collins, “Black Women and
Motherhood” in Jaggar ed., Living With Contradictions, Elsa First, “Mothering, Hate, and
Winnicott” in Bassin et al eds.. Representations ofMotherhood.
62 See the essays in Bassin et al eds.. Representations ofMotherhood.
38
practices, while it may exclude men, has the potential to be
more inclusive for women in two ways. It includes the new
categories of mothers that result in part from new
reproductive technologies: genetic mothers, gestational or
birth mothers, and adoptive or social mothers. And it has
the potential to take into account variations among
different cultures and subcultures, races, classes, ages,
and so forth, as well as differences over time. It allows
the adoption of an historical attitude toward the practices
and their values in a specific time and place, which has the
potential to highlight rather than obscure differences among
mothers
.
Motherhood used in this sense — as a series of
practices that govern their bodies, gestures and behaviors,
producing new objects and subjects of knowledge, and
inciting and channeling desires -- involves a series of
intersubjective relationships, relationships with others,
each of which has been institutionalized, as well as an
intrasubjective relationship, a relationship with the self.
All of these contribute to the way that mothers are
constituted as subjects. The institutionalized relationships
are relationships of varying degrees of power or
powerlessness that include those with their children, the
fathers of their children, extended family members, other
women and men, other mothers, lovers, friends, co-workers,
and so on. Although these institutionalized relationships
often support each other, they also act in separate ways or
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as a series of separate
thinking of motherhood
forces on mothers. Because of this,
as a series of practices can help
separate these relationships rather than lump them under one
category that emphasizes the mother function or the
reproductive body. This separation can help us see more
clearly how each works on — sometimes for, sometimes
against -- the mtrasubjective process of mothers as they
constitute themselves as subjects.
The maternal body is the epitome of heterosexual
hegemony in constructing feminine identity. As such,
constraints on the maternal body and on the production of
maternal subjectivity are two means of regulation or social
control. Making clear the links between the maternal body
and maternal subjectivity allows for a richer understanding
of how some mothers can construct a sense of self that
resists being relegated to the status of mere heterosexual
reproductive bodies, and how they might contribute to a
rearticulation of the cultural representations of
motherhood.
Chapter Two examines the effects of power on maternal
bodies and subjectivities. This chapter problematizes the
dualism that often defines bodies and differences. It traces
the ways in which the nonpregnant/maternal body is important
for an examination of the social status of mothers, because
of its location as an object and a site of power and because
of its link with subjectivity. Again, it is through the
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embodied nature of subjectivity that the subversion of
cultural scripts is possible.
Feminists have maintained a clear challenge to the
"institution of motherhood" and to its supporting cast of
institutions in order to debunk the myth of the dominant
image of mother that is meant to keep women in their
place.« But only recently has attention explicitly been
refocused on mothers as subjects. 6-* Chapter Three makes
concrete the links explored in Chapter Two. That is, it
traces the links between the dominant cultural conceptions
of maternal bodies - with whose powerful definitions white,
middle-class women most identify and therefore to which they
are most vulnerable and least resistant — and the rules and
regulations that make pregnant and nonpregnant/maternal
bodies socially adapted and useful. These rules and
regulations can be found in prescriptive texts, produced by
"experts" who attempt to impose cultural scripts on mothers
by shaping the material practices of mothers, by shaping the
series of practices through which mothers are governed and
come to govern themselves. These practices shape mothers'
experiences of their bodies, their subjectivities, and their
possibilities
.
’For example, Juliet Mitchell, Woman's Estate, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971),
Rich, Of Woman Born
; Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good, Dally, Inventing
Motherhood, Denise Riley, War in the Nursery: Theories of the Child andMother,
(London: Virago, 1983); Ruddick, Maternal Thinking.
64For example, Bassin et al eds, Representations ofMotherhood.
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While Chapter Three examines mainstream prescriptive
texts. Chapter Four explores alternative texts and
discourses such as those among feminist mothers, Afrlcan
American mothers, and lesbian mothers who, through necessity
or sheer will, refuse to conform to the dominant images of
motherhood. This chapter attempts to identify which parts of
the dominant cultural script are most ripe for interruption,
and how that might take place. Using the detailed
understanding of scripted practices of motherhood discussed
in the previous two chapters, the final chapter considers
how we might reinvent the positions of mothers from unequal
and inferior, from objects of experts prescriptions, to
subjects whose identities encompass more than their
motherhood. Because subjectivities are symbolic and social
positions, changing or reinventing these positions requires
both symbolic and social transformations — changes that
establish new representations of mothers in the symbolic
order that take into account the material variety of
embodiment among mothers, as well as new relationships
between mothers and others.
Foucault's concept of the subject and power helps make
a link in chapter Two between practices and the social
construction of certain kinds of subjects, and helps show
why, beyond violence or the coercion of force or economics,
some women may make the "choices" they do — such as to
become mothers even when it works against them by reducing
them to mere reproductive bodies, by making them unegual and
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inferior. But Foucault neglects both the gendered nature of
the disciplinary mechanisms, and the nature and sources of
power beyond its implication in discourses. I therefore turn
in the final chapter to Luce Irigaray to move to the larger
social picture and a wider vision of maternal
subjectivities. Irigaray identifies a key to power as the
power to name, to create the symbolic representations of
women that reduce them to their maternal functions. Because
she believes power has been in the hands of men who have
constructed the female body in negative terms, as defective
men, Irigaray focuses her attention on the oppression of
women as a collective problem with a collective solution,
and on how women may control the discourses of biology for
their own strategic ends. Her work offers a guide to improve
the position of mothers in the free-floating power effects
theorized by Foucault.
The goal of this dissertation is not to ground theory
m bodily specificity, nor to privilege maternity over other
differences or effects of power, nor to claim that the power
relations of all mothers are the same. But if we are to move
to the real lives and experiences of mothers from the
abstract individual mother or topic of motherhood, we cannot
ignore bodily specificity. One way to take it into account
so that it helps us understand and even change the symbolic
representations of mothers, is to use it to distinguish the
three female body concepts -- their specific attributes and
needs — in order to articulate the variety of mother's
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experiences and practices. The task is to rethink maternal
subjectivities so that mothers may answer for themselves the
questions of when, where, and how to live, and set the
conditions that determine whether they are able to act.
CHAPTER II
TO BODY TO MIND: THE EFFECTS OF POWER
When mothers face either the stigma of trying to
compete with others who have no mothering responsibilities,
or live out the designation of "special condition" in need
of "protection," they move further away from, rather than
toward, the development of a self or an identity that goes
beyond motherhood. Whether they embrace their position or
struggle against it, their efforts take up most of their
time and energy, and so seem to confirm that motherhood is
their identity. One of the goals of this dissertation is to
consider how mothers can develop a sense of self, constitute
themselves as subjects, construct their identities as women,
with motherhood being just one aspect of that selfhood. This
is a difficult task in a culture that views women's bodies,
because of their specific reproductive organs, as having a
single purpose or function — that of procreation — and
then assigns women an identity based on that function. It is
these links between body, identity, and subjectivity that
are explored here. Whether motherhood is portrayed as
negative because it limits what women can do, or in a more
positive light because it gives women special insights not
available to men, it is still imbued with the assumption
that the female body impedes women's access to subjectivity,
hinders their success in the public world and their ability
45
to achieve a status equivalent to that of men
. As long as
women's images and experiences of their bodies are so
controlled and constrained, their identities, and their
possibilities and status as subjects, will be restricted.
Identity is defined here as embodied and sexed. It is
an effect of one's specific social and historical context.
Identity is constituted through both the regulation and
control of discursive practices, and the social
relationships and practices in which one is engaged. As we
will see in this chapter and Chapter Three, discursive
practices both constrain and enable the formation of
identity. Identity also describes the process whereby
individuals are categorized along multiple and changing
orientations of such axes as sex, race, class, age, and
sexual preference -- some of which conflict over loyalties,
interests, and desires. The representations of these
categories in powerful cultural images often are
internalized, or incorporated into the structure of the
self. For mothers, this means that the cultural images of
mothers as nurturing and self-sacrificing may be
internalized, producing loyalties, interests and desires
that may conflict with other loyalties, interests and
desires produced by other images with which they identify.
Efforts to deal with these images and the conflicts they
create become part of the process through which mothers
constitute and position themselves as subjects. Mothers may
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be empowered, for example when they acquire skills
competencies which enhance them in their practices
and
of
motherhood; but at the same time they may be limited and
disciplined, for example when they confine their efforts to
the "expert" advice of the moment or when their failures
produce anxiety or guilt.
The discourses of the natural sciences traditionally
have viewed the body as stable, passive and immune to
cultural, social, and historical factors. But some
contemporary theories, such as those of Michel Foucault and
Luce Irigaray, have shown that bodies, like subjectivities,
are malleable, unstable, and never fixed or completed.
Moreover, we need only look at the three female body
concepts discussed in Chapter One to see that women's bodies
change shape during and after pregnancy, thus defying the
notion of a fixed adult bodily form. Although relying simply
on the gaze may make it appear that the pregnant body
returns to its original form after childbirth, in fact major
changes take place again (as well as many smaller changes)
which are not necessarily visible to the eye. Women's bodies
do not go back" to the way they were before pregnancy and
childbirth, nor do their ways of being, their behaviors and
practices, their ways of thinking about themselves and their
possibilities, the ways others view them and treat them and
what they expect of them, return to what they were. There is
no distinct separation of mind and body here, but rather a
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reciprocal influence and shaping. For both Foucault and
Ingaray, the body is the situated structure of
subjectivity. Within their notions of embodied subjectivity,
mind and body are inextricably linked.
The focus of this chapter is on the ways in which
discourses and representations tend to shape mothers'
bodies, identities, and subjectivities, as well as their
practices, their ways of being. The point here is to
highlight and undermine — rather than repeat — the
normalizing and discriminatory effects of the discourses of
motherhood. These discourses take as their starting point
the categorization of women not only as the "other" to men,
but also as potential, actual, or failed mothers. The
process through which mothers internalize discourses that
dictate expectations and define possibilities for mothers
calls for certain physical and mental disciplines through
what Foucault calls techniques of a "micro-physics of
power," often minute but important in their effects
.
1 This
is because, for Foucault, power is not only repressive but
productive, made up of a network of discourses that generate
knowledge and subjectivity, making both the body and mind
products of power. In his view, social subjects are produced
by power.
'Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
,
(New York: Vintage
Books, 1979), p. 139.
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Both Foucault and Irigaray help put the focus on
discourses and representations, help reveal the effects of
power in discourses. Both help to show that culture -
through power - constructs the female body as mother and
constructs the maternal subject. But they offer very
different treatments of sexual difference, how sexual
difference is produced and maintained within patriarchal
social relations. They look in different directions for new
models of subjectivity, and so find very different models.
And they take opposing positions on the question of whether
change is possible, where that change might take place, and
what provides the source of the freedom to choose.
Through his elaboration of the construction of
subjectivity, Foucault's work can be used to help depict the
powers involved in constructing and maintaining maternal
identity as one of inequality and inferiority. But his
project has limits here because of his positions on the
issues of sexual difference and freedom to choose. It is at
this point, and on these issues, that I turn to Irigaray.
Her work enables us to transform his analysis into one that
can be used to elaborate the third female body concept, the
nonpregnant maternal body, and its links with
subjectivities. Read as the first step in recognizing not
just sexual difference but also differences among women,
Irigaray' s work provides a basis, in Chapter Five, for the
effort to construct a new vision of how we might deal with
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different modes of embodiment and embodied subjectivities
without excluding women from the public world of social
exchange
.
Representation
, Self-Creatron, and Resistance
he body is a central concept in the work of Michel
Foucault. His theory of the body stems from his
understanding of history as a process in which forces act on
and through the human body in ways that shape it. That is,
the body is "imprinted" by history, making it historically
and culturally specific. He makes it clear in "Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History" that the proper focus of history is to
examine the power relations inscribed on the body, the
specific and concrete effects of power on the body. 2 It is
this process of imprinting — as seen through Foucault's
notions of power, practices, and technologies — that can be
seen in mothers as they go about their daily lives.
When Foucault says that power generally is productive
rather than repressive, he means that the sovereignty of the
state, the form of law, and domination, are only the
terminal forms" power takes. As he explains in The History
of Sexuality Vol. One,
It seems to me that power must be understood in
the first instance as the multiplicity of force
“Paul Rabinow, ed., Foucault Reader
,
(New York: Pantheon, 1984)
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That is, for Foucault, power also produces effects at
the levels of knowledge and desire
.
4 Desire here is not a
sexual desire indicating a lack, as in the psychoanalytic
view, but a positive force of production. For Foucault,
desire is a force that links objects. He links desire
directly to power and resistance. This is in contrast to the
Lacanian view, for example, in which desire is an unfillable
absence within the subject, who then seeks an object to fill
the lack
.
5 Despite her psychoanalytic training, we will see
later in this chapter that Irigaray also links desire with
power and resistance.
In foucault's view, the social field is a network of
intersecting discourses and practices in which power
3Michel Foucault, The History ofSexuality, Vol. 1
,
(New York: Random House 1978) n
92-3.
’
4Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977
,(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 59.
5For an explanation of the two very different intellectual traditions of desire, see the
glossary in Elizabeth Grosz’s Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists
,
(St. Leonards,
Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1989).
51
relates are not equal or stable but ratber non-egalitarian
Shlftln9
'
"POWer iS every»here; not because it embraces
everything, but because it comes from everywhere."
6
ndividue 1 s and crrouDs -n^+-a g oup do not possess power; instead, they
occupy various and shifting positions of power and
resistance in the network of power relations. In "The
Subject and the Power," he defines power as "actions on
others' actions Thus power, local and unstable, confronts
other power, resulting in "redistributions, realignments,
homogenizations, serial arrangements, and convergences of
the force relations," according to Foucault. "Major
dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by
all these confrontations . "« Further, because power relations
have this "strictly relational" character, where there is
power there is resistance.
9
Power relationships depend on
resistance, points of which are present everywhere in the
power networks, distributed in the same kind of "irregular
fashion" as power itself.
^
For Foucault, practices are ways of doing things. He
focuses on practices because he finds more meaning in
changes m practices than in changes in structures such as
reform of penal institutions. In "Questions of Method" he
6
Foucault, Power Knowledge, p. 93.
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics, (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1983).
Foucault, The History ofSexuality, Vol. 1
,
p. 94.
9
Foucault, The History ofSexuality, Vol.J, p. 95.
10
Foucault, The History ofSexuality, Vol l, p. 96.
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explains why he targets practices, and insists that
practices have a life and power of their own.
rn;«
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. It is a question ofanalyzing a 'regime of practices'
- practicesbeing understood here as places where what is saidand what is done
, rules imposed and reasons given
,
e p anned and the taken for granted meet andinterconnect
.
1
1
Foucault conceives of bodies as including capacities,
gestures, movements, and disciplinary practices found in
everyday habits and activities of individuals. He suggests
that claiming a history of the body means examining the ways
m which practices of a body and the discourses surrounding
it vary historically and create its capacities, desires, and
material form. As we will see from Foucault's studies of
prisons, madness and sexuality, and Chapter Three will show
in detail for mothers, practices are involved in creating
environments and behaviors. Environments and behaviors --
traditionally different for women and men, among women, and
1
1
Foucault, “Questions of Method,” in Burchell et al ed., The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmental!ty, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 75. [My emphasis]
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among mothers — contri hnfo j-_ j_iibute to the construction of certain
sorts of bodies with particular kinds of power and
capacities. Foucault says the result is particular kinds of
individuals who tend to be "ideologically appropriate," that
is, to live their lives according to the prevailing ideology
of the time. Thus to analyze practices for Foucault means to
examine both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be
done, and codifying effects regarding what is to be known. >2
For example, he explains that he wanted to write about the
practices of imprisonment rather than the history of the
prison as an institution, "to show how [a certain] way of
doing things
. . . was capable of being accepted at a certain
moment as a principal component of the penal system, thus
coming to seem an altogether natural, self-evident and
indispensable part of it." 13 This is "false self-evidence,"
according to Foucault, precarious, always unstable, and
interconnected "with a multiplicity of historical
processes .
"
In another example, Foucault insists in The History of
Sexuality Vol. One that as religious, legal, and scientific
discourses disseminate prohibitions and regulations for
sexual behaviors, such discourses produce effects at the
levels of knowledge and desire, which actually produce
sexual behaviors. In producing sexual behaviors these
I2Foucault, “Questions of Method,” p. 75.
^’Foucault, “Questions of Method,” p. 75.
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discourses also produce social relations T. I argue m Chapter
that the discourses that disseminate regulations and
prescriptions for the behaviors of
.others - whether under
the guise of care or the promotion of equality - actually
produce those behaviors, produce practices and social
relations, and produce the socio-historical status of
mothers
.
In Foucault's scheme it is technologies that link
culture and its movements to the smallest of daily practices
and events in our lives. In the text of his seminar,
"Technologies of the Self," Foucault distinguishes among the
four major types of technologies, each of which he says
implies the training and shaping of individuals in terms of
acquiring skills and attitudes.
(1 ) technologies of production, which permit us toproduce, transform, or manipulate things; (2)technologies of sign systems, which permit us to
use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification;
(3) technologies of power, which determine the
conduct of individuals and submit them to certain
ends or domination, an ob j ectivizing of the
subject; (4) technologies of the self, which
permit individuals to effect by their own means or
with the help of others a certain number of
operations on their own bodies and souls,
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to
transform themselves in order to attain a certain
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, orimmortality. 14
14Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self” in Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and
Patrick H. Hutton, eds., Technologies of the Self: A Seminar With Michel Foucault
,
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p. 18. [My emphasis]
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It is this understanding of technologies Foucault
employs when he posits sexuality as "the set of effects
produced in bodies, behaviors, and social relations by a
certain deployment deriving from a complex political
technology. "15 To focus on the technologies of
representation, power and self that are deployed in the
service of producing mothers requrres an examination of the
techniques and discursive strategies by which motherhood is
constructed that is, requires an examination of the
technologies of motherhood. I argue here, and will show in
more detail in Chapter Three, that like sexuality,
motherhood may be seen not as a function or role for women
but as a set of effects produced by technologies of power,
of representation, and of the self.
I can make such an argument in part because in
redefining power Foucault redefines subjectivity and links
it to bodily materialism. He makes clear the relationship
between thoughts and practices -- linked by the way the
technologies of power act on bodies. For example, in
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
, Foucault
addresses the submission of bodies through the control of
ideas -- that is, the body is seen here as the site of
self-formation. "A stupid despot may constrain his slaves
with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more
15Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. One
,
p. 127.
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strongly by the chain of their own ideas ." 16 m this
example, the art of punishing came to rest on a technology
of representation in which a "suitable punishment for a
crime is to find the disadvantage whose idea is such that it
robs for ever the idea of a crime of any attraction ." 17 Thus
technologies of representation control not only behavior,
but also the way behaviors are viewed by others. They are,
in Foucault's words, "an art of images linked by
association." 1 * That is, individuals' ideas, and even their
conceptions of their selves, can be shaped by images and
their associations.
Foucault shows in Power/Knowledge, which explores links
between language, action and thought, that language shapes
the people who use it. Discourses make the body an object of
knowledge and invest it with power, thereby constructing
social relations and constituting subjectivity. This
position is useful for my examination of the third body
concept because when Foucault traces the policing and
disciplining of bodies through discourse and the
representation of images, he includes the intervention of
"experts" on the body. As we will see, mothers as well as
prisoners, maternity as well as madness, motherhood as well
as sex, are policed and disciplined in similar ways.
16Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p 102-3
17Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p 104.
lxFoucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 104.
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Just as discourses on sexuality and madness came to
operate in terms of discourses of truth — that is,
discourses having the status and function of true discourses
so discourses on motherhood came to operate as "truths."
Discourses of motherhood are crucial to the regulation of
the details of mothers' daily lives and behaviors. Chapter
Three offers details and examples of this, but the point to
be made for now is that shifting definitions and discourses
of motherhood over time, including the narrow and rigid
dominant image we have in the United States today, do not
represent "truth" beyond the moment and are not the only
views of motherhood that are possible. As Chapter Four
shows, this is illustrated by feminist challenges to the
norm, and by the lives of black mothers and lesbian mothers
who do not conform to the hegemonic norms for practicing
motherhood.
According to Foucault, subjection can be achieved by
violence, ideology, or knowledge. In the case of mothers it
is knowledge that subjects: maternal bodies are subjugated
by turning them into objects of knowledge, and that
knowledge then redefines the bodies. Knowledge and power
thus are interdependent. Knowledge manifests itself as
'discourses of truth;" again, discourses having the status
and function of true discourses . 19 Through these discourses,
power aims to normalize bodies, desires and practices. The
19Foucault, Power Knowledge, p. 210.
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tendency of power in modern society is to homogenize, or
make everyone the same, according to Foucault. The power
involved in knowledge contributes to this tendency by
producing reality, domains of objects and rituals of truth
which reflect the culture and which provrde the rules and
models individuals are expected to follow. *> m this way,
bodies come to signify certain culturally specific ideas,
and subjectivity can be transformed as a result of changing
investments of power in the body.
In the first volume of The History of Sexuality
Foucault outlines a shift of power from dealing with
epidemics and famines that threatened widespread death in
the early eighteenth century, to dealing with living beings
at the level of life itself when those threats began to wane
later in the century. That is, taking charge of life gave
power even more access to the body than it had when its
purpose was to try to avert the threat of death
.
21 This
taking charge of life, or the subjugation of individual
bodies and the control of entire populations, he calls
bio-power. Bio-power entails regulating the details of daily
life and behavior. The era of bio-power, which led up to the
technology of power in the nineteenth century, was
indispensable to a form of capitalism that required "the
controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of
2()Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 194.
2 Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. 1, p. 143.
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production and the adjustment nf +-* ua o the phenomena of population
to economic processpq »22P es. One consequence of bio-power was
the increasing importance of "the action of the norm" over
the action of the juridical system of the law * Bio-power
relied on regulatory and corrective social mechanisms rather
than the sword of the law, and law itself operated more as a
social norm. The historical outcome of a technology of power
centered on life in a normalizing society, according to
Foucault. This makes the body an object of knowledge and an
element in the relations of power.
This is the background that enables us to understand
e importance assumed by sex as a political issueIt was at the pivot of the two axes along whichdeveloped the entire political technology of life.On the one hand it was tied to the disciplines ofthe body: harnessing, intensification, and
distribution of forces, the adjustment and economy
o energies. On the other hand, it was applied to
the regulation of populations, through all the
far-reaching effects of its activity. It fitted inboth categories at once, giving rise to
infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls,
extremely meticulous orderings of space,
indeterminate medical or psychological examinations,
to an entire micro-power concerned with the body.
But it gave rise as well to comprehensive measures,
statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at
the entire social body or at groups taken as a
whole. Sex was an access both to the life of the
body and the life of the species.... Spread out from
one pole to the other of this technology of sex was
a whole series of different tactics that combined in
22Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. /, p. 141.
2 3Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. 1
,
p. 144.
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varying proportions
the body and that of
the objective of disciplining
regulating populations
.
24
Discourses, knowledges, and representations of
motherhood can be seen as ways to influence both to the life
of the maternal body and the life of mothers as a group. The
aim of the influence is normalization: to discipline mothers
to take the material form of being nurturing and efficient,
and the subject form of being self-controlled and
self-sacrificing, thereby regulating mothers by containing
them in particular spheres of movement and preoccupied with
particular kinds of activities.
But while Foucault's early work appeared to present the
body as passive and available for manipulation, his later
work presents the body and subject as both acted on and
acting that is, with the potential to be self-made
products. In his essay, "The Subject and Power," Foucault
makes clear that one of the characteristics of power, in
contrast to physical force or violence, is that it is
addressed to individuals who are free to act in one way or
another
.
25 That is, individuals in his later theory model of
power do have capacity as agents. In his work on
technologies of the self, he places power and subjectivity
at the center of his analysis. In Foucault's terms, the
"techniques of self-production" make both the body and mind
24Foucault, The History ofSexuality, Vol. I, p. 145-6.
25 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault.
61
products of the power of fhp mur t e will. Thus acts of power do not
render us merely passive and compliant. That i S/ we can
adhere to certain practices, thus contributing to and
reinforcing their institutionalization, or we can resist by
creating or affirming our own way of being. We can be
mobilized in the interests of power or we can contest that
power, a point he elaborates in The History of Sexuality
Vol. Two where he describes the self-creation of
subjectivity, and Vol. Three where he describes how
individuals can ask who they would like to be and what kind
of relation they would like to have to their desires. This
suggest they can change both. In his lecture, "The Political
Technology of Individuals," Foucault explains one of the
ways we constitute ourselves when he describes his work as
an historical analysis of the relationships
between our thoughts and our practices in Western
society. Let's say very briefly that through
studying madness and psychiatry, crime and
punishment, I have tried to show how we have
indirectly constituted ourselves through the
exclusion of some others: criminals, mad people,
and so on . 26
This led him to study how we directly constitute our
identity through techniques of the self, identities that
make individuals useful to the state.
26Michel Foucault, “The Political Technology of Individuals,” in Martin et al eds.,
Technologies of the Self\ p. 146.
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Foucault's later work can be used to describe the ways
in which discourses and particular knowledges of motherhood
are inscribed on maternal bodies. These discourses and
knowledges are established as the representations of the
maternal bodies and maternal pleasures. They define
what mothers do, what mothers want, who mothers are. Yet
Foucault's notions of self-creation and resistance highlight
the fact that many mothers do interrupt these definitions.
Although Foucault never goes so far in his own work, we can
see that self-creation combined with the resistance he
describes can be useful to improving the subject position of
mothers. A Foucauldian analysis allows us to look at the
social control of motherhood as more than a matter of
control exerted from the top -- and, more importantly if the
goal is social transformation, it allows us to see that
there is resistance from below. Chapter Four shows the ways
in which the social control of motherhood constantly faces
resistance, such as from the feminist analysis and practices
of mothering.
According to Foucault, power is tolerable only when
masked or hidden: "its success is proportional to its
ability to hide its own mechanisms ." 27 That is, cultural
inscriptions can be either violent, as in prison or hospital
procedures, or hidden but still coercive, as in values,
norms, and social categories of the body. Because power is
27Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. 1
,
p. 86.
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hidden, individuals are not aiw^ucC l ays aware when power shapes
certain bodies, gestures, discourses, and desires - that
is, when power constitutes individuals, constitutes the
things that come to be identified and constituted as
individuals. For Foucault, power guides individuals, or
governs them. His concern is not with power at the level of
conscious intervention or decision, but at the point where
power is in direct and immediate relationship with its
object, where it installs itself and produces its real
effects -- that is, he is concerned with subjection as it
constitutes subjects. It is at this point, the point of
power s direct and immediate relationship with mothers,
where real effects such as internalized images of ideal
motherhood are installed.
One of the ways power operates on individuals is
through families, according to Foucault, and for nobody is
this more true than for mothers
.
28 Families do not initiate
this role as a conduit of power; they appear to impose what
they only reflect. But the family is not a simple reflection
of the power of the state, in which it acts as the
representative of the state in relation to mothers. Rather,
there are between mothers and other members of families,
specific relations of domination which have their own
For more on the effects of discourses of the family on mothers, see Marotta, “Family
Matters: Bashing and Burdening Mothers,” unpublished manuscript, presented to the
Northeastern Political Science Association 1993 Annual Meeting.
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configuration and relative autonomy from the state
.
29 The
family is a construct, both in its aspect as a social and
economic institution and in its aspect as an ideology, what
families reflect, then, are clear images of what mothers
should do and who they should be, fed and reinforced by
state, cultural, and scientific discourses. In the case of
mothers, this includes discourses disseminated by the
experts" to whom Adrienne Rich refers in Chapter One. What
Foucault adds to her understanding is to distinguish between
power as a set of institutions — the institution of
motherhood and its supporting cast of institutions — and
power as a multiplicity of relations of forces immanent in
the domain in which they are inscribed. Of concern here are
the powers involved in the constitution of the maternal
body, the third distinct female body concept. That is, just
as the family seemed to be the source of a sexuality which
m fact it only reflected and defracted, it is in the name
of the family that many mothers make the sacrifices they do.
Yet in doing so they serve more than the family; they also
serve the power of the state and the cultural patterns of
roles and behaviors for family members.
Social relations in the family are not the only link
between motherhood and Foucault’s exploration of sexuality.
He identifies the motivation behind the attention to female
sexuality as ensuring population growth, reproducing labor
29FoucauIt, Power Knowledge, p. 187-8
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capacity, and perpetuating the forum of social relations -
in short, to constitute a sexuality that is economically
useful and politically conservative . -30 These three goals
traditionally have been among the tasks of mothers. Thus the
power involved in the polirinrr of eP icing sex was very much a part
of the power of disciplining of mothers.
Foucault uses the case of the medicalization of
feminine sexuality as an example of the deployment of
sexuality, to illustrate one of the four great strategic
unities he claims form specific mechanisms of knowledge and
power centering on sex. The most visible form of this
hysterization" was the negative image of the mother as a
"nervous woman. "31 „omen thus became an object Qf knQwledge
in a strategy that made use of their sex. He described this
"hysterization" as
a three-fold process whereby the feminine body was
analyzed
- qualified and disqualified - as being
thoroughly saturated with sexuality; whereby it wasintegrated into the sphere of medical practices, by
reason of a pathology intrinsic to it; whereby,
finally, it was placed in organic communication with
the social body..., the family space..., and the
life of children 32
30
Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 36-7.
3
1
Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. 1, p. 104.
32Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. I
,
p. 104.
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Uses and Limits of Foucault
Foucault's work is especially useful to this project if
we place a focus on the way in which he poses social and
political questions, and most importantly if „e link his
work on the body to his work on technologies of the self.
For example, he asks "what mode of investment of the body is
necessary and adequate" for capitalistic society? His answer
makes clear that it depends on the specific time and place.
rom the eighteenth to the early twentieth century Ithink it was believed that the investment of the
ody by power had to be heavy, ponderous, meticulous
and constant. Hence those formidable disciplinary
regimes in the schools, hospitals, barracks,
factories, cities, lodgings, families. And then,
starting m the 1960s, it began to be realized that
such a cumbersome form of power was no longer as
indispensable as had been thought and that
industrial societies could content themselves with a
much looser form of power over the body. 33
Foucault believed his genealogical approach offered
something more than history when it looked at events
"outside of any monotonous finality" and when it searched
for events "in the most unpromising places ...[ such as]
sentiments, love, conscience, instincts;" genealogy defines
even those instances when [the events] are absent, the
moment when they remained unrealized." 34 His genealogical
3
3
Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 58.
34Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Paul Rabinow, ed.. The Foucault Reader
,
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 76.
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approach is a „ay of questioning the authority of
historically specific institutions and practices, and
provides a guide to help compose questions about motherhood
He insists that we ask what is at stake in the social and
political questions we ask. For example, when he poses
questions about the Gulag, he says that rather than
searching theoretical texts for condemnation of the Gulag,
we should ask what in those texts could have made the Gulag
possible, what continues to justify it, what makes its
intolerable truth still accepted today. We can ask similar
questions about the power exerted on maternal bodies, the
power that produces the practices of mothers: what makes
such practices as hospital births, isolated childrearing,
and double shifts accepted? What use are these practices to
society? What functions do they assure for the state? In
what strategies are they integrated ? 35
When Foucault deals with madness, rather than ask what
in a given period is regarded as sanity or insanity, mental
illness or normal behavior, he asked how these divisions
between the sane and insane are operated
.
36 Again, we can
ask not what is regarded as good or bad, fit or unfit,
mothering, but how these divisions come to be, how they
survive, how they manifest themselves. That is, rather than
ask what is wrong with motherhood today, or whether it is
35Foucault, Power Knowledge, p. 136.
36Foucault, “Questions of Method,” p. 74
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good or bad, we can focus on how motherhood is produced. We
Can
.
trY t0 determine to what problem motherhood as we know
it is a solution. Foucault's books about contemporary
practices that govern the lives of oppressed groups -
mental patients, prisoners, homosexuals — were aimed at
grasping the conditions that made them acceptable, and were
intended to serve as interventions in those practices. 37
Posing Foucauldian questions about motherhood allows us
to examine motherhood at the level of ongoing subjugation,
at what Foucault calls "the level of the continuous and
uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our
gestures, dictate our behaviors." 38 This means we are asking
how subjects are constituted as a result of the effects of
power. The search for the effects of power produced by
discursive practices leads Foucault to the point where
desires and possibilities for self-definition are formed. We
should be concerned, Foucault cautions, not "with power at
the level of conscious intention or decision," but with
"power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is
completely invested in its real and effective practices.
We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance
as a constitution of subjects." 39 The process involved
allows us to link in specific ways, as the next chapter will
show, the cultural conceptions of maternal bodies, and the
37Foucault, “Questions of Method,” p. 75, 83.
38
Foucault, Power/Knowledge
,
p. 97.
39Foucault, Power Knowledge, p. 97.
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rules and regulations that make maternal bodres socially
adapted and useful. It allows us to reveal the ways in whrch
these rules and regulations shape the material conditions of
mothers' lives, as well as their own descriptions of their
needs, possibilities, and experiences of motherhood.
In specific terms, Foucault's work exposes the effects
of normalizing power in the production of human subjects.
This normalizing power works on mothers when their lives are
encroached upon by a multitude of "experts. " When women
become mothers, the extent of the "expert" advice increases
dramatically. Mothers are subject to rules and regulations
for their pregnant bodies: what to eat, what not to eat,
drink, and smoke; how much exercise to get; how much weight
to gam; and how to think and feel about their impending
motherhood. The advice increases after the birth. Not only
is a mother-to-be counseled about the "best" birthing
methods for her body, but this is followed by more advice
about every facet of her body after the birth, and her
baby’s physical and emotional life
.
40
Foucault's work on governmentality offers a basis on
which we can see the power of this advice. When we view
motherhood as a series of practices through which
individuals are governed and come to govern themselves, we
For more on the “best” birthing methods, see Robbie E. Davis-Floyd, Birth as an
American Rite ofPassage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992 ), which outlines
how the messages conveyed by the rituals of hospital birth reflect and reinforce the core
values of our society.
70
can see more clearly how these practices are shaped by
"experts." The "experts" issue authoritative statements,
taken as truth, which mothers internalize as they go about
their daily lives. Foucault's historical analysis in his
work on governmental! ty addresses the relationship between
the thoughts and the practices of Western society. As stated
earlier, the term governmentality means the contact between
the technologies of domination of others and the
technologies of the self in which individuals may transform
themselves. To be a subject, then, is to exercise "freedom,"
but as Foucault makes clear, the process of becoming a
subject involves submission in the sense that the subject
complies with societal norms and standards. Mother/subjects
exercise a certain amount of "freedom, » but for many that
freedom exists only within the rigid conceptual constraints
of the ideology and institution of motherhood. For Foucault,
freedom is negative in that he views it as freedom from the
identities and values we inherit from our culture, or
freedom to challenge the assumptions and interpretations in
those identities and values. Freedom lies in "rebelling
against those ways in which we are already defined,
categorized, and classified ."41
Foucault s focus is on the disciplining of human
affairs by public and quasi-public agencies — what he calls
41 John Rajchman, “The Story of Foucault’s History,” Social Text, Vol. 8 (1984), p 15,
quoted in Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body, (New
York: Routledge, 199 V, P 27.
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the policing function — which paved the way for the
self-discipline through which we govern ourselves. He
explains that the term "policing" in French and German
originally meant "the specific techniques by which a
government in the framework of the state was able to govern
peoples as individuals significantly useful for the
world Foucault uses the term policing over the course of
his early work as a positive intervention in behavior, and
later introduces the concept of governmentality in which, in
part, individuals may be seen as policing themselves,
disciplining themselves as they constitute themselves as
subjects. Policing involves dealing with individuals,
especially in terms of appropriate or desired or useful
behavior, with the goal of fostering both the life of the
individual and the strength of the state
.
43 Through the
techniques of policing, individuals are integrated into the
social reality; through the techniques of governmentality
they are disciplined in this way but also discipline
themselves
.
The transition to self-discipline for Foucault is in
the policing of sexuality, because that depends more on
techniques of self-control than did the policing of madness
or criminality
.
44 All of the knowledge about the population,
^Foucault, The Political Technologies of Individuals,” p. 154.
43Foucault, “The Political Technologies of Individuals,” p. 156-9.
44Patrick Hutton, “Foucault, Freud, and the Technologies of the Self,” in Martin et al eds..
Technologies of the Self p. 121-44.
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about economic, familial and criminal behavror, provided the
means to make government of the population possible and
bound that government to the authority of expertise. In
Nikolas Rose’s terms, western liberalism inaugurated a new
relation between government and knowledge - both depending
on the existence of free individuals and seeking to shape
and regulate that freedom.
It [liberalism] thus becomes dependent upon devices(schooling, the domesticated family, the lunatic
asylum, the reformatory prison) that promise to
create individuals who do not need to be governed by
others, but will govern themselves, master
themselves, care for themselves. From this time
forth, liberal rationalities of government willdream that the national objective of the good
citizen will fuse with the personal objective for
the good life
.
45
The emphasis thus shifts from government through
society, to government through individuals. Mothers become
subjected when their goals match the goals set out to
fulfill the social good, when they mobilize themselves in
the interests of society. What appears to be a personal
choice made in freedom is in fact a matter of
self discipline to technologies of power. Discourse is
transformed into desire. And where there is desire — not
only sexual desire but, for example, the desire to have a
45Nikolas Rose, “Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism,”
Economy and Society, Vol. 22, No.3, August 1993, p. 291.
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child, the desire to be a "good mother" - the power
relation is already present.« Again, desire here lg nQt g
sexual desire indicating a lack, as in the psychoanalytic
view, but a positive force of production linked directly to
power and resistance .**7
Despite Foucault's revelations about the constitution
subjects, there are limits to the compatibility of his
project with the project of finding new models of
subjectivities for mothers. In fact, in an illustration of
an application of his ideas, we will look briefly at the
work of Judith Butler who, in her theory of gender
invention, taps Foucault’s notion of regulatory power. In
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Ideality,
Butler presents gender differences as constructed through
relations of power and normative constraints that produce
and regulate bodies
.
48 She concludes, following Foucault,
that we are culturally constructed and we also take part in
the construction of ourselves. But Butler's attempt to
reformulate gender as a cultural project ends up rejecting
specifically sexed bodies in much the way that Foucault
does. Like Foucault: she deals with only one body concept,
the sexual body; she deals with abstract rather than
46
Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. /, p .81.47Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists
,
(St. Leonards,
Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1989).
48Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion ofIdeality
,
(New York:
Routledge, 1990).
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individual bodies; and she poses an individual solution to a
collective problem.
Thus, despite her compelling analysis which she
'dentifies as an attempt to deal with the materiality of
bodies, despite her insistence that the body is crucial to
understanding women's psychic and social existence, and
despite her concern with the way the body is represented and
used in particular ways in particular cultures, Butler
ignores the very real materiality of the pregnant body and
the maternal body after childbirth. Although she states in
Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" that
her main concern is with "sex" and the workings of
"heterosexual hegemony" in the formation of what qualifies
as viable bodies, she misses the opportunity to zero in on
one of the key components of compulsive heterosexuality
.
49
Following her analysis of the category of "women," we
might be led to "get rid of the mother" as we know that
category. But before we could do that we would have to offer
some vision of what would be left or what would replace it.
It is possible to resist being defined and confined by
social representations of motherhood, and still claim a
stake in the relationships and practices of motherhood, a
stake in all three of the female body concepts discussed
49 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex, ” (New York:
Routledge, 1993).
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here and therr subjectivities, practiced in new and more
positive ways.
Beyond the problems revealed by looking at Butler's use
oucault, we find other limits to his compatibility with
a search for new models of subjectivities for mothers. These
generally fall into two main categories: his problematic
stance on sexual difference n-io ,l , and his weak position on what
he calls agency or freedom to change. Together these
represent a serious problem in Foucault's work from the
perspective of feminist theories.
Foucault goes back in time in search of a model of
subjectivity, finding classical male homosexuality, a form
of sexuality that ignores and negates sex and gender
specificity. Thus he joins a centuries-long habit of saying
"body" meaning "male body"; and he neutralizes or
desexualizes the body. That is, although he spends hundreds
of pages showing the effects of power on the body in his
volumes of The History of Sexuality, Foucault ignores one of
the most profound effects, that of sexual difference.
Although he takes great pains to show how embodied
individuals are constituted, normalized, and marginalized,
he ignores the quintessential example of these in women.
Although he claims to have dedicated his studies of power
relations in the making of norms involved in crime and
punishment, madness and psychiatry, "to show we have
indirectly constituted ourselves through the exclusion of
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some others, "50 he hlmself ignores ^^ ^^
excluding the female as "other" has supported and made
possible the system that makes the male the norm.
Although in The Use of Pleasure
, The History of
Sexuality Vol
. Two, Foucault acknowledges that men and women
have been treated drfferently, he still does not admit the
role that difference plays in making possible the status of
the male as universal
. What he finds "remarkable" in the
double standard of antiquity regarding sexual austerity, for
example, is not what the "dissymmetry" reflected but rather
that it existed at all. 51 Here he has what he needs to
examine the exclusion of sexual difference, to explore his
own questions about how the division is produced and made
acceptable, but he does not even ask the questions. Further,
m Discipline and Punish Foucault includes hierarchical
relations with others in his account of how the embodied
self is constituted by disciplinary power, which increases
the power of individuals at the same time as it renders them
more docile. 52 But his works that followed tended to ignore
the contribution of woman as other in the formation of man's
identity and value.
Foucault, then, neglects sexual difference in its
implications in unequal relations of power. Although he asks
M)Foucault, “Technologies of the Self” p. 145.
5
1
Foucault, The Use ofPleasure: History ofSexuality Vol 2, (London Penguin Viking
1985), p. 22-3.
5
52Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 183.
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the pointed question of where the authority of statelets,
taken as truths, are found, he ignores the relations between
-ale authority and discourses of female oppression. His work
does not address unequal relations nf ^4 o power, including those
within the family. Thu s his work can be said to present a
kind of gender neutrality that reinforces male domination,
nuing the lack of attention to sexual difference in
social and political theory. Foucault thus does
nothing directly to make discursive space available for
women
.
To the question of whether change is possible, Foucault
clearly answers yes. In "Questions of Method" Foucault says
that the real, the reality of daily life, ls transformed
through the subject who acts* He suggests this
transformation occurs within the individual.
Perhaps the reason why my work irritates people isp eciseiy the fact that I'm not interested inconstructing a new schema, or in invalidating oneat alraady exists.
... My general theme isn'tsociety but the discourses of the true and false,
are linked!*
effects ln the real to which they
When he suggests we can recreate ourselves by working
on our bodies, transforming our habits, and expanding our
capacities, he suggests there is a space for the freedom to
change. But he has made it clear that this space is not in a
^ 3
Foucault, “Questions ofMethod,” p. 84.
-^Foucault, “Questions of Method,” p. 85.
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new schema. Because he does not articulate how change is
accomplished within social structures where we face the
effects of disciplinary powers, the implication is made that
change must be accomplished outside those effects, in
isolation from others and from social norms.
Thus he implies both that nothing and no one is outside
the reaches of discursive power, and that we might change.
In the first volume of The History of Sexuality he says that
resistance may be located in bodies and pleasures, as though
these exist outside the discursive order. 55 This answer does
not help women or mothers, already excluded from the
discursive order, to improve their positions in the world.
It ignores that the self is formed in relation with others
and through experiences such as motherhood. It focuses on
the adult individual rather than pointing to collective
solutions to collective problems.
Everybody both acts and thinks, Foucault told an
interviewer in 1982; the way people act or react is linked
to a way of thinking, and thinking is linked to tradition. 56
Even though we cannot control the direction of the future,
he insists that we can transform our relationship with
tradition and with the past in ways that will lead to
change. That is, we can think differently about what has
5 5Foucault, The History ofSexuality Vol. /, p. 157.
56See “I ruth. Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault” by Rux Martin, in
Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault
,
eds. Luther FI Martin et al,
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).
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happened and therefore what is happenrng and what tight
happen. This is part of what takes place when Foucault makes
the familiar strange, shows it rn a new light, reveals
another way of seeing it, so that a distance is created that
fosters critique. One problem with this is that he makes
critique the center of his analysis at the expense of
vision, or at least to the neglect of revealing his vision.
He claims we are free to question, challenge, and
reinterpret our inherited identities and values. He suggests
this leads to the possibility of knowing one's desires,
which can lead to resistance to disciplinary powers, and to
social transformation. But the idea that individuals have a
will to know their desires is one of the least developed in
Foucault's project. He does not pursue the question of what
such a will to know would look like. To feminist critics who
find m Foucault a wholesale rejection of agency, Jana
Sawicki points out that his focus on the ways in which the
subject is constituted and on the broad social and political
forces that determine agency does not deny agency, even if
it points to the limits to agency
.
57 More attention to how
we might know our desires — especially the ways in which
they are produced through internalized images — as well as
how we might act on them, would provide a transition to
further the search for new models of subjectivities for
mothers
.
57Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault, p. 103.
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Thus my project must part ways with Foucault over his
problematic stance on sexual difference and his weak
position on agency, but it need not reject him entirely.
First, as Teresa de Lauretis argues, Foucault's theory
"excludes, though it does not preclude, the consideration of
gender .
"
58 If we take Foucault's depictions of the effects
of power on the body, take his elaboration of the process in
which historically and culturally specific inscriptions
constitute particular kinds of bodies and subjects, and look
at it through a theory of sexual difference — then we can
account for the effects of power not only on the sexual body
and the male body, but also on the pregnant body and the
maternal body after childbirth, so that these bodily
differences no longer have to be managed and concealed,
pretended not to exist, or held up as special conditions in
need of protection. Reading Foucault's notion of
disciplinary power through a theory of differences results
m a clearer and more precise view of the practices that are
determined by social context, and of the technologies that
link culture and its movements to the smallest of daily
practices and events in our lives. This allows us to go
beyond Foucault, to a richer understanding of
representation, self-creation, and resistance -- of the way
^Teresa de Lauretis, technologies ofGender: Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction,
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 3.
the three body concepts are socially constituted and
positioned.
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Such a theory of differences, including sexual
difference, with the goal of improving the status of
mothers, requires the rejection of oppositions or
phal logocentric identity logic that conflate the male with
the universal and depict the female as inferior. Instead,
such a theory of sexual difference would take into account
differences within and beyond the differences between women
and men, to their specific embodied subjectivities. This
would demand attention to the three body concepts precisely
because such bodily differences mean different experiences
and different needs, which would have to be met in order to
give each an equivalent status. This involves articulating
an understanding of the powers that construct the
reproductive body, the powers that reduce maternal bodies to
merely reproductive bodies and thus offer to women only the
identity of mother. That is, this demands an examination of
how the identities of mothers are formed, and how their
desires are formed and sometimes conflict.
Second, although Foucault does not offer many details
on which we could base a plan for change, there is nothing
in his work that would prevent us from doing so. If we could
find a source of a will to change and a vision of what that
change would look like, we might provide a transition that
accounts for the possibility of thinking and therefore doing
82
ngs differently that is more satisfying than Foucault
and more likely to lead to improving the positions of
mothers
.
Developing an Identity as a Subject
The pregnant body and the body of the mother after
childbirth, more than any other body concepts, belie the
neutral or desexualized body Foucault presents. That is,
being treated, and so trying to act, asexual or neuter means
that mothers, when they leave their homes to go into the
world of work or other public spaces, have to act as though
they are not mothers. This involves both the managing and
concealing by mothers of their bodily functions, but also
the pretense by mothers in public realms that they do not
bear responsibility for their children and their households.
Such managing and pretending stigmatizes mothers because of
the physical and psychological effort required of them which
is not required of men. Managing and pretending become
constraints that shape the way mothers go about their lives
and how they think about themselves and their possibilities.
Culture conditions a woman to manage and conceal her
body and her mothering so she may appear neutral, able to be
in the same positions as men and do what they do, according
to Luce Irigaray. "To behave in any other way she must go
through a complex and painful process, a real conversion to
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the female gender. This is a conversion< ln Irlgaray , s
vrew, because the male world refuses to recognize female
Identity, it has denied woman the right to her difference.
It demands of women that they become men - though at best
women can become only defective men because they lach what
““ haV6
' Penlses and the privileges and rationality
assigned with them. She suggests
not by choice, but because it is
women manage and conceal
required in a world created
by men.
The need for "conversion to the female gender" is
located on two levels: within the woman herself and in the
culture at large. Irigaray suggests identity is formed by
identification with images and representations in the
symbolic order, giving content to subjectivity, which is a
social and symbolic position, a position from which women
can speak for themselves. For Irigaray, the symbolic is the
social and signifying order governing culture. Because she
believes our sexed identity is created by the symbolic
order, she believes it is subject to change. We can
reorganize the symbolic order to create a new social
architecture. That is, while Foucault can help show the ways
m which maternal difference may be inscribed to represent
inequality and inferiority, Irigaray shows how women in
those positions may attempt to transform social and cultural
5;Luce Irigaray, je, tu, nous: Toward a Culture ofDifference, (New York Routlectee
1993), p. 21.
6 ’
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values by thinking and speaking for themselves. In this way
maternal difference can exist in the context of women as
subjects who are more than just mothers, subjects with
equivalent social and cultural value and status. Although
she does not distinguish the three female body concepts
presented in this dissertation, Irigaray's work can help
elaborate those concepts - because of her insistence on
recognizing sexual difference, her devotion to the
representation of the female embodied subject and the
creation of a discursive space for women, and the particular
way in which she places mothers at the center of her
analysis
.
In order to deepen the analysis of sex/gender
differences we must read them through Irigaray's insistence
on the sexual difference between women and men. But then we
must add an insistence on recognizing differences among
women, including the three concepts of female embodiment.
That is, bodies may be inscribed in historically and
culturally specific ways, but it matters what bodies we are
talking about since different bodies are targeted in
different ways, and the same representations may result in
different inscriptions depending on the specificities of the
bodies. That is, I argue that when women develop identities
as subjects, when they create representations to make
possible subject positions in the realm of the symbolic, it
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is not a Single image nor a single subject position - but a
pluralality of each.
In contrast to Foucault, Irigaray looks forward rather
than backward in her search for a new model of subjectivity.
Her project involves not just critique but also creation, as
She attempts to theorize a female symbolic system so that
women and men can not only think in terms of sexual
difference but also practice it. In her look forward to find
a model of embodied female subjectivity not yet represented,
she comes up with an active female thinking subject capable
of self- representation and self-determination. Foucault for
the most part ignores sexual difference, making his sexed
body a male body, usually a white, privileged male body,
sometimes a homosexual male body. In comparison, Irigaray is
intensely interested in the differences between women and
men, and she views these differences as positive. Her
commitment to empowering sexual difference is based on her
belief that only the masculine is acknowledged in our
cultural order, and that sexual difference has been
constituted in such a way that man gains his autonomous
identity at the expense of woman. The result has been that
women have been excluded from the position of the subject of
discourse and social exchange. Yet she does not want to
reverse values or to exclude men. Instead she focuses on
sexual specificity with the goal of achieving sexuate or
equivalent rights -- that is, rights specific to the bodies
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and subjects they cover. For her, specificity is located in
embodied selves. Her goal is for egual symbolic, material,
and juridical worth.
Ingaray refuses to accept portrayals of motherhood as
negative or powerless because it limits what women can do,
or portrayals of mothers as positive or all-powerful because
it gives women special insights not available to men. Her
search for notions of women's sexual autonomy and
specificity, and her search for representations of women
that go beyond the maternal function yet include that
function, are aimed at transforming women and culture so
women have a different place there. Her search for a way to
reclaim the female body rests on her belief that it is on
the basis of the social meaning and values given to their
bodies that women have been oppressed, and so social
meanings and values that must change. That is, she wants to
bring the maternal-feminine into discourse so that "mother"
can be separable from "woman, " so the daughter can identify
with "woman" rather than only "mother."
In her early books, Irigaray critiques the
phallogocentric theories that have most powerfully shaped
Western thought and women's place in culture, and offers
possibilities for what women might imagine. "It is the
philosophical discourse that we have to challenge, and
disrupt, she says, "in as much as this discourse sets forth
the law for all others, in as much as it constitutes the
87
discourse of all
work, she offers
discourses. "« In her later, more concrete
specific suggestions for changes in law and
in the symbolic proces ses of language in order to further
the goal that women's identities not be replaced with the
identity of mother when they have a child. She urges women
to "find a value in being women and not just in being
mothers ." 61 What this involves is a rethinking and
transformation of centuries of social and cultural values,
including within oneself, according to Irigaray. What this
involves is giving cultural values to female sexuality -
that is, developing an identity as a subject in which the
account of subjectivity recognizes sexual specificity.
Western culture has stressed the difference between
women and men, but in doing so has negated the feminine,
according to Irigaray. In Speculum of the Other Woman, she
names Freud as an example of this when he conceives of women
as castrated men. She analyzes and interrupts the Western
tradition, claiming it is founded on self-identity, the love
and thought of the same, on the privileging of the specular
or mirror image and the privileging of homo-sexuality. She
describes the meaning of the mirror as "interpretation and
criticism of the enclosure of the Western subject in the
Same, even in those propositions concerning the need to use
a different mirror for the constitution of female
Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is No/ One
,
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1985),
p. 74.
6
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identity. -« She asserts that the female body should not
remain the object of men's discourse or arts, but instead
should become "the object of a female subjectivity
experiencing and identifying itself ."63
In Speculum she says that a "dual dialectic" is
necessary to do this, one for the male subject and another
for the female subject. In her later work she adds a third
element of the dialectic, the relationship between the male
and female subjects as a couple or in a community
.
64 In ail
of her work she insists that women must interpret their
status not only in economic but also in symbolic terms.
Acquiring subjective status is just as important as entering
into existing economic or cultural systems. That is, women
must always keep in mind that they are women and they are
part of the world.
Irigaray critiques Freud's theory of gender
development, pointing out its masculinist assumptions. Like
Foucault's analysis of culturally and historically specific
notions of criminals, insanity, and sex, she shows that the
history Freud tells and the history he makes, constitute
only one story among many possible stories, not a natural
given but a social construct. She argues that Freud was
62 *
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caught up in his own "specular logic" or self-reflection
about the development of masculine gender identity, which
caused him to distort female gender development. This led
logic of the same" in which he assumed the girl
and boy were the same before the Oedipal stage, which
results in a focus on the penis or lack of it. The female is
defined as lack. There is only one model of subjectivity and
It is male; any other is defined negatively.
When women submit to theories of the subject, such as
Freud' s, all of which have been appropriated by the
masculine, they renounce their specificity and subject
themselves to objectification in discourse
.
65 But women
should not cooperate, according to Irigaray. Although she
agrees that the phallocentric structure of desire is
incorporated by patriarchal family and power structures into
the unconscious of both women and men, Irigaray suggests
that within the feminine unconscious are other possibilities
of understanding its sexuality that could allow for a
decentering of the power of the patriarchal unconscious and
normalizing discourse. She conducts a feminist critique of
psychoanalysis, or as Elizabeth Grosz describes it, a
psychoanalyzing of psychoanalysis -- "seeking out the
repressed or negated elements on which it has been based,
65
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arching for its blind spots and disavowed conditions of
existence .
"
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in This Sex Which is Not One, Irigaray includes among
the obstacles that women face, and Freud helps construct,
that within the masculine order, woman is indifferent in the
sense of non-dif ferent or undifferentiated. That is, woman
has no right to her own sexual difference but must accept
masculine definitions and appropriations of her sexual
difference
,
67
Irigaray says that for Hegel, whose theory she calls
the most powerful of the Western philosophies, woman is wife
and mother in a single "role [that] is a function of an
abstract duty ." 68 This is a universal task which she can
perform only by renouncing her particular desires.
In other words, a woman's love is defined [byHegel] as familial and civil duty. She has no rightto singular love nor to love for herself. She isthus unable to love but is to be subjugated tolove and reproduction. She has to be sacrificed
and to sacrifice herself to this task, at the sametime disappearing as this or that woman who is
alive at the present time. And she must disappear
as desire, too, unless it is abstract: the desire
to be wife and mother. This self-effacement in afamily-related role is her civil task . 69
Clearly when she refers to desire here Irigaray means more
than sexual desire, though sexual desire is included in her
66Grosz, Sexual Subversions, p. 197.
67
Irigaray, This Sex, p. 220.
68
Irigaray
,
I Love to You, p. 21.
69Irigaray
,
I Love to You, p. 22.
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concept of desire. Her conrpnt- o-fn cept of desire is one of the ways
in which she leaves behind Freudian and Lacanian concepts ™
- ***— is seen only as sexual, a ne.ative or Ll,
an absence that must be filled. Irigaray says in I Love to
You, for example, "In addition to need, there is another
dimension in the person, that of desire, which is linked to
energy, particularly sexual energy." 7 ! she also links desire
to creation in her essay, "The Bodily Encounter with the
Mother." There she says that mothers
bring something other than children into the
world, we
_ engender something other than children:iove, desire, language, art, the social, thepo ltical, the religious, for example. But thiscreation has been forbidden us for centuries, andwe must reappropriate this maternal dimension thatbelongs to us as women. ^
Women's love is still defined as a familial and civil
duty for many women in our culture, according to Irigaray,
but things could be thought differently. Instead of a
civilization constructed by man, a between-men society with
women as property and separated from other women, a
civilization without any female philosophy or linguistics or
religion or politics (since all these disciplines have been
Ann Ferguson in Blood at the Root (London: Pandora, 1989, p. 64) says Irigaray s
deconstruction of Lacan suggests she no longer holds certain Freudian concepts. For
example, Irigaray wants to displace the Lacanian and Freudian emphasis on genital sex and
gender games as at the center of sexual desire (p. 73).
7
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(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 43.
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established in accordance with a male subject) - we could
ave a society in which women construct an objective
identity model that allows them to situate themselves as
women, not merely as mothers, and as equals in their
relations with men." Rather than a parental, genealogical,
hierarchical model that operates by dependency, we could
have a more horizontal and intersubjective model that
operates through reciprocal listening. In Irigaray' s view, a
horizontal and intersubjective model "opens up a present in
order to construct a future. " 74 when society valorizes women
as mothers, nurturers and housewives, it defines them,
imposes on them an identity and deprives them of the
possibility of developing their own identity. For both women
and men, to recognize an identity in oneself is itself to
overcome instinctual and egological immediacy by recognizing
the negative in the self. "75 That ig/ tQ see oneself as
sexed is to see that one is not everything. To identify with
one's gender, and to recognize the existence of the other
gender, is to enter the world of mediation, to go beyond
immediacy, to overcome immediate instincts and drives.
Irigaray argues that one of the perils of modern
culture is women' s loss of identity -- "either through
reducing them to nature, to man's object or property, or
Irigaray, I Love to You
,
p. 44-46.
74
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Irigaray, I Love to You
,
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through the female gender's identification with man. "76
Being reduced to nature means being reduced to their
reproductive functions; being reduced to man's object or
property means having no rights as women; and identifying
with man means having an identity that is like a male
identity, though a defective male.
The female body enters Irigaray's work in her efforts
to rewrite it m positive terms rather than as a "lack."
This is to contrast Freud's descriptions of the "feminine"
always "in terms of deficiency or atrophy, as the other side
of the sex that alone holds a monopoly on value: the male
sex Irigaray goes about this by examining and reframing
the way the female body has been represented. She challenges
the scientific discourses that claim to explain the body and
the subject, with the goal of offering other explanations
that better represent women's own interests. The body is
important here for its place in the division of labor in the
symbolic order, which allocates to women the material,
corporeal, sensible, "natural," according to Irigaray. This
symbolic division allocates to men the spiritual, ideal,
intelligible, transcendental. 78 It is not biology but social
meaning inscribed on the body that results in the male being
seen as virile or phallic and the female being seen as
passive and castrated. The system of language and
76
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representation are internalized. In Irigaray- s view, each
sex ought to be able to represent both lists of
Possibilities, overcome the split between this assrgnment by
gender. The only identity the symbolic offers to women nowU maternit
^ - «hich
-ans an identity not as a woman but
as a mother, and preferably the mother of a son.™ Because
those assignments are not a fact of nature but of politics,
in her view they can be challenged. The discourses and
representations that give the body its form and meaning can
be challenged. Women internalize the social meaning and
value given to their bodies by a misogynist culture,
according to Irigaray.
When she focuses her attention on the construction of
other social meanings and values, much of this focus is on
the mother-daughter relationship. She insists daughters
cannot have a female identity if their mothers do not, and
their mothers do not so long as their identities are as
mothers rather than as women. In the traditional conception
of families, according to Irigaray, the child has no image
of woman but only of mother, and so has no representation of
sexual difference. In Thinking the Difference: For a
Peaceful Revolution
, Irigaray blames patriarchy for
destroying the mother-daughter bond, for the destruction of
female ancestries.
Irigaray, Elemental Passions
,
p. 150 .
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These laws require certain behaviors of women. In An Ethics
of Sexual Difference, Irigaray writes,
Kp-S” S/SnS.S/S ;*S
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Female ancestries, the mother-daughter relationship, woman's
recognition or other women, must be renewed before an ethics
of sexual difference is possible, according to Irigaray.
But Irigaray' s treatment of mothers and daughters takes
an unusual twist, which is linked to her insistence that
mothering be only one aspect of a woman's identity. She
focuses on the mother-daughter relationship not to blame or
burden mothers, but to present it as an opportunity — the
first opportunity -- for a positive identification of
females with their own sex. That is, it is an opportunity
for intersubjective recognition between women. For Irigaray,
Irigaray, Thinking the Difference
,
p. 99.
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1984)
p. 102.
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this recognition, woman to woman, subject to subject, for
what they share and for how they differ, is the first stepm creating subject status for women. Irigaray tries to
bring into symbolic representations a maternal genealogy,
the mother-daughter relationship. To have no maternal
genealogy is to be unsymbolized, according to Irigaray,
which means to have no linguistic, social, cultural,
theoretical, mythical, religious, or other representations
of the relationship in the symbolic order. It is to have no
identity distinct from the male-defined maternal function.
It is to have no horizontal relationship between women.
Woman needs to develop words, images and symbols° eXp'css her lntersubjective relationship withmother, and then with other women, if she is
need
n
to
r
r
a
i
n°ndeStrUCtiVe relation with men. We
of ident?ti
e
rh
e
;
examine
' and define this economy
. , .
l Y t at is specific to woman. This isindispensable if we are to have a livable
ThlS in tUm dePends uPon us supporting,de
f
tr°yinP' the mother-daughter relationship.We must cease to assume that the daughter mustturn away from her mother to obey her father or tolove her husband. If a sexual identity is to bebuilt, a genealogical relationship with one's owngender and a respect for both genders are
essential
The lack of representation of a maternal genealogy is
directly linked to the denial of the debt to the mother for
giving life, according to Irigaray. While there is no way
for men and women to reciprocate or pay back that debt, she
^Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p.
97
1IlS1StS “ C“ bS “Pledged by recognizing the mother as
also a woman, a subject with a life and interests that go
beyond maternity. This benefits not only women but also
children, whose quality of life suffers when their mothers
have no identity as women. *3 Daughters especially gain by
learning to recognize another woman.
Transforming the Symbolic Order
Irigaray includes among her goals altering the power
structure, and she begins with a rewriting of the female
body in an effort to counteract the construction of the
feminine body in negative terms, to give women control over
the discourse of the feminine body for their own ends.
According to Irigaray, the key to the power that produces
the body is the power to name and to create the symbolic
representations of the female body.
Therefore, no less than a complete transformation of
the symbolic order as we know it is needed before women can
be "representable," according to Irigaray. She attempts such
a "resymbolization" in her images of the body, such as those
of the two lips," in This Sex. The "two lips" is an attempt
to represent a new, positive image of female sexuality
rather than a precise description of it. This image is
multiple, ambiguous, and fluid, rather than singular,
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In presenting such images, Margaret Whitford believes,
Ingaray succeeds in inserting new images in our cultural
and symbolic baggage.*’ This is important to Irigaray'
s
work, according to Whitford, because without some kind of
symbolization women remain "homeless" in the symbolic order,
in a state of dereliction. Irigaray provides images of
women's bodies which have become new material for symbolic
exchange among women, exceeding the boundaries of
patriarchal representations of women.
This is what has led Irigaray to insist that within the
culture, giving cultural value to female sexuality means
developing a civil identity, which requires changing
attitudes and behaviors, and language. This takes time.
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according to Ingaray, but the process can start through
asserting women's rights. Her goal is for women to have what
equal subjective rights, "equal obviously meaning
different but of equal value, subjective implying equivalent
rights in exchange systems. "« Her emphasis is on the
difference of rights between male and female subjects
required to offer equivalent rights or status to both
g ders. The right to live for women requires that they have
legal authority over their body and their subjectivity.
She lists among women's rights the right to human
identity, including the right to motherhood as a component
and not a priority of female identity .» For Irigaray this
means "the right to voluntary motherhood without Church or
state leaders exercising, either directly or through
institutions, real power over a woman, and that includes
financial or ideological power ." 88 The point is not to make
children less of a priority, but to make women more of a
priority. Motherhood becomes an unbearable injustice, the
deprivation of subjective rights, when it is forced on women
as their inescapable fate, she says. We need to think about
a different female identity in which the sufferings and joys
of motherhood, are no longer the criteria.
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Society would not be spending millions of dollars on
the new reproductive technologies to expand and insist on
the possibilities of motherhood for the women of infertile
couples unless the framework for women's existence were
exclusively maternal, in Irigaray's view. These technologies
do little for women: they offer a precarious liberty if that
liberty is based on the ability of women to have children
without men, and anyway men are still in the picture through
semen, profit, and the social control such possibilities
exert on women to reduce and confine them to motherhood.
Thus to be in good health, women need to discover for
themselves the characteristics of their sexed identity, and
they need reciprocity with men. An initiation into
subjectivity is a way to help women resolve the existing
unequal distribution of subjective and objective rights.
This is one of the routes Irigaray takes toward her
suggestions for concrete legal changes to give women a civil
identity, changes she characterizes as necessary for both
the sake of elementary social justice and in order to
89
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establish a minimum of legal consistency. "For what do
women's work and political affiliation mean if women have
not got their own civil identity?" she asks
.
90
Irigaray asserts, in contrast to the Western tradition,
a division between male and female that does not make the
male model dominant. Further, she wants to abolish the
generational position of the sexes which within the family
forces women to be mothers and men to be fathers, making way
for more creative rather than procreative couples
.
91 This
new division is aimed at making possible a new alliance
between men and women in which it would no longer be
necessary for them to be dependent on the family and its
objectives, according to Irigaray. The new alliance would be
manifest in private and public life and institutions.
Sometimes it is easier to establish this in the public
realm than in simple subjective attraction because
objectivity [that is, without subjective attraction]
facilitates recognition and a pact between woman and man,
women and men . " 92
Irigaray defines the principle of morality and ethics
as consisting concretely in the respect for real
differences, and in this sense respecting the law becomes a
moral and ethical task regulating the spiritual behavior of
every individual and regulating the organization of society.
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Her research on language reveals speech habits that
parallel the lack of social identity for women. Irigaray
found in one study that men designate themselves or other
men as subjects of a sentence, while women seldom designate
themselves or other women as subjects of speech, reserving
that for men. 94 in another study she found that women
privilege relations between subjects while men give priority
to relations to the object, putting themselves at the center
and concerning themselves with such relationships as
conquests and success in business dealings. 95 Interestingly,
she says, young girls dream of sharing love with a partner
more than they dream of motherhood; a child is the fruit of
the love with a man. Young boys, in contrast, talk mostly
about possessing objects, and then about ideas. As
adolescents, boys dream of erotic, romantic or social
exploits but not sharing between persons.
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When lrigaray shows the signlficance Qf reiig . on Qn
culture, she helps show that even when we do not seek out
the prescriptive texts on motherhood we still are shaped by
them.
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Part of her critique of modernity is that the majority
of people no longer know what is true, and give up their
right to judge for themselves, instead following others whom
they think know more. This includes social and cultural
norms, as well as tacit consent to the manipulation of role
models in advertising, the media, and art.
The more patriarchal cultures consolidate theirpower, the more systems of exchange and
communication are cut off from individual truth
and become the business of specialists and experts
alone. This is one of the causes of thedifficulties of the modern world. 97
According to lrigaray, we are still subject to conditioned
social rules that we confuse with freedom. We are brought up
96 lrigaray, je, tu, nous, p. 23.
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and educated to adaot tn a oov.+.certain way of doing things,
Without innovations or discoveries of our own.
Although she sometimes appears to lapse into describing
caricatures, and other times comes close to the
mother-blaming of psychoanalysis, Irigaray may be seen as
challenging existing images, breaking them down to their
most brutal components, rather than trying to present
accurate descriptions. For example, she says that when women
do not have an identity, they are unhappy, some of these
women, dependent on men both economically and socially,
become nervous wrecks, or they compensate for their lack of
identity through authoritarianism over their children; they
try to console themselves through a relative pleasure in
being kept, or through their desire to receive or buy gifts.
"All this remains an integral part of an economic system in
which we still live." 9 **
he rights women have gained in the last few yearsare for the most part rights that enable them to
s ip into men's skin, to take on the so-called
male identity. These rights do not solve theproblems of their rights and duties as women
towards themselves, their children, other women,
men and society.
Moreover, the rights gained by women
sometimes place them in conflict: they may choose
when they want to be mothers, for example, butthey do not have the female identity that would
enable them to make that choice
.
99
98
Irigaray, Thinking the Difference
,
p. 79.
"irigaray, Thinking the Difference
,
p. 79-80.
105
Changes to the symbolic
and religion, will allow the
elementary social justice, "
codes, especially language, law
establishment of what she calls
to save the earth from total
subjugation to male values (which often give priority to
violence, power, money). "100 A!though Foucault is not always
clear or consistent in his views on the subject, for
irigaray a new female subject is crucial in part because it
is a key to women speaking in an active voice and taking
responsibility and defining themselves for themselves.
Speaking in a passive voice is for Irigaray like living in a
free market economy in that we are surrounded by choices
which gives us a false feeling that all possibilities are
available to us. We think we are free to make any choices
but it is a false sense of security in that we still are
constrained and controlled because the choices are limited.
If women become speaking subjects, if they "refused to go to
market" by refusing to select from limited choices, the
symbolic process that governs society would change, and
society itself would change, according to Irigaray. 101 Women
would become involved in constructing culture and the world.
They would have a chance at articulating what Irigaray calls
the double demand of equality and difference.
I00lrigaray, Thinking the Difference
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Irigaray' s Embodied Selves
Ingaray has at times been a controversial figure among
feminists and others because of her experimental writing
style, her practice of presenting new concepts and
representations of women as an example of concepts defined
by women, and because her readers often cannot come to
agreement on what she means and on whether she is
essentialist. The question of essentialism led to a debate
within and around feminist theory that Rosi Braidotti has
characterized as "a political and intellectual stalemate
from which we are just beginning to emerge. "102 Although
some read Irigaray as essentialist because of her emphasis
on the body and on sexual difference, which may appear as
having only two parts, there are other more attentive
responses to her work. ><» Irigaray may be read, as she is by
some, as a strategic essentialist, one using essentialism as
a strategy to achieve her goals, which are not necessarily
essentialist. An example of this is a reading that views
bodies and their parts as metaphors, as in the "two lips."
But it is also possible to read her as not essentialist, if
we define essentialism as assigning a fixed nature to each
sex that results in anatomical or biological destiny. For
102Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in
Contemporary Feminist Theory
,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994 ), p. 149 .The question of Irigaray’s essentialism has been explored thoroughly elsewhere See in
the bibliography for example, Margaret Whitford, Teresa de Lauretis, Elizabeth Grosz
and Diana Fuss.
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Irigaray, it is not women's anatomies that cause their
oppressron but the social meaning and value given to their
bodres which are transmitted by a masculinist culture and
then internalized. In fact, in order to distance herself
from the link between anatomy and destiny, she uses the term
"morphology" to refer to the way the bodies of each sex are
lived by subjects and represented in culture. To consider
bodies and subjectivities the result of symbolic
inscriptions, as she does, precludes the possibility of a
pre-cultural or acultural body that is required for an
essentialist position.
Irigaray insists on the importance of the biological,
or sexual, differences between men and women not as
opposition and not in order to posit a certain fate or role
for women and men based on those biological differences.
Rather, she does so in order to recognize the relation of
sexual differences in her attempt to secure for women the
natural and civil rights they are due, rights that are
appropriate to their sexual specificity. She focuses on
bodies in order to expose assumptions and definitions and
whose they are. She does so precisely to reject that women
are "so changeable," so alike that one can substitute for
another
.
104
"If we keep on speaking sameness," as though we
were the same, as men do and we have been taught to do, we
104
Irigaray, This Sex, p. 205.
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will not be who we are or who we can be. >05 But Irigaray i#
talking not just about bodies, but embodied selves in all of
specificity. This is why she argues that no single set
rights will offer equivalent status to the various
embodied subjects they cover, and certainly not to the three
female body concepts and their subjectivities under
discussion here. As needs, experiences, and possibilities
vary, so do appropriate rights.
Much of Irigaray' s attention is on the possibility of
mutual exchange between women and men, to the apparent
neglect of differences among women. Her goals include
reciprocal communication with neither sex dominant, a mutual
interaction of intersubjective recognition, each subject
With its own place within the interaction and within
discourse. She writes passionately about the differences
between the sexes, seeking fair and civil treatment of each,
again as though difference is made up of two. She refers to
"rights suited to female identity" and "rights appropriate
to the two sexes, " 106 and "women's right to their own
specific culture ," 107 all of which may be read as two
possibilities or two participants, one female and one male.
Again, some see this as tactical
,
108 but it may be read
as paving the way for the recognition of all differences.
I(b
Irigaray, This Sex, p. 205.
h)6
Irigaray, Thinking the Difference
,
p. xv.
l(,7
Irigaray, Thinking the Difference
,
p. xvi.
See for example, Rosi Braidotti, Patterns ofDissonance: A Study of Women in
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Xrigar.y does stress women's multiplicity, not just in their
corporeality but in their identity, which changes If
women- s identity is multiple and changing, then it cannot be
the same for all women. These imply differences among women
- thus her work, like Foucault- s, can lead into the plurals
identities and subjectivities.
Ingaray argues that women are not individuated, that
they are only mothers or the maternal function. Everything
she says about women's identity not being represented by
women, about women being forced to subject themselves to a
culture that is not their own, can be taken further and
applied to differences among women. Thus, for example, her
comment that "there is still hardly any sort of work that
enables a woman to earn her living as a male citizen does
out alienating her identity in working conditions and
contexts developed to suit men alone, sets the stage to
recognize not just one class, race, sexual preference, or
other category of women, one body concept, but all
differences and specificities among women. Just as the
mother and daughter must recognize each other, woman to
woman, before women can have an intersubjective relationship
with men — so a sexed identity for women must exist before
differences among women can be recognized. For women to have
their own identity is to change the notion of identity.
Contemporary Philosophy, (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 99.
I09lrigaray,ye, tu, nous, p. 85.
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irigaray argues. For women to have their own identity, the
symbolic formations that are the basis of identity must
change
.
When she says that women should refuse to go to market
irigaray means they should both refuse to be conmodities and
refuse to select from choices defined and limited according
to a male model. As the next chapter shows, one aspect of
the market for mothers is the prescriptive texts that tell
mothers what to do and who to be. These appear to be
choices, but when we apply concepts from Foucault and
irigaray to mothers in the late twentieth century United
States, we can see that mothers are constrained, denied
control over their bodies, and in the process made useful to
society. Chapter Three continues the discussion of the
effects of power on embodied subjects by pursuing the links
between power and knowledge, and the thoughts and practices
of mothers. It examines the very representations mothers
internalize, the images they see around them every day, the
limits and definitions that shape their images of themselves
and their practices, their aspirations and goals.
CHAPTER HI
FROM IMAGE TO PRACTICE
:
THE HEGEMONIC MODEL FOR "GOOD" MOTHERS
Motherhood is one of the most dramatic and far-reaching
social transformations in a woman's life. But what makes it
so powerful a force of change is not simply a matter of
biological process or maternal response to the child.
Equally important, but much less understood, is the matter
of cultural processes which attempt to shape the identity of
the woman to replace it with the identity of mother. The
cultural forces come in part from images of mothers produced
by experts" who attempt to impose cultural scripts on
mothers by shaping the series of practices through which
mothers are governed and come to govern themselves.
Cultural scripts teach cultural values which we
internalize, and which give us our sense of the world around
us . 1 The scripts position us socially, and organize that
n an early use of the notion of cultural scripts, John H. Gagnon and William Simon
‘^7 ( onduct: The Sources ofHuman Sexuality, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.,
1973), argue that all human behavior is scripted, in that there is very little in human
behavior that can be called spontaneous. Scripts are involved in such culturally shared
routines as learning the meaning of personal feelings, organizing the sequences of specific
acts, decoding situations, and setting limits on responses. Sharon Marcus in “Fighting
Bodies, Fighting Words, in Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds.. Feminists Theorize (he
Political (New York: Routledge, 1992), also has developed a notion of scripts in her
discussion of the politics of rape prevention. Marcus suggests that we treat rape as a script
through which men learn they have power over women and women learn they are
powerless against a rapist. That is, she suggests we treat rape as “linguistic fact” that can
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strives to reproduce a universal motherhood in
each individual mother. The scripts exclude certain
interpretations and perspectives of motherhood, and
Privilege others. The scripts are enabled by narratives and
institutions that get their strength not from force but from
their power to structure our lives
.
2
As we saw in Chapter One, the dominant cultural scripts
today for mothers today are embedded in images of mothers as
either good, or the source of all that is "bad." The
scripts insist that "good" mothers identify their happiness
and fulfillment with their children, through the practices
of self-control, self-discipline, and self-sacrifice. This
chapter focuses on the links between the cultural
conceptions of the third female body concept - the
nonpregnant, maternal body — and the rules and regulations
contained m the cultural scripts which aim at making
maternal bodies socially adapted and useful. Some of these
rules begin during pregnancy, and so also affect the second
female body concept, the pregnant body. As we saw in Chapter
Two, the acts of power involved here do not render us merely
passive and compliant. But when these rules and regulations
shape the material practices of mothers, they are among the
factors that shape mothers' experiences of their bodies,
their subjectivities, and their possibilities.
be interrupted.
2Marcus, “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words.”
This chapter will focus on prescriptive texts which are
part of the deployment of cultural scripts - that is,
prescriptive texts in the form of popular books and
magazines that provide both descriptions of "good" mothers
and advice on how to become "good" mothers. The chapter
focuses on the forms of prescriptive texts that are in the
mainstream, which for the most part use the standard of
white, middle-class motherhood, and which are read or viewed
by millions of mothers and others, who in the process learn
how to judge mothers. The last 20 years has seen an
explosion of prescriptive texts in the form of books,
magazines, pamphlets, and videotapes about "parenting" but
mostly aimed at mothers. The discussion here will include
some authors whose advice has made them the most popular and
famous of the childcare "experts," such as Benjamin Spock
and T. Berry Brazelton, both pediatricians, and Penelope
Leach, who has a Ph.D. in psychology. It will also include
less well known but still very popular authors, who are
better known by the titles of their books than by their
names, such as Alvin Price and Jay Parry's Discipline: 101
Alternatives to Nagging
, Yelling
,
and Spanking
,
and Thomas
Phelan's 1-2-3 Magic: Training Your Preschoolers and
Preteens to Do What You Want. 3 The discussion in this
In her book. The Cultural Contradictions ofMotherhood, (New haven: Yale University
Press, 1996), Sharon Hays gathers publishing information from several sources to name
Spock, Brazelton, and Leach the “the best-selling triumvirate of child-rearing advisers,”
from Spock s 40 million copies sold in six editions ofBaby and Child Care, (New York:
chapter rs not meant to be an exhaustive examination of
these boobs, but uses the texts to show the patterns of
CUltUral SCrlPting and Prescriptive practices aimed at
mothers in order to furt-hov +-u e examination of the effects
on the subjectivities of mothers
.
4
Other materials exist which challenge these mainstream
texts, some better than others, but their influence is
estncted by their small audiences and limited
availability, chapter Four will take up these texts, and
alternative discourses of feminist mothers, black mothers,
and lesbian mothers, to attempt to identify which parts of
the dominant cultural script are most ripe for interruption.
The concept of motherhood as a series of practices is
particularly useful here when it insists that the lives of
mothers encompass more than childrearing, more than the
mother role or relationships that result from their
Pocket Books. 1985), to Leach’s 1.5 million copies sold of Your Baby and Child(London Penguin, 1986), (Hays, p. 52). Kathenne Arnup in Education for Motherhood-
1ZTf0r, I! Canada, (Toronto: University ofToronto Press
( notes that Spock s Baby and ( hi/d Care has been translated into 38 languages
suggesting the interest in advice literature and the consumption of literature espousing thedominant model of mothering in the United States is no, limited to North Amend
21 7). The titles to Price and Parry’s Discipline (Parenting Resource Group and Brite
^>84?
’
H P
and Phe'an * '-2-iMa«,c <Glen El|yn > I” : Child Management Incj984) are well known to mothers and teachers of young children.
Hays, in The Cultural Contradictions, says that the popularity of Spock, Brazelton andLeach means that the material presented in their books “is an approximation of the
dominant cultural model of raising children” (p. 52). She concludes that the model is
internalized based on the consistency in the understandings of mothering amom> the
mothers she interviewed, despite the diversity of their backgrounds and social
circumstances (p. 98). Even when mothers reject the model, they feel compelled to justify
their rejection (p. 72).
reproductive bodies. Certainly many of the practices
included in this chapter may be used by men. But there are
two clear distinctions. First, the practices would fit into
men's lives in very different ways, as illustrated in the
recent focus on the family as the solution to the ills of
society - which tends to blame mothers for these ills since
mothers are considered synonymous with and responsible for
the family. Mothers then become the target population whose
behavior must change, which makes women the objects of
public policy, social pressure and theory in a very
different way from men. Second, as a result of this, the
prescriptive texts which describe and advise, to which I
trace many of the practices, are overwhelmingly aimed at
women
.
The discourses on motherhood, and the way we think
about and practice motherhood, are historically linked to
power and social control. At issue here is not whether women
should or should not become particular kinds of mothers, but
Who gets to represent and define mothers' needs and how
those needs should be satisfied. That is, at issue are the
assumptions that inform the practices of mothers, the
restrictions for mothers in the cultural scripts.
Prescriptive advice to mothers — from experts made up
mainly of pediatricians, psychiatrists and psychologists --
is linked to the devaluation of the feminine and leads to
the specific devaluation of the maternal. I argue that the
narratives about mothers and the prescriptive advice aimed
at mothers are naturalised and seem to he about what is real
but, rn fact, they may be contested and interrupted.
Further, they focus on the coprng strategies of individuals,
seeking to transform women into "good” mothers, to the
neglect of examining structural causes in a society that
needs mothers to "be” a certain way and to fill certain
roles
.
Prescriptive Texts
Prescriptive texts are based in both narratives and
science. The narratives, or stories of mothers' successes
and failures, work as a kind of shorthand through which
readers make sense of the world of motherhood and learn the
difference between "good” and "bad” mothers. The science
that is used makes claims to objectivity and truth, but as
we will see, it attempts to produce "truths” so that certain
choices are seen as natural, self-evident, indispensable.
For example, Spock's most popular book. Baby and Child Care,
IS presented in encyclopedia form, with detailed
prescriptions on how to respond to infant and child behavior
at each stage of development. Brazelton' s books tend to rely
more on anecdotes and stories about a few specific families
and their children, yet he also offers detailed
prescriptions on what to do with and for children.
These prescriptions attempt to represent and define
mothers- needs, and define the practices mothers shouid use
to satisfy those needs. Women often seek such advice even
before conception so that they can do the most to produce a
"perfect" baby. Texts - in the form of pamphlets, books,
and magazine articles, many of which have been made into
videotapes — are recommended to pregnant women and new
mothers by their doctors and by hospital staffs in part to
make up for the lack of support and advice from extended
families. Prescriptive texts also make up for the drastic
reductions in hospital stays after birth, which were sending
new mothers home with their babies within 12 or 24 hours of
the birth. Recent protests have resulted in a federal law
requiring longer stays. 5 The mothers who receive these texts
from doctors and hospitals are the same women who have been
bombarded with the message that they cannot give birth to
healthy babies without lots of medical intervention, which
already has caused them to lose trust in their bodies. 6
'What started as a consumer movement to shorten hospital stays in order to make havina
a baby seem less medical and more natural, turned into an insurer movement to save
money. When some insurers considered reducing the stay to six hours, mothers and
octors started to fight back. In many places they received support from hospitals that
noted that mothers sent home so quickly often returned within two weeks with other
problems - sometimes with evident of child abuse. (See The Boston Globe
, July 1 1, 1995
“Hospitals Cut Stays for New Mothers;” July 12, 1995, “Mandated Hospital Stays
Supported, and Ellen Goodman, “Newborns, Moms Deserve a Slower Start ”)
’Robie Davis-Floyd, Birth as an American Rite ofPassage
,
(Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992).
The emergence of the science of childrearing as a
specialized form of knowledge may be counted as a
significant event in the history and experience of
motherhood. In the terms of Michel Foucault, we can create a
revealing history by identifying such events which emphasize
certain facts or the emergence of particular rationalities 7
The identifications help reconceptualize the present and
"show that things
-weren't as necessary as that,"' to show
they are not self-evident, that we may take them for granted
but they can be challenged. This method can be used as a way
of critiquing the rationality that increasingly dominates
motherhood through prescriptive texts.
Scholars such as Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre
English, Philippe Aries, and Jacques Donzelot, locate the
emergence of the takeover of childrearing by science around
the turn of the twentieth century. 8 in order to raise
children right, women had to do it by the book, or more
precisely by the books produced by the experts. The
assertion was that professionals knew how to care for babies
better than mothers did. But as anthropologist Sheila
Kitzmger has pointed out in her book, Ourselves as Mothers:
Michel Foucault, “Questions of Method,” in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, eds.. The
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmental/ty, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1991), p. 76-7.
&
8Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, For Her Chin Good: 150 Years of the Experts ’
Advice io ^men, (New York: Anchor Books, 1978); Philippe Aries, Centuries of
childhood: A Social History ofFamily Life, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962); Jacques
Donzelot, The Policing ofFamilies, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979).
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The Universal Experience of Motherhood, there was no
evidence that information about tasks made women better
mothers. In fact, she says such information often results in
dissatisfaction and resentment
.
9 In her view, forcing
information on mothers in order to shape their practices has
at least three additional flaws: intellectualizing makes the
job of mothering harder; "experts" have biases; and
"experts" often focus on restricted areas of behavior, out
of context of the whole or other behaviors
.
10
The attempt to impose science on childrearing is an
attempt to create mothers as subjects so that they may
govern themselves according to the rules and regulations of
the cultural scripts. Generic advice for different stages of
development displaces the mother's spontaneous responses to
her specific child who is not generic. As we will see, the
governing and normalization of mothers becomes unlimited and
invisible when mothers become their own governors. Mothers
are constituted by and constitutive of the governmental
practices and rationalities that govern their behavior as
mothers. The prescriptive texts are powerful influences on
mothers because they do two things : they assert their
"expert" authors as essential to solving the "problems" of
motherhood; and in laying down authoritative rules or
directions they help construct and recreate particular kinds
^Sheila Kitzinger, Ourselves as Mothers: The Universal Experience ofMotherhood
,
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1995), p. 10.
1()
Kitzinger, Ourselves
,
p. 10.
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of bodies and practices to perform
to solve those problems. The power
experts" will be addressed later
particular kinds of tasks
of prescriptive texts by
m the chapter, after a
discussion of the historical development of such texts aimed
at mothers
.
In their seminal work. For Her Own Good: 150 Years of
the Experts' Advice to Women, first published in 1978 and
reprinted in 1989, Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English
concluded that the reign of the expert is over. No doubt it
appeared that way in the late 1970s after consciousness-
raising and mutual ties among women were strengthened
through the efforts of the second wave Women's Movement. But
from the vantage point of twenty years later, any decline in
the power of experts seems short lived.
Today the pattern looks much like what Ehrenreich and
English document - including a field of experts who present
themselves as authorities on the "problem" of childrearing,
who secure legitimacy through "science," and who seek not
what is true but to "pronounce on what is appropriate." 11
Their book, in their words, is about the scientific answer
to the Woman Question" as it has been elaborated over the
last 100 years by a new class of experts. Their discussion
shows that in the nineteenth century many women heeded
expert advice because it came from science which portrayed
1 Ehrenreich and English, For Ffer Own Good, p. 28.
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itself as on the side of freedom and progress. '2 I argue
that in the last decades of the twentieth century, many
mothers heed expert advice because it comes from science
which portrays itself as on the side of equality and
personal fulfillment.
But just as the science which drew women in also
betrayed women in the Ehrenreich and English account, it has
the potential to betray women again. While domestic
scientists had expected to elevate the nineteenth century
homemaker into partnership with scientific experts, instead
the homemaker became the object of scientific study. > 3
Consumer education became consumer manipulation. Today,
instead of empowering themselves, we will see that many
women who seek expert advice more often are disciplining
themselves in ways that curtail their freedom and their
choices. The science of childrearing for mothers, which uses
the language of liberation and personal fulfillment,
actually confines.
Popular advice books written by doctors on the subject
of female health emerged and prospered beginning in the
1850s, asserting that the normal state of women was sick. 14
Pregnancy also was considered a sickness. Women were sicker
and more likely to die then in part because of tuberculosis
12Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 29.
13 Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 181 .
14Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 108, 1 10.
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and high maternal mortality rates. '5 But Ehrenreich and
English report there existed a strong commercial
justification for regarding women as sick. "The theory of
female frailty obviously disqualified women as healers....
same time the theory made women highly qualified as
patients Thus it was assured that only men would be
doctors, and that they would have an endless supply of
female patients. The theory was that a woman needed constant
medical assistance because her mind, body and soul were "in
the thrall of her all-powerful reproductive organs." 17
Health books and doctors advised women to "devote themselves
to developing their reproductive powers and their maternal
instincts
.
7,18
Following medical experts on female health came a new
set of experts who presented the idea of housekeeping as a
full-time profession, creating a new field of "domestic
science" that consisted of the science of childrearing and
the science of housework. 19 These experts, unlike the
doctors, were mostly women, who promoted the idea that it
was better for women to scrub and organize their households
- Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 1 12. Ehrenreich and English report that
women were particularly vulnerable to tuberculosis, especially young women who died at
twice the rate of men of their age. Further, virtually without any means of contraception,
married women laced the risks of childbirth repeatedly throughout their fertile years, and
often faced resulting gynecological complications for the rest of their lives.
‘"Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 112.
17Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good, p. 120.
1
^Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good, p. 121
.
19Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good, p. 142.
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than to be sick. They believed it was "more American to
strive for a single standard for home life
.
. . centered on
the classless image of the housewife" than to live a sickly
life. 2“ Although first concerned with the middle class, the
science of housework pushed its way into slums, public
schools, settlement houses — always with an ideological
message about what constituted "right living," defined as
living like the American middle class lived or aspired to
live. That meant being thrifty, orderly, clean, and valuing
privacy to the neglect of spontaneity and neighborliness.
The other side of domestic science, the science of
childrearing, by the turn of the twentieth century placed
the child at the center of white, middle-class life in the
United States. But the child was the center for women only.
Childrearing experts issued advice, warnings, and
instructions to be consumed by each mother in the isolation
of her home. No material help was involved. Ehrenreich and
English describe this science of childrearing as a
"masculinist science" which eventually came to see mothers
as the major obstacles to childrearing. 21 This science
offered an entirely new conception of the vocation of
motherhood, as a noble calling, often called "the cult of
motherhood;" it presented the two choices of being a good
and wise mother, or being in contempt. 22
20Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 167-8.
21 Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 184-5.
22Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 190.
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For the first time, the standards of successful
motherhood were being set outside the home, beyond the
mother's control — and judged where women had no
experience, m the public sphere of men. In "an attempt to
make a dignified response to this difficult and
contradictory situation," mothers invited experts to
intervene
.
24 That is, mothers started child study and
mothers' clubs that eventually became the mothers' movement,
which, like the domestic science movement, was an attempt to
study whatever scientific advice was available on the topic,
this time the topic of motherhood
.
25 Led by professional
r\
^
’Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 191 .
24Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 193 .
''The idea was not to provide a more congenial or collective setting for childrearing,
according to Ehrenreich and English, but to preserve the home. By the time the movement
was institutionalized in 1897 as the National Congress of Mothers, it was more concerned
with preservation of the home than with children.
125
ts who would tell mothers what to do, motherhood was
reinterpreted as a profession. Children were imbued with the
P tential to reach higher evolutionary development,
childrearing was made more challenging and all engulfing,
and at the same time experts were installed in the home as a
new source of patriarchal authority* That is, although
children held great promise and reaching that promise became
the main goal of mothers, mothers were in effect
administrators of the advice of the male experts.
The childrearing experts then moved from one approach
to another, presenting at least four models of childrearing,
some related, by the middle of the twentieth century. A
brief description of each illustrates the changes in advice
from experts that came over only about 50 years. While some
changes were more dramatic than others, they all asked
mothers to behave in certain ways in order to produce "good"
children.
The first recommended during this time period was the
industrial approach, based on the goal of shaping children
to be disciplined, efficient, and precise in order fit
modern industry. 27 The key to reaching this goal was
regularity; the result was obedient children who lived by
schedules. This model of childrearing undermined the
mother's movement view of the child as an "exemplary human
26Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 1 89, 210.27Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 20
1
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bexng to be studied,- turning the child instead into "raw
material to be molded and channeled. And the work itself „as
not that of a professional
- but that of a semi-skilled
employee with punched-card instructions to follow. "28
Developed from the industrial approach by the late
teens was the behavioral approach which considered the child
a machine that could be trained or programmed to fit into
any culture. Behavioralism asserted that only the observable
exists, and only behavior is observable. Following this
approach required mothers who rejected emotion, again
undermining the mother's movement. Some who favored the
behavioral model questioned whether mothers were the best
to raising children, suggesting more scientific ways
of childrearing. The implication, according to the authors,
was that women who stayed at home were not fit to raise men
for the industrial world of work. "The century had begun
with middle-class mothers organizing to search out the
science' of child raising," according to Ehrenreich and
English. "Now that science had been found ... there was very
little room in it for mothers ." 30 The behavioral model
settled on a more acceptable solution to the problem of how
to standardize childrearing that was conducted in individual
homes -- training experts who would take their scientific
^Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good, p 203.29Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good, p. 203.
30Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good, p. 205.
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methods to the delated mothers in the form of parent
education
.
But by the 1920s a cultural inversion took place in
Which private life and childrearing became an end in itself,
inviting "women to enter deeper and deeper into a shadow
world of feelings and suspected feelings, guilt,
analysis, and every nuance of ambivalence." 31 That is
a third model of childrearing emerged, the permissive model.
Which with individual consumption of consumer goods and
leisure became a kind of national mood. The pendulum took a
swing from discipline and self-control to self-indulgence.
"From now on the energies of mothers would pour into the job
of nurturing the kind of American youth who, from the cradle
on, would fit the mold of the consumer society." 33 m the
industrial and behavioral models of childrearing, the mother
had been the representative of the expert in her home; in
permissive model the child became the representative and
instructed the mother in what was to be done. Dr. Spock in
his Problems of Parents, first published in 1955, which
helped popularize the permissive model, made it clear that
all mothers had to do was to love and cater to their
children, and the children would want to learn and behave
well. 33
O 1
1
Ehrenreich and English, For Her Chin Good
, p 211
^Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
[
p. 213.
Benjamin Spock, Problems ofParents, (Greenwich, CT: Crest/Fawcett Publications
1962), p. 237.
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But psychoanalysis entered the scene to take mothering
back into the fold of the scientrfic expert, insisting the
behavior of mothers is regulated by their hormones. The
psychoanalytic model of childrearing presented the ideal
mother whose fulfillment would be her permissively raised
child
'
34 "The cbi Id-guidance books now told women simply to
trust their instincts - though of course, they insisted on
defining for women exactly what those instincts ought to
be '"35 M°therUness became the characteristic of the mature
woman, who herself was turned into a child as she was
expected to be obedient to the father figures in the
experts
.
36 According to Ehrenreich and English,
psychoanalysts, trained to find pathology, shifted their
attention to the deviant, to the neuroses that might poison
children with mental illness. The quality of the mothering
could be discerned by the behavior and happiness of the
child. If children had problems, it meant that mothers had
failed. If motherhood was fulfillment," flashes of hostility
or feelings of rejection for the child must be traitorous
and destructive; the result was to create an agonizing
self-doubt in mothers and science had no comfort to offer
them. Psychoanalytic theory identified two broad categories
of bad mothers, the rejecting mother and the overprotecting
mother
.
34Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 221
35Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 222.
36Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 223, 224
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The other side of the powerful mothers was the degraded
father. By the 1950s experts said mothers were failing at
their jobs, and fathers were called in to protect the
children. The new advice was for women to try harder to be
sexually attractive to their husbands, and to continue to
teach strict sex roles to their children. Childraising
theory became completely dependent on the father as the
"skilled domestic engineer" who instilled the feminine role
m his daughters and the masculine role in his sons. Freud's
dramatic story of the Oedipus complex was transformed "into
an orderly series of functional necessities" in which the
Oedipus Complex was seen as an ordinary stage in sex role
socialization. 38
Then by the end of the 1960s, the experts shifted once
again, this time away from nurturing and protecting
children. The experts blamed the social movements and
upheaval of the 1960s on the permissiveness model, and began
to encourage some of the very characteristics they had
37Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 233.
38Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
,
p. 249.
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denounced m the domineering mother
.
39
Ehrenreich and English, the turnaround
the experts lost status.
But according to
was so abrupt that
Defining Needs and Practices
Of course, Ehrenreich and English are only two of the
many authors who have documented the rise of experts and
their influence on women, others such as Adrienne Rich have
shown that the advice given to women, mostly by male health
professionals, has reflected male needs and fantasies about
women, and male interest in controlling women, particularly
m the realms of sexuality and motherhood
.
40 Despite
claiming to offer scientific rationales for their
prescriptions for behavior, today's experts are as time
specific as their predecessors. They claim to further the
goals of self-fulfillment and personal happiness, all the
while teaching self-discipline, self-control, and
self-sacrifice. For example, Spock, Brazelton, and Leach all
have urged women to stay home with their children, at least
m the early years. Although Spock and Brazelton have backed
off on this somewhat in response to the growing numbers of
mothers who work outside the home, they still suggest a
single primary caregiver. Leach still insists one parent
39Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good, p. 259.
4()Adrienne Rich, “Compulsory Heterosexuality,” p. 29
r at least the first three
stay home with the child fo
years
.
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Sharon Hays argues in her book. The Cultural
Contradictions of Motherhood, that this intensive,
expert-guided, and gendered model of raising children calls
for mothers to spend huge amounts of time, energy, and money
on their children as a defense against the larger social
deteriorating social ties and commitments
.
42 This is
contradiction in a culture in which so many mothers of
Young children work outside their homes, and in which
behavior in nearly every other aspect of life is guided by
self-interest. What makes the hard work of mothering more
palatable, according to Hariette Marshall, who has analyzed
childcare manuals in Great Britain, is that the expert
guidance portrays motherhood only in positive terms - as
See Spock, Dr. Spock s Baby and ( hdd ( 'are, (New York: Pocket Books 1985) first
published in 1946, revised and updated, Brazelton, Infants and Mothers, and Leach ] Baby
and t hild Brazelton, in a speech delivered in Springfield, MA. in February of 1993, said
that when his daughters became mothers they persuaded him that young children would
not be irreparably harmed if their mothers worked outside the home. Leach, in her latest
book. Children First, continued to insist someone be home with children for at least the
first three years. Leach says no single salary can pay someone to do for children what
mothers are expected to do for love, pointing out that even traditional nannies had nursery
maids who worked for them (p. 94-5). She begs the question of which parent should be
the one to stay home, but seems to suggest it should be the mother.
Hays, The ( ultural ( ontradictions, p. xi-xiii, 8. Hays says the dominant contemporary
model of mothering serves men, capitalism, the state, the middle class, and whites - by
sparing men from competition in the workforce, raising children to be good consumers
and obedient citizens, and producing workers for the future at a relatively low cost
(p 162-3).
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"^problematically fulfilling and effortlessly taking its
own course."43
Today's experts again define themselves as objective
and above special interests. Their prescriptive texts
attempt to represent and define mothers' needs, and define
the practices mother should use to satisfy those needs. The
needs emphasize childrearing over all other concerns. The
needs are defined as ranging from nutrition and exercise
during pregnancy and breastfeeding, to schedules for
feeding, bathing, and sleep for infants and young children.
While diet and exercise are important to a healthy
pregnancy, they are used to introduce mothers to the
discipline that will be expected of them in their new role
in areas in which such disciplinary practices could more
easily be contested.
For example, mothers are now encouraged to breastfeed
(they were not in the 1950s)
,
and those who do breastfeed
are encouraged to count the number of wet diapers (6-8) and
bowel movements (2-5) each day to make sure they are
producing enough milk for their babies. The message is that
43Hariette Marshall, “The Social Construction of Motherhood: An Analysis of Childcare
and Parenting Manuals,” in Ann Phoenix, Anne Woollett, and Eva Lloyd, eds..
Motherhood: Meanings, Practices and Ideologies, (London: Sage Publications, 1991), p.
67-72. Marshall concludes that childcare manuals in Britain make it clear that in order to
mother adequately, women need to be with their children 24 hours a day, and to be
continually and actively engaged with them (p. 83). If children do not develop normally,
the mother is blamed. This not only produces guilt in mothers but puts responsibility for
the next generation on individual women, and blames all social problems on faulty
mothering, according to Marshall.
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the way to know your babv i c t-nv--;o y s thriving is to count diapers
and measure weight gain; the only measures considered valid
are those entrenched in the authority of the experts.* This
practice feeds the anxiety that is produced when doctors and
other experts" suggest mothers may not be able to produce
enough milk, an anxiety which in turn may reduce mrlk
production. Penelope Leach's Your Baby Your Child starts its
section on breastfeeding this way:
eas5
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Although Leach goes on to assure "glorious" times ahead if
women do not give up on breastfeeding, her ominous beginning
reinforces the fears she says women feel about
breastfeeding. Later in the book she begins a section on
breastfeeding with another warning, "Underfeeding in a
breast-fed baby can creep up on you very gradually in a way
which is unfairly difficult to spot ."46
Texts that urge women to count wet diapers if they are concerned about having enouoh
milk, include Penelope Leach, Your Baby and Child: From Birth to Age Five
,
(New York
Alfred A. Knopf, 1988); John J. Fisher, ed., From Baby to Toddler
,
(New York Perigee
Books, 1988), p 35-6;
' S
4
-"Penelope Leach, Your Baby and Child, p. 52.
46Leach, Your Baby and Child
,
p. 127. In her later book. Children First, Leach seems
more aware of the effects of social warnings that babies may not get enough breast milk
She debunks breastfeeding advice - such as nursing three minutes on each breast - as a
deterrent to milk production (because longer feedings stimulate more milk production)
and baby satisfaction (because the first milk out is diluted, the later milk richer in calories
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Compare Leach's approach with the La Leche League's
assurance that 90 percent of breastfeeding is mental
attitude, and 10 percent is technique - thus breastfeeding
"flourishes on the power of positive thinking. "47 The La
Leche League asserts "there is nothing mystical or magrcal
about producing enough milk to satisfy your baby's needs;"
all that is required is understanding the process of milk
production. 48 Although the League says concerned mothers may
count diapers and measure weight gain, it offers
alternatives such as whether baby is nursing frequently on
both breasts at each feeding, baby appears healthy with good
color and resilient skin, is alert and active with good
muscle tone. 49 The League, which claims to help more than
300,000 breastfeeding women a year in 45 countries including
the United States, offers an alternative approach toward the
topic of breastfeeding — something which is not true of
many of the areas of "expert" advice on surveillance and
examination
.
50
and nutrients that will satisfy the baby for longer and promote weight gain) (p. 60-61).
The La Leche League, The Womanly Art ofBreastfeeding, (Franklin Park, 111 La
Leche League International, 1987, Fourth Revised Edition), p. 1 15. The League,
acknowledging the concern mothers have over milk production, lists two subsections in
the Table of Contents that ask in their titles whether baby is getting enough milk. Two
other sections are titled “Increasing Your Milk Supply” and “Slow Weight Gain.” The
League insists you can know whether your child is getting enough milk if the baby nurses
every two or three hours, and is gaining wait, growing in length, active and alert. But if
you need reassurance you can count wet diapers and bowel movements, and weigh and
measure the baby regularly (p. 76-77).
48The La Leche League, The Womanly Art ofBreastfeeding, p. 144
49The La Leche League, The Womanly Art ofBreastfeeding, p. 145.
50The La Leche League, Ihe Womanly Art ofBreastfeeding, p. xii.
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In another example of disciplinary practices, Deborah
Shaw Lewis in Motherhood Stress: Finding Encouragement in
the Ultimate Helping Profession, includes in her advice to
mothers to make changes in their practices at dinner time,
so that toddlers do not get overstimulated and become
behavior problems. 5. Lewis and other psychologists offering
advice on motherhood practices tell mothers to do most meal
preparations ahead of time - when the toddler are napping
and before older siblings get home from school if the mother
is at home; the night before after the children go to bed if
the mother works outside the home during the day. Mothers
are told to stay off the telephone during the late afternoon
and evening hours so they will have more time to devote to
their children. Or mothers are encouraged to keep diaries of
their children's behaviors, and their own responses to the
behaviors, to help them see patterns of their own practices
that they might address. Ann Phoenix and Anne Woollett argue
that such social and psychological constructions of
normal," "good," or "ideal" mothering runs counter to the
reality of motherhood for many women .
^
5
1
Deborah Shaw Lewis, with Gregg Lewis, Motherhood Stress: Finding Encouragement
in the Ultimate Helping Profession, (Dallas: Word publishing, 1989).
Ann Phoenix and Anne Woollett, “Motherhood: Social Construction, Politics, and
Psychology,” in Phoenix, Woollett, and Eva Lloyd, eds., Motherhood
,
p. 13 Phoenix and
Woollett argue that psychology has been instrumental in constructing the ways in which
motherhood is seen, and in maintaining mothers in their current social position. Mothers
are socially constructed as pathological, and differences between mothers are not
adequately studied or reported Mothers learn early that it is extremely difficult to mother
well.
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These elements of surveillance and examination fit
Foucault's model of disciplinary power which entails
knowledge and power over indrvidual bodies, including
capacities, gestures, movements, locations and behavior. The
disciplinary practices that result entail the everyday
activities and habits of mothers, compelled "not through the
threat of violence or force, but rather by creating desires,
attaching individuals to specific identities, and
establishing norms against which individuals and their
behaviors and bodies are judged and against which they
police themselves ." 53
In the case of counting wet and soiled diapers, the
"experts" exploit the mother's desire to have a healthy
baby; they attach to the mother the identity of being
ultimately responsible for achieving a healthy baby; and
they establish norms against which the mother measures
whether she has achieved a healthy baby. Of course,
virtually all mothers want healthy babies. The question is
whether they really need to keep a chart of wet and soiled
diapers and then use it to prove to the doctor that their
bodies measure up by producing enough milk to meet the
"norm." In the case of keeping a diary of child behaviors,
the "experts" exploit the mothers' desires to have
civilized children and peaceful time with them; they
53Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body
,
(New York:
Routledge, 1991 ), p. 68.
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attach to the mother the identic w •ntity of being responsible for
achieving these goals; and they establish noY sT: i rms so that the
mother can measure whether she has achieved them. In other
practices, such as those that result from the desire not to
spank the child, or the desire to combat infertility, „e
will see that even the desire behind the practices are
constructed.
Breastfeeding mothers count diapers and weigh their
babies not under threat of force, but because they desire
healthy babies and they know that as mothers they are held
responsible for producing healthy babies. They compare
themselves and their hshi oc th-mobab es with the norm, adjusting their
own behavior when they or their babies do not measure up.
They learn to see that they can make themselves good mothers
by heeding experts who, in a relationship of power, act on
their bodies and thoughts in a way that shapes their
behaviors and practices. This happens at the level of
ongoing subjugation, at what Foucault calls "the level of
the continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our
bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviors ." 54 That
is, this happens at the level that subjects are constituted
as a result of the effects of power.
As children get older, mothers are bombarded with
advice on how to develop good eating and sleeping habits and
4Foucault, Power Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 97.
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model behavior in their children by discrplining the
mothers' own behavior and responses to their children. For
example, current prescriptive advice in boohs and magazines
call for mothers to remain calm and in control of their
emotions at all times. One example of this comes from the
psychologist Sylvia Rimm, whose "ultimate tip" on
childrearing in her book Sylvia Rimm' s Smart Parenting
offers this: if you don't feel in charge, pretend you are
.
55
The emphasis is on control, or the illusion of control.
Mothers often are presented as out of control, and in
need of training to discipline themselves. For example,
Leach in the concluding chapter to Children First : What our
society must do - and is not doing - for our children today
,
emphasizes the need for parental training
.
56
"Bringing up
children is probably the most difficult life task people
undertake, yet society offers less preparation for it than
for any other," according to Leach. She reports that even
people who wish to keep childrearing practices free of
public regulation "must accept that education concerning
them is a public responsibility. Private domains (families)
are now too limited and fragmented to be relied upon as sole
conduits for information ." 57 According to Leach, new parents
^Dr. Sylvia Rimm ’s Smart Parenting: How to Raise a Happy, Achieving Child. (New
York: Crown Publishing, 1996).
56Penelope Leach, Children First: What our society must do - and is not doing
-for our
children today
,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), p 241.57Leach, Children First
,
p. 240.
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in the Western world, many of whom have never known or held
an infant, have idealized expectations of babies from
advertising, she asks, "Who would embark on breeding horses
or rearing dogs in such ignorance?"** The only people who
should become parents, Leach says, are those willing to be
trained and willing to put the child (ren) first for at least
three years.« She does not address that for the most part
it is mothers who she is asking to be so self-disciplined,
self-controlled, and self-sacrificing. And when she
describes the impossible predicament of many parents, she
does not acknowledge that it usually is mothers who are
denied recognition, or blamed.
Parenting is set about with prescriptive andproscriptive laws and regulations concerning
children's safety and well-being, but it is not
cushioned by an equivalent set of privileges.Doing it well brings people no special personal orinstitutional recognition but doing it badlybrings personal criticism, institutional
intervention and the final legal sanction oflosing their parental rights - losing their
children
.
60
Leach declares the disadvantages doled out to mothers,
especially in the workplace, and reassures new parents that
their uncertainty about their new lives is typical. But her
message is the same as that from many other experts: it is
normal to be confused; I can help. She critiques many
I
-
-^Leach, Children First
,
p. 241.
59Leach, Children First, p. 242.
60Leach, Children First, p. 6.
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western practices that appear to wort agarnst mothers such
as their burden of doing most housework and childcare, and
so seems sensitive to mothers' needs - but she also makes
it clear that many mothers do not know what they are doing,
and even if they think they do they are being misled. For
example, Leach says mothers do not hold their infants enough
because they have been advised such treatment will spoil
their babies; the result is that both mothers and babies are
miserable
.
61
T. Berry Brazelton in his Infants and Mothers takes a
different tact on training and intensive mothering, calling
mothering "too complex and instinctive to teach ."62 when he
does this he makes it clear that mothers are responsible for
children. But he also spends hundreds of pages telling
mothers how to be better at that job. In Infants and Mothers
he presents a month-by-month description of the stages of
infancy, insisting that such information is crucial to good
parenting. He predicts for parents the wants and needs of
their children based on their birth order and on whether
their character is active, quiet, or average. In his book,
What Every Baby Knows, Brazelton urges parents to seek help
from experts such as pediatricians, child psychologists, and
social workers whenever they feel it is necessary
.
63
61 Leach, Children First, p. 65-6.
62T. Berry Brazelton, Infants and Mothers, (New York: Dalacorte, 1983), p. 42.
63Brazelton, What Every Baby Knows, (New York: Ballantine, 1987), p. 38, 264.
141
Being trained and in control today includes never
spanking your child, because that teaches a physical and
violent response to frustration. But this is only the most
recent installment in advice on physical punishment which
has flip-flopped from one extreme to the other. Thus, not
spanking becomes a historically specific prescription and
practice. The result is that although Krystie Keller reports
that more than 55 percent of American parents say they spank
their children64 - books, and articles rn magazines and
newspapers, suggest parents feel more guilt and shame about
it now than when spanking was a recommended practice. 65 The
guilt and shame is part of what inspires mothers to try
harder to follow the prescriptive advice and match the
prescriptive images that will make them good mothers.
Keller starts her discussion of spanking with
statistics on the U.S. murder rate. She points out that
African Americans66 traditionally use more physical
punishment to discipline their children than do whites, and
links that to the statistic that young black men suffer the
highest homicide rate at 85.6 deaths per 100
,
0 0 0. 67 Alice
,
K
7st :e Keller’
“An Argument Against Spanking,” in Hannah Nuba et al eds.. Resources
fo/ Early ( hildhood: A Handbook
,
(New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1994), p 171.K See for example, Alvine H. Price and Jay A. Parry, Discipline: 101 Alternatives to
Nagging, Yelling, and Spanking, (Brite Music Inc., 1983), p. 3, and throughout.
’ There is no agreement on which term is best to use to describe black Americans. I use
the words African American and black interchangeably in this chapter and in Chapter Four
not to take sides in that debate but in an effort to be descriptive and inclusive without
being offensive.
67
Krystie Keller, “An Argument Against Spanking,” p. 172.
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Miller in For Your Own Good, concludes that the practice of
Physical punishment is an example of misguided parenting
that results in such offspring as Adolf Hitler, a child
murderer, and a prostitute - that is, not the way mothers
Should want their children to turn out « Others, including
a cover story in Parents magazine, lament the return of the
practice of spanking and insist it is not the loving and
caring „ay to discipline - not the way "good" mothers
respond to their children.
I am not trying to make a case for or against spanking.
I simply want to show the historical transformation of
advice and reveal some of the techniques involved in
producing certain practices at certain points in time, such
as the scare tactics in the examples above that are intended
to produce certain daily regimens or else guilt and shame.
Even though the effort to end the practice of spanking is
not entirely successful, the effort still has the potential
to produce useful results in the byproduct of guilt and
shame since these may prompt some mothers to try to do
"better .
"
For many mothers, the contemporary disciplinary
practice that prohibits spanking may result in personal
liberation from a history of abuse, or cultural
transformation by contributing to less violent children. But
Alice Miller, For Your Own Good, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983).
9Nancy Samalin and Catherine Whitney, “What’s Wrong with Spanking?” Parents May
1995, p. 35-36.
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when the prohibition is imposed categorically and often
without elaboration of liable alternatives, it can result in
distraught mothers and unruly children, which seems to
confirm the cultural image that mothers need to learn how to
handle their children.
In another example, experts and social scripts urge
women to do all they can to conceive children. Social
P ssure to engage in practices to combat infertility is
extreme, with little mention of the high cost not just in
dollars but in the physical discomfort and heartbreak
involved in what usually has a less than 10 percent chance
of success. When mothers "choose" such procedures rather
than adopt or go childless, they illustrate one of the ways
in which disciplinary practices are both imposed on subjects
and voluntarily sought. 70 Practices to combat infertility
may result in the fulfillment of having a baby. But when
such practices result in obsession and a sense of failure,
the practices function as if in collusion with the cultural
conditions that produced them, including compulsory
biological parenthood.
70Of course the practices involved in combating infertility, and the reasons women pursue
t em, are much more complicated than this and often involve partners and their reasons.
See Janice Raymond, Women as Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle over
Women ’s Freedom, (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993); Judith Rodin and Aila Collins,
eds.
.
Women and New Reproductive Technologies: Medical, Psychological, Legal, and
Ethical Dilemmas, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991); and Barbara Katz
Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology’ in a Patriarchal Society'
(New York: W.W Norton & Co., 1989).
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One of the problems is that the measure of the quality
of their mothering is limited: the prescriptive texts named
here and discussed in more detail later in this chapter say
that women are fit mnthpro -f +--uo e s if they conform to the normative
ideal
, for example and do not spank; or they are unfit
mothers if they do not spank. Because of this, if they do
spank they feel guilt and shame. If they do not spank and
their children still are not well behaved, they feel
disappointment in the behavior of their children, which
results in anxiety and guilt at not having done well enough.
Again, more examples of such prescriptive advice will
be presented at the end of the chapter. The point I am
stressing now is that when mothers engage in these practices
they recreate themselves, redefine who they are. They may
change their behavior by ending their practice of spanking,
for example, which changes who they are. The discourses and
the practices mothers engage in, in Foucault's words, turn
their bodies into individuals of particular kinds, and
create ideologically appropriate subjects. The techniques,
such as guilt and shame, produce practices, such as
alternatives to spanking, that construct certain sorts of
bodies with particular kinds of power and capacities.
Alternatives to spanking, such as those recommended in Alvin
Price and Jay Parry's Discipline: 101 Alternatives to
Nagging
, Yelling , and. Spanking, require self-control,
consistency, and other self-disciplining practices, not to
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mention time and space (to separate children from each
other, or yourself from them, for example ). 71
The techniques involved in the prescriptive discourses
that produce such practices incite and channel desires to
achieve certain bodily forms, behaviors, and relationships.
Foucault describes techniques as daily regimens, timetables,
methods for distributing and organizing bodies in space,
drills, training exercises, as well as examination and
surveillance techniques. Although some mothers may acquire
skills and develop competencies which enhance them in their
practices of motherhood, at the same time they lose power by
being subjugated by theses techniques. That is, Foucault's
model of disciplinary power increases the power of
individuals at the same time as it renders them more docile.
II mothers succeed in never spanking, they may have acquired
useful skill. If they do not succeed, they feel inadequate.
Of course, this has not always been the case. It was not so
long ago that experts advised "spare the rod and spoil the
child. in tact, mothers lose control over the range of
possibilities for their practices in part because the
possibilities are so time specific. Any look at historical
studies of attitudes toward childrearing shows dramatic
71 Price and Parry, Discipline
,
especially p. 159-172. I do not mean to discount their
advice, which was among the least judgmental that I found, but to show that the
underlying assumptions are the same: that women are better mothers, that is they have
better-behaved children, when they possess self-control and self-discipline.
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changes over time and only narrow possibilities
moment in time
.
72
at any
As we saw in the discussion of Ehrenreich and English
earlier in this chapter, the changes in advice damaged the
experts' credibility. Ehrenreich and English concluded,
"'Science,' applied to child raising, began to look like a
chameleon which could match any national mood or corporate
need. Further, although Ehrenreich and English do not
include much on this, it is clear from the work of other
authors that the details of prescriptive texts and responses
to them vary by race and class. K. Sue Jewell points out,
for example, that African American women often ignore or
resist the normative ideal presented by American culture
writ large, and instead define themselves according to their
own microculture
.
74 But according to Jewell, not all African
American women reject all western cultural images of
womanhood since they, too, want to obtain the rewards that
result from conforming to cultural images.
Barbara Christian shows that in many African American
communities, "the idea that mothers should live lives of
72See for example, Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good
;
Philippe Aires, Centuries
oft hildhood: A Social History ofFamily Life, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962),
Jacques Donzelot, The Policing ofFamilies, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), Steven
Mintz and Susan Kellog, Domestic Revolution: A Social History ofAmerican Family
Life, (New York. Free Press, 1988); and Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were:
American Families and the Nostalgia Trap, (New York. Basic Books, 1992).
73Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good, p. 264.
74K. Sue Jewell, From Mammy to Miss America and Beyond: Cultural Images and the
Shaping of U.S. Social Policy, (New York. Routledge, 1993), p 68.
147
sacrifice has come to be seen as the norm ." 75 This i s
perpetuated by black men who, in the interests of
patriarchal domination, create this controlling image when
they glorify black mothers as embodying devotion,
self-sacrifice and unconditional love, according to
Christian. Many poor mothers who come into contact with
the macroculture through government agencies and their
experts often have to conform in order to receive government
benefits
.
77 In fact, the American welfare system regulates
the lives of women in many ways — from efforts to
discipline and Americanize the urban poor and immigrants, to
restrictions which have changed the makeup of poor families.
But no matter what race, class or time period is
involved, and no matter whether mothers are forced to take
the expert advice or pay top dollar for it, the standard
used in prescriptive texts is for the most part that of
white, middle-class motherhood
.
78 This standard is produced
in symbolic representations which carry messages that say
that mothers are nurturing, caring, sacrificing, and,
although heterosexual, they are asexual. Mothers are
75Barbara Christian, Black Feminist Criticism: Perspectives on Black Women Writers(New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), p. 239.
76This was the image presented by Louis Farakahn for the Million Man March in October
1995. Black women were expected to offer physical, emotional, and financial support, but
were not welcome to join the men at the march.
77Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policyfrom
Colonial Times to the Present
,
(Boston: South End Press, 1988).
Alice Adams, “Maternal Bonds: Recent Literature on Mothering SIGNS Winter 1995
Vol. 2, No. 2.
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responsible for their children and the men in their lives.
As we saw in Chapter One, this means they are easy targets
for blame when anything goes wrong, and for the burden of
making the sacrifices to make everything right.
The blaming of mothers is applied to African American
women in the stereotype of the underachieving Welfare Queen,
and its opposite, the overachieving Black Lady. Wahneema
Lubiano asserts that what she calls the narrative of the
Welfare Queen insists that single black mothers are the
cause, rather than the effect, of the welfare state because
they cannot take care of their children
.
79 The
welfare-dependent single mother is "the shortest possible
shorthand for the pathology of poor, urban, black
culture ." 80 By not achieving, this mother passes on the
pathology. The flip side, in the narrative of the Black Lady
who disproportionately overachieves, ensures the
underachievement of black men. The message of these
narratives are that these two "types" are responsible for
the disadvantaged status of all African Americans, according
to Lubiano.
Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels: Ideological
War by Narrative Means,” in Toni Morrison ed., Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power:
Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the Construction ofSocial Reality, (New
York. Pantheon Books, 1992), p. 340.
8<)Lubiano, “Black Ladies, Welfare Queens,” p. 335,
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Explosion of Prescriptive Sources
The United States has seen an explosion of prescriptive
sources in the last decades of the twentieth century, „hich
may be seen as a response to two changes among mothers
Women now give birth over a four-decade span of their lives,
and they are turning by the millions to the growing number
of mainstream sources of advice on what is termed parenting
but what is overwhelmingly aimed at mothers. This is
evidence that the legitimacy of experts, whose decline
Ehrenreich and English document, has risen again.
The four decades of fertility represents a new twist in
the indispensability of advice to new mothers. The advice
always has exploited the isolation of women from their
extended families and from each other. But when Winnicott
and Spock wrote their advice for mothers in the 1950s and
1960s, most of their readers — who lived or aspired to the
dominant standards of white, middle class — bore their
children in the context of family and friends, and during
the same stage or time of their lives as other women. Today,
the practice is that women give birth for the first time at
some point during a four-decade span of their lives. This
means they are less likely to be having their children when
their sisters, friends and neighbors do. Further, their
mothers are more likely to be more removed from their own
birthing experiences and, if by chance they live nearby, may
be too elderly to be of much physical help.
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Today there are 24 parenting magazines, more than half
of which were established in the last 10 years. « Nineteen
of the 24 magazines were established since 1975. They have a
combined circulation of over 13 million - about 8 million
of that number is paid for, the remaining 5 million being
distributed free to doctors' offices, hospital waiting
rooms, and pregnant women. Estimated readership is three
persons per magazine, for a total readership at nearly 40
million
.
82
The science on which most the stories in the mainstream
magazines are based comes from the studies and experiences
of psychiatrists and other professional "experts." One
example is a series of studies published in the American
Journal of Public Health in 1995 that claimed to be the
nation's most in-depth research on retardation among school
children. The studies concluded that mothers who never
finished high school are four times more likely to have
mentally retarded children than better-educated mothers.
Fathers are never mentioned in the research. 8^
This statistic and the others that follow in the paragraph are from The 1995 Working
Press of the Nation: Magazines and Internal Publications Directory
,
Vol.. 2, 45th ed .,(New Providence, NJ: Reed Reference Publishing Co., 1994). A 1981 survey, quoted by
Hays in The ( ultural ( ontradictions
,
found that 97 percent of American mothers read a
least one childrearing manual, and nearly 75 percent consulted two or more (p. 51).
These numbers do not include an additional three magazines categorized as women’s
magazines but which are specifically for or about mothers - including Family Circle
magazine with a paid circulation of 5 million, and Working Mother magazine established in
1978 with a paid circulation of 850,000.
83The research reports, first published in the American Journal of Public Health, March
1995, (Vol 85, No. 3, p. 302-306; 312-334), also noted factors of race and poverty. But
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Most of the parenting" magazines are aimed directly at
mothers, which is made clear in the text, the photographs,
and the advertisements. The authors of the articles are
usually experts, though sometimes they are mothers writing
about their own experiences. Further, more and more of the
"experts" of today's prescriptive advice in magazines and
books are women, many of whom are mothers and present
themselves as "one of you." But most offer the same messages
as male experts. And an increasing amount of the literature
now is produced by manufacturers of products or drugs which
have a clear interest in shaping mothers' attitudes toward
their products.
One such prescriptive booklet prepared by Mead Johnson,
a manufacturer of infant formula including the popular
Enfamil, is included in a packet of materials given to
pregnant women by the largest Health Maintenance
Organization in Massachusetts, Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Also
included are several pieces of information from the local
hospital with which the HMO office is affiliated, and a
90-page glossy commercial magazine full of prescriptive
articles. The Mead Johnson booklet instructs mothers not to
be pressured into breastfeeding.
The 50-page booklet, entitled "Delivery & Beyond: The
Practical Aspects of Parenting in the Early Stages," starts
their effort to prove race does not play a larger role in intelligence than preventable
socioeconomic problems is made at the expense of mothers by blaming the practices of
mothers for discrepancies in intelligence.
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With a statement that is more true than most women realize
when they read it. "Both before and after you have your
baby, you'll be receiving advice from many directions." It
goes on, "The best advice is given by your own doctor or
qualified health practitioner. Your doctor should be your
prime adviser in everything that concerns your health or the
health of your child.” And of course it i s her doctor who
has just given her this booklet, which goes on to extol the
advantages of Mead Johnson products.
The introduction to Part One, entitled "Having Your
Baby," says.
The approaching birth of your child undoubtedly
exhilarates you. And, if it's your first child, you
may be a little apprehensive also. You want
everything to be perfect for your baby. And you’re
afraid you may not measure up -- not be the mother
or father you'd like your baby to have. Don't worry
Your love and concern are the most important
ingredients for successful parenthood. For the
technical knowledge you need, there's plenty of
help
.
Part Three of the booklet, entitled "Feeding Your
Baby, states that today both medical and popular opinion
favor breastfeeding, and offers the reasons in a single
paragraph. Then, after four paragraphs on how wonderful
infant formula is today, it ends the section urging the
reader to make her own decision about whether to breastfeed,
and stating that whatever her decision, "it will be thp
for you and your baby" (underlined in the
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original)
nutrition
Throughout the booklet is emphasized that good
is an expression of love, and that love and
concern are the most important knowledge mothers need
booklet, then, offers
= good nutrition.
some prescriptive advice on love
The
love
Relationships to Experts
is in their daily practices that mothers try, and
sometimes fail, to measure up. it is in their daily answers
to such questions as whether to spank or not, bathe daily or
not, speak frankly or censor language, whether they cuddle
enough, read enough, whether they work for pay in or outside
of their homes, and so on. Their answers come from the
images around them, including prescriptions that make it
clear the goal should be to get the housework and laundry
done amidst the confusion of a house full of kids, smiling
and enjoying the children all the while (more on this
later)
. These images then are reinforced in advertisements
such as a recent one for a laundry detergent which takes
into account that women make up a more sophisticated
audience today than in the past. The ad starts, "Whether you
like it or not, you're judged by how white and bright your
kids' clothes are," and shows a woman fussing with the
collar on her little girl's dress. We do not need to be told
that the woman is a mother, or that the words are aimed at
mothers; we can see it very clearly from the image. The
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message is: this is who mothers are
should care about.
and this is what they
When expert advice is used as an objective standard,
mothers necessarily tail because they cannot measure up to
the ideals presented. Any look at recent scholarship,
newspaper and magazine reports, or Congressional activity
will show, f0r example, that motherhood is under constant
critical scrutiny. The tendency is to blame mothers for
problems; the solution is to get more information to
mothers, to train mothers so they can get better at their
jobs. In addition, many public policies revolve around
definitions of motherhood as presented or reflected in these
texts
.
There is a self-perpetuating logic in the way that
prescriptive texts work. The expert authors tend to present
motherhood as a problem that must be solved, and insert
themselves and their advice as the knowledge that can
provide the solution. Thus they establish themselves as
teachers of self-governing. The prescriptive texts make
"experts" necessary by defining the problem mothers must
solve. They make the existence of "experts" possible by
supplying the underlying rationale for mothers' practices.
They make prescriptive texts effective by providing the
practical knowledge mothers then believe they require.
That is, the experts present descriptions and advice
that produce "truths" -- or as we have seen from Ehrenreich
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and English, what appears to be "true- at a particular tlme
and place. In this process the experts produce aspirations
and desires. Once desires are there - such as not to spank,
or to combat infertility - the experts have established a
relationship of power from which they can act on bodies and
thoughts in a way that shapes mothers' behaviors and
Practices. This happens at the level of ongoing sub : ugatron
mentioned earlier, at the level at which subjects are
constituted as a result of the effects of powers.
That is, at the same time that prescriptive texts
create a space for "experts ” -inq-i- j-t_, justify their existence, and
assure their impact, they do two other things. They
establish a relationship of power, and the advice they
dispense creates and reinforces particular spheres of
movement for mothers and their activities. The "experts" and
their discourses help construct maternal bodies that are
socially appropriate. Maternal bodies thus are less the
result of biological difference than the effects of socially
and historically specific practices. That is, maternal
bodies and practices are based on relations of power.
Analyzing the influence of prescriptive texts on
maternal bodies from a Foucauldian approach allows a focus
on how bodies are turned into individuals of particular
kinds. This is done by examining the ways in which
discourses employed by prescriptive texts create practices
which create ideologically appropriate subjects, and the
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ways in which practices construct certarn sorts of bodres
with particular hinds of power and capacity. For Foucault,
the emergence of disciplinary techniques such as
surveillance, examination, and discipline, make it possible
to obtain knowledge about individuals, and with that
knowledge comes power. Disciplinary practices are involved
m such divisions as sane/insane, as well as "good"
mother/"bad" mother, which are used for the purposes of
normalization and social control.
Governmental lty is a "problematizing activity," in
Foucault’s view. It posits a problem and inserts itself as
the solution to that problem. Motherhood is a construct in
its aspect as a social institution, in its aspect as an
ideology, and in its practices which implicate it in the
"complex and multiple practices of a 'governmentality .'" 84
As we saw in Chapter Two, by governmentality Foucault means
the contact between the technologies of domination of
others, and the technologies of the self. The former
objectifies the subject as technologies of power determine
the conduct of individuals and submit them to domination;
the latter permits individuals to effect operations on
themselves to transform themselves, that is, to become
subj ects . 85
84Foucault, The Use ofPleasure: The History ofSexuality, Vol. 2, (London: Penguin
Viking, 1985), preface.
85Foucault, “Technologies of the Self’ in Martin, Gutman, and Hutton, eds., Technologies
of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault
,
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts
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Foucault uses the term policing over the course of his
early work as a positive intervention in behavior, and later
introduces the concept of governmentality in which, in part,
individuals may be seen as policing themselves, disciplining
themselves as they constitute themselves as subjects. The
policing process created a frame of mind that seeks explicit
definitions of what behavior is appropriate. Through the
techniques of policing, individuals could be integrated into
the social, and eventually come to discipline themselves.
That is, the policing function paved the way for the
self
-discipline through which we govern ourselves.
The emphasis thus shifts from government through
society to government through individuals -- for our
purposes, through mothers — as they exercise what appears
as "free choice" but is in fact limited by the narrow
possibilities at any particular moment in time. Mothers
become subjected when their goals come to match the goals
set out to fulfill the social good, when they mobilize
themselves m the interests of society. What appears to be a
personal choice made freely is in fact a matter of
self-discipline to power technologies
.
Press, 1988), p. 18-19.
86
Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of work in Progress” in Dreyfus
and Rabinow, eds., Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and hermeneutics, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983), Barbara Cruickshank, “Revolutions Within:
Self-Government and Self-Esteem,” Economy and Society (Vol 22 No 3 August 1993)
p. 342.
’ ’
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In Ian Hacking's terms, it is the self-knowledge of the
mothers, rather than force, that keeps them in line,
following expert advice.*? The techniques of the self that
mothers learn and use - on themselves and their children -
include such things as exercise, diet, seeking expert advice
on how to respond to their children, and trying to be
exemplary role models. Although these techniques feel like
private matters, even the seeking of advice from experts has
been shaped by exposure to the experts.
In this process, the new requirements of control are
desires and powers. For example, motherhood may be a desire
for many women but it is also a way in which women are
controlled. Mothers may desire not to spank their children,
but when that goal matches the goals set out to fulfill the
social good, they also are mobilizing themselves in the
interests of society. When the desire to have children
prompts some women go through expensive and painful
procedures to combat infertility to fulfill the social
strictures for biological motherhood, they are mobilizing
themselves in the interests of society at least as much, or
more so, than in their own interests.
Yet individuals are not victims or passive consumers;
they are active participants. The power in the technologies
of power always presupposes capacity as an agent. According
87Ian Hacking, “Self-Improvement,” in David Couzens Hoy, ed., Foucault: A Critical
Reader
,
(New York. Blackwell, 1986), p. 236.
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to Foucault, power is addressed to individuals who are free
t0 BUt “ 13 the the subject
' s own will
that constitutes the new technology of the self.** The
sacrifice is made willingly, to constitute a new self.*’
Mothers sacrifice their will to the will of the experts and
constitute a new self. They are the subject of needs and
aspirations based in the cultural scripts, and they are the
object of the experts - aware of what they want but not
always of what is being done to them* Yet, as discussed in
Chapter Two, mothers can break away from the cultural
scripts by questioning, challenging, and reinterpreting the
identities and values that the scripts assign to them.
Although Foucault does not explain the source of this
freedom to act, he suggests that it lies in our way of
thinking, which is linked to tradition. He suggests changing
our relationships with tradition: if we think differently
about what has happened before, we can think differently
about our possibilities.
Without such challenging and reinterpretation of
cultural scripts, mothers often help fulfill objectives of
experts in the name of the social good, not through coercive
enforcement of control by threat of punishment or sanctions
but through the construction of themselves as social
^Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” p. 45.
89Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” p. 49.
90Foucault, “Governmentality” in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller eds.. The Foucault Effect:
Studies in Governmentality
,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 100.
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subjects with particular desires. « The experts often
succeed in their attempts to produce the desire in „omen to
use scientific childraising, and new reproductive
technologies when deciding how far to go to combat
infertility.
In fact, Denise Riley, among others, traces the
emergence of the new sphere of the social in the nineteenth
century which she says changed the concept of "women” by
furnishing it with a new terrain in which women became both
agents and objects of reform in unprecedented ways. 92 Female
social reformers took up social goals, often directed at
other women. Mothers were prime targets of this reform, but
m a way that continued to separate them from the political
— both because of the continued association of women with
nature and the new association of them with the social.
Thus, especially since the widespread availability of
contraception, it is not that women have been coerced into
privacy, into investing their lives in children and in
families, due only to inequities in institutions from the
labor market to education and childcare. Rather, their
commitments are prompted by cultural scripts, by the
activation by experts of individual guilt, personal anxiety
and private disappointment if they veer from the scripts.
;i Nikolas Rose, “Beyond the Public/Private Division: Law, Power and the Family,” in the
Journal ofLaw and Society, (Vol. 14
,
No. 1, Spring 1987 ), p. 72 .
Denise Riley, Am I That Name ? Feminism and the Category of “Women ” in History
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988 ) p. 51 .
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aspects of the processes by which individuals
constitute their selves and their lives, and come to
establish certain
’personal, aspirations and evaluations -«
The construction of subjectivities of motherhood
through mechanrsms of guilt and anxiety link mothers with
social, economic and political objectives to keep mothers
isolated at home and subordinate to men. The decisions
mothers make to engage in certain practices at given pointsm time are not as personal as they may appear. To
understand how women come to choose specific practices, we
must turn again to the link between power and subjectivity,
important to this are the practices and techniques through
which individuals actively fashion their own identities.
Mothers have been influenced to engage in specific practices
through the technologies of power which shape and constitute
subjectivity, which produce personal goals and desires that
promote social order and stability.
We can take as examples women who postpone motherhood
until the fourth decade of their fertility, and those who
become mothers in the first decade of their fertility. Many
married women who postpone motherhood until they are in
their 40s are in part responding to power mechanisms
directed at upper middle-class heterosexual career women to
solve one set of problems, including the need for two
;
-'Nikolas Rose, “Beyond the Public/Private Division,” p. 72-3
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incomes to maintain a certain desired standard of living,
and assurance of a higher income by establishing a career
first. Economic conditions help make this practice
acceptable, even inevitable, for this particular category of
mother. They mobilize themselves in the interests of society
by providing an income in order to give their children
advantages that require money, at the same time that they
empower themselves by taking advantage of the long feminist
struggle for women to have careers.
Teen mothers, most of whom are caught in a cycle of
poverty, are solving a different set of problems. They see
pregnancy as a way to create and have something of their
own, escaping from a certain set of responsibilities and
conditions such as hopelessness about the future (albeit
into another set of responsibilities for their children)
. Or
they see pregnancy as a way to resist white, middle-class
motherhood norms. They mobilize themselves in the interests
of society by perpetuating an underclass, and by bringing up
their children according to the expert advice they receive
(sometimes required to receive) in order to get public
assistance
.
Disciplining Mothers
An example of the mechanisms of control used by experts
once women have their babies comes from a mother who was
frustrated because her three-year-old child would not
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cooperate, especially when she tried to keep schedules such
as leaving for wort and daycare in the rooming
. When she
discussed this with a neighbor who had faced similar
problems with her child the year before, the neighbor
brought out several recently published books aimed at
mothers of young children, including Phelan's 1-2-3 Magic-
Training Your Preschoolers and Preteens to Do mat You Want;
Kevin Leman's Parenthood Without Hassles
, Well
,Almos ;* **
Lewis' Motherhood Stress: Finding Encouragement in the
Ultimate Helping Profession-, Pat Holt and Grace Ketterman'
s
When You Feel Like Screaming! Help for Frustrated Mothers;«
and Price and Parry's Discipline: 101 Alternatives to
Nagging, Yelling, and Spanking. The first four books
presented the message that if the reader were a better
mother, her child would behave properly. The books, directed
toward mothers, addressed the behavior of mothers more than
the behavior of children, and in so doing blamed the mothers
for their children's behavior. They played on the mothers'
individual guilt at having a child who did not behave,
personal anxiety at having to deal with the behavior, and
private disappointment that their children were not turning
out "right," that is, docile.
*1979)™
Leman
> Parenthood Without Hassles. Well. Almost, (Irvine, CA: Harvest House,
"Pat Holt and Grace Ketterman, When Yon Feel Like Screaming1 Help for Frustrated
Mothers, (Wheaton, III : H. Shaw Publishers, 1988 ).
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In this way, the books attempt to impose cultural
scripts on mothers, shaping and disciplining the practices
of mothers. The "expert" authors, most of them
psychologists, teach mothers how to discipline themselves.
The fifth book, Price and Parry's 101 Alternatives
, offers
constructive steps to help change unwanted behavior, without
blaming mothers. But even this book, as discussed earlier in
this chapter, encourages parents to be in control and so
equates good parenting with self-discipline and
self-control. Of course parents' behavior is important, but
most of these books, and examples of others that will
follow, blame parents for the problems they have with their
children, some going so far as to say parents are training
their children all wrong.
These texts help explain how certain practices are
employed at a specific time and place. Unless we question
the practices, they appear natural, inevitable. The neighbor
who lent the books had not noticed that they blamed her for
her child s behavior, but when this was pointed out to her
she was relieved. Reading those books had made her feel
anxious and disturbed, but she had not identified why.
Prescriptive texts help establish norms not because mothers
are victims or stupid, but because, as mothers engage in
practices to do the best they can by their children, they do
not always recognize how those practices are linked to
powers
.
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Phelan's book, 1-2-3 Magic: Training Your Preschoolers
and Preteens to Do What You Want, which also comes in a
120-minute video, describes itself as using the "wild animal
trainer model" to help parents learn to handle "normal
problems with normal kids
.
"*> It begins with the warning
that the methods must be used exactly as they are described
m the book. The author makes his philosophy clear when he
says that how mothers handle "normal" problems like picking
clothes up off the floor "has a tremendous effect on the
emotional well-being of both parent and child and in many
ways determines the nature of their relationship." 97 The
author insists most parents are at a disadvantage when they
try to handle such problems as temper tantrums, arguing,
cleaning rooms, whining, and so on, because they are not
trained, have difficulty acting reasonably in an emotional
situation, and are urged by their instincts to do what often
is the worst thing to do. Obviously, parents need help.
The messages to mothers are clear: it is normal for you
not to be able to get your children to do what needs to be
done, and it is normal to need to be trained to do so; do
not think about it or improvise or attempt to consider the
specific personality of your child; simply follow these
directions exactly if you want to succeed; and if you do not
follow these directions you risk harming your child’s
96Phelan, 1-2-3 Magic, p .l.
97Phelan, 1-2-3 Magic
,
p.3.
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emotional well-being a s well as your relationship with your
child. According to Phelan, "Dire consequences will ensue
unless you change your horrible parenting this minute. "9* He
cautions parents that they have choices: follow these rules,
and be good parents; continue as you are and ruin your
children. He begins the last chapter acknowledging some of
the traps of those who pursue prescriptive texts to improve
their parenting, and yet at the same time he adds to the
traps
.
Unfortunately, the net effect of many books onparenting is that in the long run they simply makeMom and Dad feel more guilty rather than more
effective. Now they know what they should be doing,but they also realize that they don't keep it up, sothey wind up feeling worse than they did when they
started. y
He does not distinguish his advice from that which he
criticizes, yet he suggests his offers more opportunity for
parents to be empowered.
Leman, a psychologist, also admits many prescriptive
texts confuse parents with contradictory advice, but urges
in his book Parenthood Without Hassles that they seek expert
advice nonetheless.
Those of us who are experts in the field of
child-rearing and psychology have done a pretty good
98Phelan, 1-2-3 Magic
,
p. 26.
"Phelan, 1-2-3 Magic, p. 57.
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Dob of confusing parents, the consumers.
sychologists who write in parents' magazines arecontinually confusing us. One week we have a storystating that bottle-fed babies are happy babies ande very next issue, we hear, "Mothers, don't robyour child of breast-feeding." The following week a
report "if
3 psychoanal ytical model might, If you breast-feed your child, he mightdevelop a perpetual pucker for the rest of his lifeand his psyche may be forever impaired "
Parenting is very difficult for us 'in that wesometimes cannot really see the product of our inputand work in child-rearing until it's too late
However, it's safe to say that our early input inparenthood pays off handsomely.
Many of the parents whom I see hold the
misconception that if we just love a child enough
everything will work out all right. I don’t think
anything could be further from the truth 100
According to Leman, love is incomplete without discipline.
He encourages his readers to seek therapy or professional
help at each turn, and ends with a chapter on how to find
competent professional help. Reading the experts in
magazines is not enough, even though most of them also have
practices in which they work with parents.
Deborah Shaw Lewis, who with her husband Gregg Lewis
wrote Motherhood Stress to help women cope with motherhood,
illustrates how even the books that take great pains to say
"you count” and "your stress is real," also attempt to
discipline mothers by offering strategies through the use of
narratives describing mothers’ experiences with stress, and
through the use of scientific evidence of the damage stress
1()()Leman, Parenthood Without Hassles
,
p. 34-35.
can do. She, too, focuses on the lack of training in
mothers
.
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Government and business both recognize theimportance of training. Airline pilots have to logthousands of flying hours before they can captain aBoeing 747. Teachers spend years of study and atleast a term of student teaching before they're
entrusted with a classroom of elementary studentsfor six hours a day. Even a McDonald's worker gets
more formal training (complete with manuals and
videotaped instructions) in how to prepare
hamburgers and French fries than the average new
mother gets for a job requiring life-and-death
decisions (she's bestowed with the power to control
her child's entire world!). 101
Mothers feeling unsure of themselves before they read this,
end up sure of at least one thing: they need help. And as is
typical, fathers are not mentioned, not even in the "child's
entire world.
"
While Lewis takes pains to acknowledge what she calls
"the lack of status bestowed on motherhood," and the
mind-boggling" abundance of advice and direction being
101 Lewis, Motherhood Stress, p. 27-8
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given to mothers, she tenHq +-~ . ..ds to contribute to both. 102
Further, she privileges and idealizes motherhood The
rewards of motherhood far outweigh the stresses, according
to Lewis
. And mothers can choose their perspective, that is
they can choose to accept the conditions in which they must
live and engage in certain practices to try to cope with the
stress such as work part time, laugh, pray, and/or do
something for yourself such as get away, garden,
cross-stitch.
Lewis, an at-home mother of five, spends 100 pages
convincing mothers they are stressed and have low self
esteem, thus defining and establishing the problem. Then she
establishes herself an expert with the practical knowledge
mothers need, and offers strategies to cope. A special
chapter at the end of the book for husbands and/or fathers,
written by Gregg Lewis, feeds into the cultural scripts that
say mothers are responsible for children and that mothers
have little value. "Written to men, by a man, it succinctly
covers much of the ground this book covers," Gregg Lewis
writes, making clear men’s time is too valuable to expect
them to read the whole book, and anyway men are more
succinct and can appreciate that in a book. "It's included
so women can ask their husbands to take just a few minutes
and read it -- sort of a crash course in the causes,
effects, and implications of motherhood stress aimed at
1 02Lewis, Motherhood Stress, p. 39, 44.
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raising sensitivities
support
.
" 103
and encouraging yet a higher level of
Another of the hooks provided hy the neighbor mentioned
earlier. Holt and Ketterman' s ,hen You Peel hike Screaming-
Help For Frustrated Mothers, asks these questions on the
back cover. "Do you ever feel you're losing control over
your kids? Like you want to scream? Have you ever felt
guilty about screaming, but don't know how to stop? Or what
to try next?" This is followed by, "if you . ve answered yes
to any of these questions, don't worry! You are a normal
mother since the book is all about how bad it is to scream
at your kids and how you can train yourself to stop, the
message is clear: mothers left on their own are bad.
The book starts with "Dear Mother,” so it clearly is
aimed at mothers. And it takes the perspective of children,
beginning with descriptions of children's answers to the
question of what they like and dislike most about their
mothers. The answers to what they like most varied, but
nearly all of the 150 9-12-year-olds answered the "dislike"
question with "her screaming." The authors then conducted a
nationwide survey to learn why mothers scream, and found
that the reasons were the same regardless of the ages of the
children, or the marital, professional, and socioeconomic
status of the mothers — no mention is ever made of race,
ethnicity or sexual preference. And, by the way, the only
1
‘b Lewis, Motherhood Stress, p. 134.
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mention of fathers is when they are proud of the
self-control of the mothers, or when mothers find they
scream at their children because the children remind them of
the trarts they dislike in the fathers.
The reason mothers scream, they concluded, is that it
is a bad habit, and one which can be broken. The authors -
both women, one a pediatrician/psychratrist, the other a
school administrator
- say that they can help their readers
best mothers they can be, which they must be or they
will 'scar future generations ." 104
The authors exploit by rubbing raw the concern of
others who feel guilt, shame and disappointment because
they scream at their children. They report 45 percent of
those surveyed said screaming is sometimes a problem for
them, only 6 percent said they never scream. 105 The result
of the screaming is that the mothers break their children's
hearts, force them to leave home early, rob them of
self-esteem, prevent them from becoming the accomplished
pianist they could be, and turn them into screamers. 106
The text is full of first-person stories from mothers,
mostly of their failures in self-control. Also included are
some stories from children, in double-sized type --
indicating, perhaps, that children are the most important
ones in the picture, and emphasizing the perspective of
Holt and Ketterman, When You heel Like Screaming, p. 2
"Holt and Ketterman, When You heel Like Screaming, p. 83.06Holt and Ketterman, When You Feel Like Screaming, p. 23-27
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children and their needs at the expense of the
.others and
their needs. The authors report the top three of the seven
most common answers to why mothers scream, and the authors'
solutions, in this way.
1) Mothers scream because the stress is too great.
Mothers should learn to say no to excessive demands and
needs of others. "Children are a mother's dearest and most
important responsibility, next to her husband,
" according to
th© authors
. "You must hp rarofni +.u e oe c e ul to reserve your best for
them and give to others whatever time and energy is
left." 107 No mention is made of the mothers’ needs.
2) Mothers scream when there are too many demands on
their limited time. The text tells the first-person story of
a mother who screamed at her children during a hectic
morning. "Preventing this sort of an explosion demands that
a mother plan ahead. Getting up a little earlier, doing some
food preparation the night before, and delegating duties to
family members can work wonders in avoiding the frantic
morning rush, as well as other stressful time periods." 108
3)
Mothers scream when they don’t feel well. Take care
of yourself physically, and watch the calendar for the "dark
days of premenstrual tension so you can exert more control
over diet and schedules, according to the text. 109
Holt and Ketterman, When Yon heel Like Screaming
,
p. 4.
Holt and Ketterman, When You heel Like Screaming, p. 4.
9Holt and Ketterman, When You heel Like Screaming, p. 5-6
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The primary purpose of the text is to teach mothers
self-control, the primary message is that a controlled
mother is a good mother, and the primary methods are
surveillance and discipline. The authors tell the story of
Kim, „ho wanted a neat house, laundry done, nourishing meals
and time with her children - but she couldn't pull it off.
The story offers not just advice, but standards by which
readers can measure themselves.
One. day m desperation she viewed the smallmountain of laundry, her messy house, andquarrelsome children. She decided to take charge ofer home and family. First she made a list,
^
rranging the 3°bs to be done. She packedhe dirty laundry m six heavy-duty trash bags and
o them to her local Laundromat. While it washedand dried she read to her children and then got them
o help fold and carefully put away their ownthings
.
Next she put a tasty dinner in the oven. While it
cooked, she and the children raced through the housepicking up and putting away things. Soon the house
was m order, the laundry heap had vanished, and adelicious and attractive meal graced the table. Herhusband was proud and amazed. But best of all, sheknew she could manage the demands of her household
because she learned how to plan, prioritize and
follow through. So can you. 110
The authors offer a list of characteristics of
controlled mothers. Imagine measuring yourself against this
list of "worthy and attainable goals." A controlled mother
is organized, flexible, plans ahead, has a sense of humor,
Holt and Ketterman, When You Feel Like Screaming
,
p. 46- 7 .
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strives to keep balance in her life, has a positive
attitude. The prescription for flexibility is at first
Perplexing, since the authors also say consistency is
extremely important.
This is what they say about flexibility,
"a mother must
train herself to go with the flow, even if it means
temporarily abandoning her plan or realizing that it goes
against the natural inclinations of her personality. It
isn't always easy, especially at the start, but the rewards
are tremendous.'-" The authors claim to empower mothers by
offering information on how to train themselves and make
choices, such as being flexible, so they can be good
mothers. The message is clear about who mothers are: they
are the ones responsible for the children and men in their
lives
.
This is what they say about consistency, which makes it
clear the flexibility exists only for the children. Mothers
must say what they mean and mean what they say at all times.
"This requires thinking, planning, and following through
with confidence, and above all, consistency. A mother must
learn to be consistent, even when she is tired,
overcommitted, and under excessive stress. A mother can
choose to discipline herself to be consistent regardless of
what is going on (or not going on) in her life ." 112 The
Holt and Ketterman, When You heel Like Screaming, p. 47
Holt and Ketterman, When You Lee! Like Screaming, p. 58.
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emphasis is on learning the "rirrht- w «.y n ig t way, making the "right"
choices, disciplining the self, and sacrificing.
The list of motivations to help choose self-control
also is descriptive of what is good. Ideas to motivate:
"happier, better adjusted children; a desire to be a better
mother; wxshrng to enjoy good feelings rather than the shame
or remorse you experience after yelling; the approval of
your spouse, parents, or friends because of your changing;
confidence that you can learn better, more successful
parenting skills ." 113
Every mother's dream is to speak softly and get a
cheerful, obedient response from attentive, cooperative
children,” according to the text. "An impossible dream? No,
but it requires that the mother behave as the controlled,
firm, loving, fair, consistent authority figure who chooses
not to scream. There is a way to make this dream become your
reality. " 114
Then the key is presented: a mother must be velvet over
steel. This is "the mother who is fun, loving, soft, gentle,
yet exudes strength and control ." 115 The authors offer a way
for mothers to undergo a normalization by setting up
standards or norms against which mothers can measure and
shape their behaviors. They produce a "truth" as well as
aspirations and desires through which mothers identify their
113Holt and Ketterman, When You heel Like Screaming, p. 52.
Holt and Ketterman, When You h ee! Like Screaming, p. 57.
Holt and Ketterman, When You Feel Like Screaming, p. 57.
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happiness and fulfillment with bodily efficiency ^
nurturing, self-control, self-discipline, and
self-sacrifice
.
Ih*" "**“*" «
. p„m.,
needs to be solved They assert getting some help as
essential to solving the problem. They provide practical
knowledge the readers have learned they need. They lay down
authoritative rules and directions to help construct and
recreate mothers into the kinds of bodies who perform the
tasks of efficiently getting their housework and other work
done While smiling and hugging their children, so that their
bodies are socially adapted and useful. They make "velvet
over steel" appear as the only alternative to individual
guilt over having screamed at their children, personal
anxiety over what the results might be, and private
disappointment over both their own and their children's
behaviors
The book ends this way.
When you have dropped your fear, anxiety, angerand stubbornness, you will know the release from
'
pam You, too, can forgive — yourself and others.
e healing will set you free to love and be loved
as never before!
And isn’t love what life is all about — love and
relationships? We hope this book has given you firmground to stand on and some new handholds for whenyou feel frustrated. Now it’s time for you to take
some steps to change your life for the better. Weknow you can do it. We believe in you!
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And the rewards? Thev will +.
all areas of you lifp T +. tremendous -- ine. Just wait and see. 1 ^
From Sick to Incompetent
Ehrenreich and English said that the normal state of
women in the late erghteenth century was slot, which wasjustified because such a state di«?miai if jsqu l ied women as healers
and qualified women as patients. Today the normal state of
mothers is incompetent, which disqualifies them as equals
and qualifies them as objects of childrearing experts. The
century-old ideological message resounds: a "good" mother is
one who lives like the American middle class mother lives or
aspires to live, with the aspiration constructed by the
experts
.
Mothers continue to be seen as the major obstacles to
childrearing. Children with problems still are traced to
failed mothers. The prescriptive advice, warnings, and
instructions are still to be consumed by each woman in
isolation — making available the script so that they may be
"good" mothers, so they may "be" nurturing and efficient, so
they may fill the role of self-control and self-sacrifice,
so that no structural changes in society are required.
The prescriptive texts described in this chapter offer
illustration of one of the ways in which power constructs
bodies and subjectivities, which has to be understood in
16Holt and Ketterman, When You Feel Like Screaming
,
p. 80
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order to be challenged. That is, motherhood is scripted not
lust by cultural images but by texts produced by "experts"
and aimed at governing mothers. Such texts can be seen as
imposing specific cultural scripts on mothers. But if the
practices of mothers ~can be seen as performances scripted by
experts, the next chapter will show that the scripts can be
contested. The performances can be interrupted, and the
scripts rewritten.
CHAPTER IV
FEMINIST MOTHERS
TH
AFR Tp
C 1 PL
I
^ARY PRACTICES:
' ICAN AMERICAN MOTHERS
and lesbian mothers
The disciplinary practices and cultural scripts imposed
on mothers are powerful and enmesh mothers in networks of
power, but they do not leave mothers merely passive and
compliant. Whether mothers conform or resist, their bodies
are inscribed at the same time as they actively constitute
themselves as subjects. The difference between conforming to
the dominant cultural standards, and resisting or subverting
them, lies in part in who represents and defines mothers'
needs and how those needs should be satisfied. That is, the
difference comes through questioning not only what the
assumptions about motherhood are, but whose they are.
This chapter will examine how some mothers have
succeeded - through necessity or will - in breaking out of
the cultural scripts for mothers and establishing practices
that attempt to meet their own needs, aspirations, and
lifestyles, often in opposition to dominant image of
motherhood contained in cultural scripts. Studying such
experiences, and the practices and discourses that have
resulted from them, offers both potential models for change
and ways to examine some current realities of maternal
differences without reifying those differences. In fact,
such practices and discourses help keep maternal differences
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perspective as existing among a multiplicity of
differences among mothers. Examining them is part of an
attempt to take into account the specific powers and
capacities women have developed in historical and cultural
context
.
Alternative practices of mothers can be found in the
long history of struggle among feminists, and in other
contexts outside white, middle-r 1 a qq u_i_cl ss, heterosexual women and
families, in the cases of feminist mothers, the
struggles to alter power relations in both public and
private have created space for new practices in which women
attempt to define their own needs and how they should be
satisfied. Building on the struggles for birth control and
abortion rights, many feminist mothers continue the effort
through the practices of turning away from medicalized
births to midwives, arranging childcare and housework with
male partners in ways that defy the norms of second shifts,
providing nonsexist or anti-sexist childrearing, or by
insisting on raising their children on their own.
Other alternative practices of mothers often begin as
individual or subculture solutions to specific problems.
Although these are not necessarily feminist solutions, nor
all of them feminist politics, examination of them has
potential to contribute to social change, especially in
Not all feminist mothers are white and middle class, but white and middle-class women
dominated the second wave women’s movement and its attention to the family and
motherhood.
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ttitudes toward maternal and other differences, inthat they modei different ways of thinkung about
.others
Two examples come from African American ^
mothers - many of whom may be viewed as being grounded in
strong, vigorous cultures which provide alternate sources
of power and alternative constructions of motherhood. 2 Many
black mothers practice cooperative and collective rather
than privatized mothering. They resist creating a family
serves only the needs of the dominant elements of
society. Many lesbian mothers offer a model for egalitarian
practices within the family, especially in sex roles and
including between two parents as well as between parents and
children
.
Further, many feminist mothers, black mothers, and
lesbian mothers illustrate in their daily lives the ways in
which motherhood can be just one aspect of identity. They do
not allow motherhood to become for them the virtual
annihilation of self. Their discourses illustrate the ways
m which the dominant discourses are contestable, and the
ways in which difference has the potential to be a creative
force for change. 3
Clearly many women fall into more than one of the categories of feminist, black and
lesbian. That is, the categories are not mutually exclusive or homogeneous. But they are
usehil as a way of organizing practices of mothers in order to show models of resistance
to the hegemonic images presented in our culture.
Of course, not all feminist mothers, black mothers, and lesbian mothers participate in
these kinds of practices that reject or neglect the norms. Many of such households, for
example, recreate the dominant paradigm in order to seek the social rewards offered to
those who conform. But I have sought out examples of those who either refuse or simply
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In the words of Elizabeth Spelman, there is no reason
to presuppose that what counts as Another’s love- win not
vary from culture to culture, from subgroup to subgroup
Thus means that the practices of mothers also will vary
, and
such alternative practices reveal alternative models of the
subjectivities of mothers. One of the goals of this chapter
IS to focus on the alternative practices of motherhood that
already exist, and place those in the context of the long
history of feminist efforts surrounding motherhood.
In fact, the discourses by and about African American
mothers and lesbian mothers present a very different view of
mothers, especially in terms of their authority, than the
"official" discourses on motherhood. As often marginalized
members of society, they have a different relationship to
powers, expertise, and the production of desires. Often of
lower economic classes, many of these mothers have what
Emily Martin calls "greater critical vision" than more
advantaged members of society
.
4
"Those at the bottom of the
heap tend to see more deeply and clearly the nature of the
oppressions exacted by those at the top of the heap ." 5 In
Martin's view, they are more likely to see that the dominant
ideology is partial in that it does not capture their
cannot participate in the dominant model of motherhood and so develop alternative
practices.
JEmily Martin, The Woman in the Body: A Cultural Analysis ofReproduction (Boston
Beacon Press, 1992), p. 203.
^Martin, The Woman in the Body
,
p. 202.
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e of the medical establishment's
management ofPregnancy and childbirth, for example, as well as the
expert ' influence on childrearing and the
-proper" behavior
;°
therS
- ^ ^ — chapter, this sphere of
uence prevents many women from defining these roles fortwelves, from representing and decidrng how to satisf
-err needs. Based on interviews and research on women J
liferent classes, Martin concludes,
"Overall, middle-class
women appear much more
'mystified' bvLrr o y the general cultural
models than working class women ."6
But, as Jane McDonnell finds about mothers of autistic
children, mothers who seek to enter the realm of the
P rts, to tell their own stories, are not only humbler
and less arrogant but also less frequently read, and assumed
to be less reliable narrators.? These mothers have different
stories to tell because they have different experiences and
practices of motherhood, but their voices are seldom heard.
Because the self is formed in the arena of interpersonal
relationships and not in isolation, mothers construct their
identities as mothers in very specific ways depending on
^Martin, The Woman in the Body
,
p. Ill
Jane Taylor McDonnell, “Mothering an Autistic Child. Reclaiming the Voice of theMo her; m Brenda O. Daly and Maureen T Reddy, eds.,
Maternal Subjectivities
,
(Knoxville. University of Tennessee Press, 1991 ), p 70
*
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those relationships, according to McDonnell.* Thus just as
mothers of children with handicaps construct their
identities rn part through relatronships stewing from that
fact, so do many white, middle-class, femrnist mothers,
black mothers, and lesbian mothers construct their
identities in specific ways stemming from the details and
the contexts of their lives. Although their stories often
challenge mainstream prescriptive texts on "good" mothers,
the circulation and influence of their stories is limited.
Many of these mothers clearly are, in the words of
Adrienne Rich, "outlaws" from the institution of motherhood
And many, as Ellen Lewin and others show, struggle for an
identity against the very same cultural forces that have
such a powerful hold on so many white, middle-class,
heterosexual mothers - especially the tendency to privilege
motherhood over nonmotherhood, a tendency that crosses
differences of color and sexual orientation. They continue
to face oppression based on gender, class, and race and/or
sexual orientation. While they may break out of cultural
scripts that call for certain practices, this does not mean
"McDonnell, “Mothering an Austistic Child,” p. 74. McDonnell says the example of
autism is paradigmatic of the way mothering in general has been viewed in much of
Psyc ° ®glC
f
llt
^
rature of the twentieth century, in which the mother is both silenced and
assumed to be all-powerful, capable of doing enormous harm to her child and incapable of
understanding and addressing her child’s condition (p 59). Because male “experts”
denned autism as a defense against a rejecting mother, mothers of autistic children who
tried to speak were discounted by the very theory they tried to resist; the “experts” said
the mother could not be believed and should not be involved in the treatment of the child
according to McDonnell.
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they have solved all their problems. In some cases it takes
long, hard looks to find the ways in which daily practices
work to fulfill their self-defined needs.
Audre Lorde wrote that to be a woman of color and a
lesbian is to have an opportunity to teach about difference
'Gays and lesbians of color are different because we are
embattled by reason of our sexuality and our color," she
said, "and if there is any lesson we must teach our
children, it is that difference is a creative force for
change, that survival and struggle for the future is not a
theoretical issue ." 9
The Struggle of Feminist Mothers
Examining the theoretical roots and the practices of
white, middle-class feminist mothers adds another piece to
the puzzle that is the recent history and experience of
motherhood, a history and experience in which what is at
stake has been both survival and struggle for the future.
The struggle is made up of efforts to redefine motherhood,
and increase women's power over their mothering, as
economic, political and cultural opportunities arose to do
so
.
Theoretically, motherhood had been understood as
women s function and role, their fulfillment as women. As we
;Audre Lorde, “Man Child: A Black Lesbian-Feminist’s Response,” in Pollack and
Vaughn, eds., Politics of the Heart: A Lesbian Parenting Anthology, (Ithaca, NY:
Firebrand Books, 1987), p, 314
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saw in previous chapters, mothers were to work under the
superior moral authority first of men, then of
-experts," so
power over their mothering was restricted. But
Simone deBeauvoir changed the face of the struggle with her
book The Second Sex in which she declared motherhood
dangerous for women who want to be free and independent . “»
She found the female body inherently alienating, mainly
because of its reproductive capacities which use up all the
energy women otherwise might have to engage in creative,
rational, independent activities. Beauvoir found the role of
wife enslaving, draining women of their capacity for
greatness. But she found the role of mother even more
restricting to women's self-development. She concluded women
would have to reject motherhood in order to become persons.
That is, menstruation, pregnancy, and childbirth tie
women to their bodies and to immanence or the material,
blocking transcendence to the rational. Men are not tied to
their bodies in such ways, and so are free to engage in
creative activities and to achieve transcendence. Women's
reproductive role led to the sexual division of labor,
according to Beauvoir. Woman was different, separate, and
inferior to man because of biology -- not because biology is
destiny, but because of the way in which biology is
interpreted by society to suit the needs of men. This
allowed man to name himself Self or subject, and name woman
l()Simone deBeauvoir, The Second Sex, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989 ).
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Other or object. As other, woman was a threat to man and sohad to be made subordinate. Beauvorr beiieved sociai roles
were the primary way the Self could control the Other -
role of mother controls women and keeps them
subordinate to men.
In fact, in a chapter devoted to mothers, Beauvoir
focuses on the lack of birth control, the dangers and
abundance of illegal abortions, the discomforts of pregnancy
which annihilate the mother, the pain of childbirth, and the
ambivalence of sacrificing for the child who then becomes a
tyrant and treats the mother like an object, offering no
reciprocal love or generosity." Beauvoir refuses to assign
a high value to the suffering associated with pregnancy and
childbirth. She finds nothing natural about maternal love,
and finds it an "extravagant" fraud that women are shown
contempt while mothers are shown respect
.
12 Yet, it is a
qualified respect.
here has also been no dearth of talk about thesacred rights of the mother; but it is not as
mothers that women have gained the right to voteand the unwed mother is still in disrepute; it isonly in marriage that the mother is glorified -that is, only when she is subordinated to ahusband
.
15
1
'Beauvoir, Ihe Second Sex, p. 484-527.
12Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 523.
'^Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 525.
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Shulamith Firestone built on ^ biologicai^ ^
Beauvoir' s work, argulng that the materlal^ ^^ g
oppression were in biology rather than economics and
therefore the liberation of women would come with the end ofthe biological family.. 4 The feminlst revolution^^
the seizing of the means of reproduction, using
technology to release women from their biological destiny -
including birth control, test tube fertilization, and
artificial placentas. '5 Firestone believed that such
artificial systems would mean the end of gender role
divisions associated with childbearing and childrearing, and
thus the elimination of all sexual roles.
But Beauvoir wanted women to reject their specificity
in order to be more like men, and Firestone wanted to
obliterate sexual distinctions altogether with no real
assurance of the outcome. Their work was targeted for
criticism for its biological basis, and prompted responses
that began a romance with motherhood - that is, motherhood
as a new way of understanding the self in relation to the
Other, a relation that is not dominating. Feminists such as
Mary O'Brien in her The Politics of Reproduction insisted
that although motherhood was the source of women's
oppression, it had the potential to be the source of their
Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic ofSex: The Casefor Feminist Revolution (New
York: Bantam, 1971), p. 11 .
1
"’Firestone, The Dialectic ofSex, p. 197-8
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liberation
.
16 Adrienne Rich's Of Women Born, discussed
earlier, also saw motherhood as powerful and as a source oflealousy and fear by men. But rather than recoiling from
female biology and renouncing children, Rich urged embracing
the power of motherhood including raising children with
feminist values. Some authors, such as Dinnerstein and
Chodorow, also discussed earlier, found fault with the
absence of the father in childrearing which they believed
gave the mother too much power over children; others such as
Rich and Ruddick saw potential for transformation in
mother-centered childrearing.
Such work fueled efforts by women to take more control
over their pregnancies and childbirths, both to make the
experiences less alienating and isolating and to make
motherhood less enforced. That is, what started as a concern
with the politics of reproduction, especially abortion
rights, centered on sisterhood, shifted to a concern with
the politics of motherhood
.
17 In theory, this shift
privileged the mother-daughter relationship, and, in a few
cases such as Iris Marion Young's "Pregnant Embodiment;
I^l7n°R
Brien
K 'v
e PfUCS ofRe?mduc"°"’ <Bost°n: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
* r,en belleved that men attempted to compensate and counteract their alienationfrom reproduction and their chidlren through the system of patriarchy,
Wi
a
Z M
J"
S
’
W°ma"' A'a""V andP^che’ (New Haven: Yale University
’
u e
' S ,dentl es a >n focus to motherhood from sisterhood, which also
was a shift away from the politics of abortion or non-motherhood. She offers a new
understanding of this shift: “that within the feminist critique of society, female desire, as a
esinng relation between daughter and mother, is seen as the origin or ground of woman’s
experience while recognition between women (sisterhood) is the goal or telos” (p. 200).
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Subjectivity and Alienation," attempted to insert the
subjectivity of the pregnant woman in the discourse of
pregnancy. 18
Other authors, such as Suzanne Arms in her Immaculate
Deception: A New Look at Women and Childbirth in America,
described and analyzed practices. Arms described the
deception that she said developed over 2,000 years that
"normal childbirth is inherently dangerous, risky, pain£ul
,
and terrifying," and the modern corollary that birth with as
much medical intervention as possible is safe, fast, and
easy. Robbie Davis-Flovd in her- dv^i,noya m r Birth as an American Rite
of Passage describes women as reduced to children,
powerless, by the medicalization of birth. 20 Such practices
as placing fetal monitors on women as soon as they arrive at
the hospital, restricting their movements, assures their
passivity and contributes to the feeling that the birth is
the achievement of the medical staff rather than the mother.
Such medical practices change mother's experiences of their
bodies, and of what they believe possible for themselves.
Movements responded with home birthing and choosing midwives
Iris Marion Young, “Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation” in Young’s
throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
,(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
1
^Suzanne Arms, Immaculate Deception: A New Look at Women and Childbirth in
America
,
(Boston. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975), p. 11.
2()Robbie David-Floyd, Birth as an American Rite ofPassage
,
(Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1 992). Sheila Kitzinger also addresses these issues in Ourselves ad
Mothers: The Universal Experience ofMotherhood (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
1 995).
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esponse to the oppression women felt in the
nuclear family, several movements began including one to
Promote dual parenting, or the egual sharing of parenthood
between mothers and fathers. Fueled by Dinnerstern' s Mermaid
and the Minotaur, and Chodorow' s The Reproduction of
Mothering, which linked women- s oppression rn the family to
women's total responsibility for mothering, those involved
in the movement hoped to transform life inside and outside
families in a way that would liberate mothers and also
improve the quality of life for both fathers and children.
Dual parenting was intended as one alternative family
structure among those aimed at challenging the oppression of
mothers
.
As Diane Ehrensaft explained in her "When Women and Men
Mother," shared parenting among heterosexual couples demands
that men enter the sphere considered feminine, which is
expected to transform relations between women and men . 21
Their domg so is the practical embodiment of thesocialist feminist demand that women's traditional
work be socially recognized and shared. But ratherthan turning to the state or to the public sphere
as m the demand for wages for
housework/mothering or for universal childcare -
Diane Ehrensaft, “When Women and Men Mother,” in Joyce Trebilcot, ed„ Mothering
f
47
’ Ehrensaft uses the verb “t0 mother” to mean to take primary care of a child
While I take issue with using “to mother” in that way, I think the concept has value as an
alternative to traditional family roles.
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ivision of labor at
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.
22
1 p t of reproduction: the
Ehrensaft su-ar.zes the aims of shared parenting as to
free women from full-time mothering, giving them more
opportunity for equal realationships with men and allowing
men more access to children, children would be freed
-from
the confines of an 'overinvolved' parent who has no other
outside identity. "« The goal was tQ break ^ gendered
aracter structures m children, challenge the myth that
women are better equipped for parenting, and put pressure on
political, economic, and social structures for changes such
as improved paternity and maternity leaves, job sharing, and
childcare facilities.
But without changes in gender and power relations
outside the family, shared parenting is difficult to
achieve. Ehrensaft admits that women and men both gain and
lose from the arrangement, but women lose more. A father may
have more difficulty competing at work when he spends more
time with his children, but a mother "gives up power in the
domestic sphere, historically her domain, with little
compensation from increased power in the public sphere ." 24
And even when physical tasks are shared successfully, the
psychological labor of planning and organizing usually
22Ehrensaft, “When Women and Men Mother,” p. 46-7.
23
Ehrensaft, “When Women and Men Mother,” p. 47.
24Ehrensaft, “When Women and Men Mother,” p. 50-5 1
.
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remains unevenly divided
. Yet Ehrensaft terms the breaking
away from traditional roles one of the most exciting
contemporary social projects, especially at a time when more
mothers are entering the workforce which forces families to
come up with new arrangments.
Thus many feminist mothers have struggled to take more
control over their mothering practices in order to empower
themselves and their daughters. African American mothers and
lesbian mothers also exert control over their mothering
P ctices again, often aimed at releasing women from
taking full responsibility for their children. This is most
often explained as for the good of the children, as a way to
diffuse the nurturing relationship over several people. Yet
even when these efforts are not made in the name of
feminism, they have the nni'pni'i 3 1 +--.y P°tent al to empower women because
they expand the concept of motherhood.
Practices Among African American Mothers
The cultural scripts that shape the practices of
African-American mothers took shape on the American
continent in a context of a dearth of attention and support
for their family lives and roles. Although American society
at its founding initiated legal, economic, and social
practices designed to promote the growth of family life
among European colonists, no such practices were instituted
for those who Bonnie Thornton Dill terms racial-ethnics, who
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were equally as important tQ ^ growth q£ ^^ 2J ^fact, slave family life was precarious precisely because it
presented the threat of disruption, according to Dill. s iave
^n WSre n0t thS— providers or authority figures rn the
family. The mother-child tie was the one of greatest
interest to slave owners because it was critical to the
reproduction of the labor force, especially after the
importation of African slaves was outlawed in 1807. The
integrity of the slave family „as undermined further by the
use of rape of slave women as a weapon of terror and
control, according to Dill. 26
"It was within this context of surveillance, assault,
and ambivalence that slave women's reproductive labor took
place," according to Dill. 27
Whereas some mothers murdered their babies to keenthem fr°m being slaves, many sought with , n the
P
family sphere a degree of autonomy and creativitvdenied them in other realms of the society ^hemaintenance of a distinct African-American cultureis testimony to the ways in which slaves
maintained a degree of cultural autonomy and
resisted the creation of a slave family that onlyserved the needs of the master 2* y
2
!rT Th,°rnt0n Di "’ “°Ur Mother ’s Grief: Racial Ethnic wo™en and the Maintenance
of Families, in Margaret L. Anderson and Patricia Hill Collins, eds., Race, Class and
Gender: An Anthology’, (New York: Wadsworth Publishing Co 1995) n 24126
Dill, “Our Mother’s Grief,” p. 242.
” P '
27
Dill, “Our Mother’s Grief,” p. 243.
28
Dill, “Our Mother’s Grief,” p. 243.
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Studies show that slave family patterns included a
belief in the importance of marriage as a long-term
commitment and acceptance of women who had children outside
of marriage, according to Dill. Kinshrp networks helped
slaves resist the organization of labor that treated the
individual, and not the family, as the unrt of labor. This
organization also meant that men and women slaves were
treated with a considerable amount of equality by their
owners, according to Dill, though it is not clear whether
much of that equality translated into the family sphere
since there is evidence that women did most of the
housekeeping and child care work. What is more clear is that
black women were denied support and protection for their
roles as mothers and wives in the family sphere, and so they
had to modify and structure those roles around the demands
of their labor for their owners.
The nineteenth century notion of separate spheres of
male and female labor had mixed results for white women —
they gained some power as mothers but lost power because
family wage and protective legislation that resulted
increased their dependence on men and men's wages. That is,
the separate spheres were the basis for confining white,
middle-class women to the household, while at the same time
sustaining white, middle-class families by providing social
acknowledgment and support to women in the performance of
their family roles. Most working class women were left out
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of such social status and support, and kept in the factories
and at other paid labor outsrde their homes. For black
women, the separate spheres and the legislation it spawned
had only negative results, in Dill's view. The separate
spheres served to reinforce the subordinate status of black
women and in effect became another assault. As they
increased their work outside the home, they were forced into
a productive labor sphere that was organized for men and for
"desperate" white women who were so unfortunate or immoral
that they could not confine their work to the domestic
sphere, according to Dill. Although capitalism exploited
men, too, black women faced a double bind. They faced
exploitative jobs and low wages when they were required to
work outside the home to sustain their families, which in
turn denied them the opportunity to embrace the dominant
ideological definition of "good" wife and mother because
they did not confine themselves to the home. 29
These kinds of conflicts between ideology and reality
m the lives of black women during and after slavery set the
stage for stereotypes such as the Black Matriarch which
emerged m the 1960s as the dominant image of the mother
figure m black homes. According to Patricia Hill Collins,
the modern black matriarchy thesis stems from the inability
of black mothers to model appropriate gender behavior. 30 The
29
Dill, “Our Mother’s Grief,” p 256
Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the
Politics ofEmpowerment, (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 75.
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thesis contends black working mothers spend too much time
away from home and so cannot properly supervise their
children, which contributes to their children's failure in
school. 31 Further, black matriarchs are overly aggressive
and unfeminine, and so emasculate the men in their lives,
who then understandably either desert them or refuse to
’
marry them. "From an elite white male standpoint,” according
to Collins, "the matriarch is essentially a failed mammy, a
negative stigma applied to those African-American women who
dared to violate the image of the submissive, hard-working
servant.
m
real African-American families, research
shows few matriarchs exist, according to Collins.
In fact, according to Collins and other black women
scholars, the image of the Black Matriarch is just one of
many weapons of control over black women. Johnnetta Cole, an
anthropologist and president of Spelman College in Atlanta,
says in her autobiography,
If it were not so damning, the concept of theBlack matriarchy would be laughable because it is
a truly prizewinning oxymoron in a society whichby design and structure denies power to people of
color and withholds as much as possible from
women. Nevertheless the legend lives. 33
3 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, p. 73-4.
3
~Collins, Black Feminist Thought
,
p. 74.
3 3Johnnetta Cole, Conversations: Straight Talk With America's Sister President, (New
York: Doubleday, 1993), p. 70.
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The legend lives because it is so useful as a
controlling image, according to Cole. She rnsists that the
damage done by such an image is twofold: it compromises the
humanity of African American women in wider society, and it
leopardizes their relationships with African American men
because it makes African American women scapegoats for their
oppression. She warns that the stereotype of the Black
Matriarch also shapes the behavior and practices of black
women, making them feel defensive and guilty about their
accomplishments and for exhibiting "healthy" attributes. "To
be nurturing and caring is good, as it is to be
self-sufficient, independent, and liberated from
unproductive, old-fashioned ideas about sex," according to
Cole. "But in the case of the African American woman, in
displaying these positive qualities she is aware that she is
likely to be viewed (and thus treated!) as a Mammy, a
Jezebel, a Sapphire ." 34
Other black feminist scholars add to the
white-male-created matriarch image, the black-male
-perpetuated image of the "superstrong black mother."
Barbara Christian says that the concept of motherhood is a
central one in the philosophy of both African and African
American peoples
.
35 But black male scholars in particular
typically glorify black motherhood by refusing to
34Cole, Straight Talk
, p , 71.
Barbara Christian, Black Feminist Criticism: Perspectives on Black Women Writers
,(New York: Permamon Press, 1985), p. 213.
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acknowledge the issues faced by black mothers whose^
often consist of coming home to cook, clean and deal with
their own homes and families after spending all day dorng
those things for white families, according to Christian, she
says that when black men claim that black women personify
devotion, self-sacrifice, and unconditional love -- the
attributes associated with archetypal motherhood - they
roster an image different to the Black Matriarch but just as
controlling for black women. In many African American
communities, so much sanctification surrounds black
motherhood that "the idea that mothers should live lives of
sacrifice has come to be seen as the norm ." 36
According to Patricia Hill Collins, this prevents many
black men from seeing the very real costs of mothering to
African-American women. And such stereotypes reflect power
relations, in the view of Holly Sklar
.
37 The stereotypes
work inside and outside the African American community, and
have a tremendous influence on those who "receive" them
through the media and other cultural sources. But there is a
movement among some scholars and fiction writers to contest
these stereotypes and their interpretations.
The same history that produced the myth of the Black
Matriarch has produced the contemporary debate over the
36Christian, Black Feminist Criticism, p. 234.
Holly Sklar, The Upper Class and Mother N the Hood,” in Anderson and Collins, ed..
Race, Class, and Gender, p 124
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impact of slavery on black families That -i Qil - s, some scholars
argue that slavery created the conditions for a black
matriarchy by destroying the institutional role of marriage
that is, deinstitutionalizing marriage and inverting gender
roles in the family. But other scholars insist the
institution of marriage among African Americans lived on
through and survived the days of slavery, so slavery cannot
be blamed for today's problems within the black family.
Robert Staples and Leaner Boulin Johnson take on what
they call the classic historical theories that claim that
the institution of slavery destroyed the basis of black
family life, as well as neohistorical theories that claim
that the family structure of the African slaves was for the
most part untouched by the slave owner.-18 They insist, like
Cole, that while some see a Black Matriarchy, they see only
black women with little power struggling to take care of
their families. They found that 75 percent of black families
were intact up to 1925, a "strong antidote to the historical
generalization that the institutional role of marriage was
destroyed under slavery." 19 Staples and Johnson insist that
current research on power relationships with African
American families provides strong evidence that the
historical generalization is wrong.
38 iRobert Staples and Leanor Boulin Johnson, Black Families at the Crossroads:
C hallenges and Prospects, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishes, 1993).
^Staples and Johnson, Black Families, p. 21
.
201
as
In fact, these authors say that the study of black
families has always used the white, middle-class family „the referent, which means blast families win always fall
short
. But Staples and Johnson also assume the nuclear
family as norm, and focus on this singular type of black
family even though they insist there is no monolithic black
family. 40 Their case seems tQ that d . d
not destroy the black family than that the black family has
strength today. In the process of making that case they
criticize black feminist scholarship on the family but seem
to want it both ways: first they say black feminist
literature on the family views the role of men in the family
as entirely negative; then they say black feminists focus on
women's roles to the neglect of "entire half of the family
formation .
"
41
Stephanie Coontz says in The Way We Never Were:
American Families and the Nostalgia Trap that in almost
every decade for the last 200 years someone has discovered
that the black family is falling apart. 42 The so -Called new
consensus on this topic, which she says is not new except in
details, concludes that black poverty exists because black
men are irresponsible, black women are immoral, and black
children run wild. This new consensus says that what blacks
"’Staples and Johnson, Black Families, p. 29, 33
4l Staples and Johnson, Black Families, p. 27.
“Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia
Trap, (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
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need is not government programs but sexual restraint,
marital commitment, and parental discipline.
«
Contrary to historical myth, according to Coontz,
female-headed families in t-ho i +.ni m the late nineteenth century were
sociated with urban poverty, unemployment, and
underemployment rather than with the heritage of slavery or
migration. The exclusion of blacks from skilled trades and
factory work in the late nineteenth century forced many
families to pool resources, other families to split up as
members took different directions to search for work or
security. High mortality rates, and so the dissolution of
mage by death, resulted from the dangerous jobs black
men had to take and the unsanitary living conditions of
urban slums. "Both dire necessity and cultural traditions
led to different gender norms as well as to alternative
household arrangements among African-American families,"
according to Coontz
.
44 Included in this was that married
black women were five times more likely to work for wages
than, were married white women.
Although blacks who migrated to northern cities in the
early twentieth century faced harsher housing and job
segregation than other ethnic groups, they used kinship
ties, churches, and political organizations creatively to
unite and protect themselves, according to Coontz.
43Coontz, The Way We Never Were
,
p. 235.
44Coontz, The Way We Never Were
,
p. 241
.
203
Differences among black and white families grew in the
Postwar era, she says, but these often have been sources of
strength rather than failure as hl^ fblack families adapted to
changing economic and political circumstances.
in many
1
regions^ the
# for
,
examP le ' researchers
building* communit^while coping'with'^long-term
911^
?hrc^trali?v
0
:f
ng rates°Zng
r
men.
networks helped com^nsa^ loTthTlZttt^Ty
iP
precarious employment situation of black men
Y
whose relative marginalization was produced bywhite discrimination, not by black matriarchy Theemphasis on matrilateral ties in such famUiLeft plenty of room for men to play active roles
or uncles /5
husbands, stepfathers, grandfathers,
The special traditions of African American family
adaptations and variations that resulted — role
flexibility, including that black men are more likely to
share housework than white men; extended-kin networks,
including fostering traditions; parallel institutions such
as black newspapers, churches, and professional
organizations; a tradition of pooling economic resources;
and many more resisted the idealized white model and
offer practices that have produced healthy individuals with
a strong group consciousness and for many the ability to
rise above widespread violence, discrimination and poverty.
"^Coontz, The Way We Never Were
,
p. 242.
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according to Coontz. That is, while the image of the Black
Matriarch persisted, the real lives of African-American
mothers had very little resemblance to that image. And in
those real lives, they faced the kind of patriarchal
domination illustrated in the Million Man March of 1995 ln
which the black men's movement to reassert responsibility
for and control over their families expected black women to
offer physical, emotional, and financial support but did not
welcome them to participate in the march.
Between 1890 and 1950, the similarifioc ,,' cu t es among black and
white families were more striking than the differences,
according to Coontz, but in the 1950s new differences arose,
with the biggest differences appearing in the 1970 s and
1980s. "This divergence was not a legacy of slavery,
migration, or the social welfare programs of the 1960s," she
says. "It was a response to the paradoxes and
discontinuities of the African-American experience in the
postwar period."46
As these differences grew, so did differences in the
practices among black and white mothers as black mothers in
large numbers also rejected the dominant ideal of
motherhood. Coontz attributes this at least in part to the
dire consequences of accepting mainstream values when people
have no way of living up to them. Not rejecting mainstream
values under such circumstances results in self-contempt,
46Coontz, The Way We Never Were
,
p. 243
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depression, even insanity and suicide. *m fact, embracing
dominant values has sometimes had negative effects in the
context of the pressures on African Americans, » according to
Coontz
,
47 For example, black men most likely to leave their
families when faced with unemployment or income loss are
those who subscribe most firmly to the idea of a
self-reliant male breadwinner. And Coontz reports that some
studies show that blacks who take into account racism are
better able to pursue work and educational goals in the face
of reverses than those who believe in the ethic of
individual achievement.
But the fact that Coontz can come to such conclusions
in the 1990s from her extensive historical research is at
least in part due to Carol Stack, who in her seminal work,
All Our Km: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community
,
may have been the first to bestow widespread legitimacy to
the practices of African American mothers. 48 That is, the
practices behind the image of the Black Matriarch, since
Stack, have received a richer and more understanding
treatment. Stack, an anthropologist, spent years studying
black families and concluded that their practices amounted
not to neglect or manipulation but to cooperation. Child
care arrangements, sometimes full time, could be temporary,
or when needed could turn into long-term care or even
47Coontz, The Way We Never Were, p. 250.
48Carol Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community, (New York:
Harper and Row, 1974).
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informal adoption. In fact. Stack shows that black family
ties often are so strong that they can discourage individual
economic mobility. In one example of this she reports that
every time a couple saved enough money for a down payment on
a hose outside the neighborhood, they would agree to
requests for money from kin for more immediate needs.
Patricia Hill Collins makes the point that African
American, Latino, and Asian American mothers had to create
different institutional arrangements to resolve the tension
between their need to work and their need to take care of
their children
.
49 But the struggle for power by women of
color was a very different struggle than the one described
by much feminist theory as against the father as patriarch
or against male dominance, according to Collins. For women
of color the struggle is over the power to control their own
bodies to preserve the choice of whether to have children,
to keep the children who are wanted, and to fight off the
pervasive effort by the dominant group to control their
children's minds. If they are grounded in a strong, dynamic,
indigenous culture, women of color can invoke alternative
sources of power and create alternative social constructions
of motherhood, according to Collins.
For example, the philosophy of cooperative mothering,
which manifests itself in such practices as "other mothers"
4;Collins, “Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing about Motherhood,”
in Donna Bassin et al, eds.. Representations ofMotherhood, (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1994), p. 63.
207
or "community mothers," is both good for black mothers and
children and a potential model for others, in Collins'
view
.
50 African American communities recognize that vesting
one person with full responsibility for mothering a child
may not be wise or possible, according to Collins. Sharing
mothering with others is a result of both West African
cultural values and functional adaptations to race and
gender oppression, she says
.
51 Further, women who choose not
to give birth despite strong cultural norms encouraging them
to do so, often receive recognition and status from their
relationships with the children of other women — from their
Othermother" relationships in which they share mothering
responsibilities. And community mothers -- those who care
for one another' s children in the neighborhood, a kind of
cooperative child care -- originated in the adverse
conditions under which so many black women mothered. This
arrangement allowed black mothers to work without worrying
about their children and without having to pay what would
amount to most or all of their paychecks for childcare.
The Othermothers Collins describes also support
children whose mothers for some reason could not remain in
5()For more on othermothers and fostering among African Americans, see Stanlie M.
James, Mothering: A Possible black Feminist Link to Social Transformation?” in James
and Abena P.A. Busia, eds.. Theorizing Black Feminisms: The Visionary Pragmatism of
Black Women
,
(New York: Routledge, 1993), p 44-54.
51 Collins, “Black Women and Motherhood,” in Alison Jaggar, ed., Living With
( ontradictions: C ontroversies in Feminist Social Ethics
,
(Boulder: Westview Press,
1994), p 451
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the role of blood mothers, such as children orphaned by sale
or death of the parents under slavery, conceived through
rape, born into extreme poverty, or to young or alcoholic or
drug addicted mothers. Collins concludes that these
practices show how traditional cultural values of
community-based child care can help people cope with and
resist oppression. The practices challenge a fundamental
assumption underlying the capitalist system, she says, that
children are "private property" and can be disposed of as
such. African Americans challenge the prevailing property
relations when they see the larger community as responsible
for children and give othermothers and other nonparents
"rights" in childrearing, "it is in this sense that
traditional bloodmother/othermother relationships in
women-centered networks are 'revolutionary,'" according to
Collins
.
52
That is, because competition rather than cooperation is
the key to the capitalist system, mothers under capitalism
are required to love their own children to the exclusion of
other children, place their individual children above all
others. When motherhood is conceived as a collective
responsibility, mothers care for and about all children, see
all children as equally entitled to their care -- thus the
^Collins, “Black Women and Motherhood,” p. 453
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notion that this is a revolutionary idea in western
society
.
53
In Collins descriptions, othermothers also often help
diffuse the emotional intensity of relationships between
bloodmothers and their daughters. The work of othermothers
stimulates a more generalized ethic of caring and personal
accountability among African American women who often feel
accountable to all the black community's children. This
often is extended to provide a foundation for political
activism among black women. Thus motherhood — whether
bloodmother, othermother, or community othermother - can be
invoked by African-American women as a symbol of power as
they express ethics of caring and personal accountability.
Such power is transformative in that Black women'srelationships with children and other vulnerable
community members is not intended to dominate orcontrol. Rather, its purpose is to bring people
along, to -- in the words of later
nineteenth-century Black feminists -- "uplift the
race" so that vulnerable members of the community
wili be able to attain the self-reliance andindependence essential for resistance
.
54
Such power is transformative for black mothers as they
create their subjectivities in this arena of relationships.
highlights the ways in which the search for
sel f-def ini t ion is mediated by membership in different
53 Brenda Daly and Maureen T. Reddy, “Introduction,” in Daly and Reddy, eds..
Narrating Mothers: Theorizing Maternal Subjectivities, (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1991), p. 7-8
54
Collins, “Black Women and Motherhood,” p. 456-7.
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...» » th.
identity is crucial to all "motherwork"
-- the term
to soften what she calls the rigid distinctionsm feminist theorizing about motherhood between public and
Private, family and work, individual and collective,
identity as individual autonomy and identity as growing from
the collective self-determination of one's group. Mo such
clear distinctions exist for women of color, in Collins'
view.
As discussed in earlier chapters, despite the dominant
discourses insistence to the contrary, the distinctions
Collins lists also are not clear for most mothers who work
outside the home while they have dependent children. The
"revolutionary" practices Collins describes clearly address
this predicament of mothers by recognizing that motherhood
is only one aspect of identity, thus contributing to the
subjectivity of mothers; relieving individual mothers of all
the responsibility of the role so that their lives are less
stressful; putting mothers together in a context of
emotional and material support and thus avoiding the
isolation so many mothers feel.
But Collins notes that black mothers, like other
mothers, are ambivalent about their motherhood. Black
mothers face the contradiction that their communities value
motherhood, but their ability to cope with race, class, and
gender oppression should not be confused with transcending
those conditions
. Black motherhood can be rewarding,
according to Collins, but it ran“ c also extract high personal
costs
.
Black community values claim that good black women
always want their children, accordrng to Collins. But
combined with a lack of information about birth control,
this leaves many back women with unplanned pregnancies and
the long-term responsibilities of parenting. These strong
pronatalist values may stem in part from traditional black
values that award adult status on women who become
biological mothers. Collins reports that in spite of high
personal costs, an overwhelming majority of unmarried black
adolescent mothers choose to keep their children. And
although black mothers pay the cost of giving up their own
dreams of achieving "full creative ability," motherhood
remains a symbol of hope for many of even the poorest black
women
.
55
White feminist theories have limited use for African
American women, according to Collins. Her critique of
feminist theorizing on motherhood is multiple, centering on
the assumptions and the way the theorizing minimizes the
importance of race and class. But the most important point
for purposes here is that such theorizing considers the main
human enterprise as the struggle for individual autonomy in
the face of controlling, oppressive "public" society or the
55
Collins, “Black Women and Motherhood,” p. 458
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father, which assumes a publi r
i
Q n . ,Di c/male split with the
private/ female sphere of the family where the struggle takes
the form of increasing opposition to the mother. But in
Collins' view this distorts the experiences of women in
alternative family structures with different political
economies
.
56 Women of color perform the kind of work that
challenges social constructions of work and family as
separate spheres, according to Collins. "For women of color,
the subjective experience of mothering/motherhood is
inextricably linked to the sociocultural concerns of racial
ethnic communities — one does not exist without the
other. 57 These concerns mean that the work of mothers is
not just about ensuring survival of the members of their
families but recognizing that individual survival,
empowerment and identity require aroun onnn„3 iy j-c 4 1 .Lt; y p survival, empowerment
and identity.
In fact, Kathryn Keller, who studied mothers and work
m 40 years worth of popular magazines, explains the ways in
which the conflict African American mothers faced beginning
more than a century ago only recently became a problem for
white, middle-class mothers
.
58 Keller insists that the
conflict over women's economic and familial roles that began
in the mid-twentieth century is uniquely a white.
56Collins, “Shifting the Center,” p. 57-8.
57
Collins, “Shifting the Center,” p. 58.
58Kathryn Keller, Mothers and Work in Popular American Magazines
,
(Westport, CT:
Greenwood press, 1994).
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middle-class women's problem because their new role as
single-parent breadwinner or co-bread„rnner does not match
therr expectation of stay-at-home mother. No such conflict
exists for men because their job is a role both at wort and
the family, nor for upper class women because
traditionally they have not been responsible for either
family financial support or direct childcare; nor lower
economic class women because they always have been economic
providers Keller points out that African-American women
have a long history of working outside the home, with the
result that their daughters are socialized for more
independence.
But most white women know little or nothing about such
things
, according to Keller, in part because they rarely if
ever hear from women with perspectives different to that of
the white, middle class. For example, Keller found only one
article on an African American woman in her content analysis
of 450 articles that appeared over 40 years in large-
circulation American magazines aimed at women readers. 60
That article was about Jean Young, a woman of financial
means who was married to a famous man, Andrew Young, when he
was U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. The voices of
neither women of color nor feminists were included in those
59
Keller, Mothers and Work
,
p. 6
60
Keller, Mothers and Work
,
p. 9
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magazines
, accordina tn k0 i i
„
9 Keller
' Whlch to the control
° iscourse on women' s roles
K. Sue Jewell, who studies cultural lmages Qf
AfriCan-AmeriCan W°men and the consequences for U.S. social
POllCY
' 3375 that When the mass media does transmit images
African American women, these images suggest it is their
values, beliefs and behaviors - rather than their race,
gender, and class inequalities
- that are responsible for
their limited access to social resources and institutions «
Such representations become important when we recognize the
role images play in creating bodies and subjectivities.
Because there is a scarcity of imagery constructed by
members of specific cultural groups themselves, according to
Jewell, the cultural imagery defined by those who control
wealth and power tends to be accepted « These are based on
the same images that were used to justify slavery - Mammy,
Sapphire, Jezebel - and were continued after emancipation
because they were effective in keeping African-American
women outside the economic mainstream, according to
Jewell. « Such cultural images influence societal
expectations and role expectations within the group, shaping
women, telling women who they are and who they can be.
!‘K Sue Jfvel1’ From Mammy to Miss America and Beyond: Cultural Images and theShaping of U.S. Social Policy
,
(New York: Routledge, 1993 ).
’^Jewell, From Mammy
,
p. 24 .
^Jewell, From Mammy, p 56 .
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That is, there were economic motives for images that
defined African-American women as domestics and confined
them to performing menial tasks that others in society are
unwilling to perform. This is important, according to
Jewell, because it leads to societal perceptions and
expectations that African-American women should do only
this. Cultural images such as these reinforce beliefs that
certain groups are entitled to more or less of society's
resources simply because of their gender, race, or social
class, and serve as a basis for class and other inter-group
conflict
,
64
Once the images are accepted, they become a form of
subjugation. That is, in contrast to the conventional view
that sees the media as providing information that enables
people to act m their own interests, some see the media as
constructing a social reality which helps construct the
subjectivities of those who watch — and in the process
reinforce the established power structures and value
hierarchies
.
65 Thus attention to the media becomes more a
form of subjugation than an aid to autonomy. For example,
the constructed spectacle" presented through the media
either conceals inequalities or justifies them . 66
64
Jewell, From Mammy
,
p. 60.
"Murray Edelman, C onstructing the Political Spectacle
,
(Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988), p. 34.
66Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle, p. 124.
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Given these conditions, Jewell terms the refusal by
African-American women to capitulate to western culture's
image of African-American womanhood "no minor
to insulate themselves from negative imagery both admirable
and astounding. 67
If African American women did not haw gUnn
definin^self-estee^thafhis^b “2 3 hlSt°“ ° f
reference group comprised ^in^oVo^fA^can
^temp“dTt?;nsf
18
i
llkely that they would ^vea t pte a tra ormation m their emotional
ose that are said to represent the Westernconception of womanhood. 68 w
These networks are marked by uplifting and supportive
discourse among African American women, as well as
compliments and affectionate physical closeness, according
to Jewell. These aspects of informal social support systems
help them withstand negative definitions. This illustrates
the difference it can mean when women define their roles and
themselves for themselves rather than according to the
dominant culture. But not all African American women reject
Western cultural images of womanhood since such rejection
excludes them from the possibility of obtaining the rewards
that come when women conform to dominant cultural norms.
67
Jewell, From Mammy
,
p. 68.
68
Jewell, From Mammy, p. 68.
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After all
, one of the objectives of culturalimagery is to legitimize and perpetuate
^
d conform to
' emulate and internalize
o^tL?.
r“c
^“rto% ^1*
^cept
ors
American women, inequities based on race haveareiy resulted m African American women assuming
cultural^
ma
^
e ~ uP inherent in the Western
African a™
womanhood. The uniqueness of
qt-^ h
A^eriCan women ' s experiences in the United
w f- haa resulted m the evolution of a womano has the ability to assume some qualities
.traditionally associated with womanhood as well asthose attributed to masculinity
.
69
Although the black press is able to define and redefine
cultural images of African American women, it is targeted
almost exclusively to black audiences and rarely reaches
whites, according to Jewell. The black press also tends to
made up of weeklies with geographical limitations aimed at
local markets, with limited financial support. So there is a
restricted audience for the images that are constructed by
African Americans, while everyone else sees the mainstream
media images. These mainstream images influence, among other
things, job segregation.
What is happening is that cultural images are used
to transmit certain values, expectations and
69
Jewell, From Mammy
,
p. 69
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ideologies which rpi nfnvr'^
segmentation. Ultimately
°ccupatlona l
socCta^in^rr tha
"'
as the legitimate^iS^r^rso-e^^s^"?^
Thia yields an expectation that all other groups are
peripheral to key occupations in the United States; and when
real people illustrate this expectation by fin ing only
non-key jobs, often because that is all they can get, this
image-based expectation is reinforced. Thus these images
ensure the distribution of societal resources including
wealth, power, and other prestige goals of the culture,
according to the Jewell, and this is at the root of the
inequities that some groups face.
Thus, while the function of all institutions is tomaintain the status quo through the culturaltransmission of norms, values, belief systems andbehaviors, the mass media are the main instrumentsby which societal institutions undertake andcomplete this process of perpetuating the socialorder, also known as socialization
.
71
This leads Jewell to conclude that any substantial changes
on social, economic, political and educational institutions
must be initiated by African Americans themselves by
creating their own images and definitions after critique and
criticism of existing ones . 77
70
Jewell, From Mammy, p. 85.
71
Jewell, From Mammy
,
p. 86.
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,
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This can be illustrated by the fact that as long asAfrican American church, school, and family collectively
defined cultural images, they emphasized the strengths —
and the images in the mainstream media had little impact on
the stability of relationships between black men and women
according to Jewell. 73 But all that changed with the Civil
nights Movement, which espoused integration, which called
tor African Americans to adopt the values, beliefs, and
behaviors of white, middle-class Americans. When blacks
embraced the white ml fm-o j-u,n culture they were expected to measure
their seif-worth, beauty, femininity, masculinity,
relationships and institutions against a new set of
criteria. This new criteria and the decline of African
American institutions meant relationships became unstable,
according to Jewell.
For example, employers, especially corporations,
expected African American women to modify their value
orientations, to adopt new values, norms and belief systems
for career mobility. 74 And cultural images of black women as
matriarch or sexually loose and irresponsible continued, now
taking the form of women who substitute welfare for work and
marriage, and cannot be taken seriously. 75 This ideological
hegemony was nurtured and promulgated not just in the media
and m board rooms, but also within the legal system as it
'l'X
’Jewell, From Mammy, p. 94.
74
Jewell, From Mammy, p. 176.
75
Jewell, From Mammy, p. 202.
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attempted to convince
-the masses" that when decisions are
rendered there, justice has been served.™
Jewell appears to put great hope on African Americans
defining their own roles. But bell hooks says little has
changed in the struggle by African Americans to gain control
°VSr h°W arS represented
' despite that they have made
progress in education and employment
.
77 The
images late twentieth century Americans are most likely to
see are images of black people that reinforce and reinscribe
white supremacy. Like Jewell, she targets the mass media,
especially for teaching black people to internalize racism,
for demanding self-negation.
of °*i earnincftbat
^ ^ blaCk people
'
the Painl g h we cannot control our images howwe see ourselves (if our vision is notdecoionrzed), or how we are seen is so intensethat it rends us. It rips and tears at the seamsof our efforts to construct self and identity
.
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One aspect of this is that black female identity often
is made synonymous with victimization, according to hooks.
That is, the "authentic" black female voice is the voice in
pam. Another aspect is that black male identity often is
a kind of phallic misogynist masculinity, rooted in contempt
for the female, as a response to a supremacist sexist
76
Jewell, From Mammy, p. 127.
77
bell hooks. Black Looks: Race and Representation
,
(Boston: South End Press, 1992), p
7xhooks, Black Looks, p. 3-4.
77hooks, Black Looks, p. 44.
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representation of blackC males as castrated, without phallic
Power, and therefore pseudo females
.
80
Because it usually is within the famrly that we witness
coercive domination and learn to accept it - parent over
male over female — hooks believes the family makes a
practical setting for feminist critique, resistance, and
transformation. 8
- For if we are unable to resist and end
domination in relations where there is care, according to
hooks, it seems unimaginable that we can do so in other
relations of power. But she insists the effort must begin
with women addressing themselves as much as structures,
addressing their identities and roles. For hooks, feminism
is a transformational politics, transforming from seeing
ourselves as objects to acting as subjects.
Thus in the context of a long history of economic,
race, and gender oppression that continues today, black
women have engaged in practices that attempt to meet their
own needs. Through the necessity of working outside their
homes, they have found ways to break out of the cultural
scripts and posed themselves in opposition to white,
middle-class norms. Although African Americans adopted a
nuclear family, it was not the traditional idealized nuclear
family of the white, middle-class. Instead, this family form
80hooks, Black Looks, p. 147
bell hooks, "Feminism. A Transformational Politics,” in Deborah L. Rhode ed
Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference, (New Haven: Yale University Press
1990), p. 187.
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has the flexibility to incorporate subfamilies of adults and
children, whether relatives or not, when necessary. These
practices of incorporation, the mutual aid networks and
strong kinship bonds, help mothers define their own
lifestyles and contest the dominant images. But the black
mothers who have succeeded in these efforts also pay a high
price and continue to face pressures from the larger society
and their own group to conform. They have solved only one of
many sets of problems. But in this one they offer a model
from which other groups can benefit.
Practices Among Lesbian Mothers
The cultural scripts that shape the practices of
lesbian mothers also took shape in a particular context, in
this case the legal system, in custody battles or under
threat of losing custody rooted in widespread homophobia. In
the words of one lesbian mother, gay parents live "in the
shadow of a legal guillotine that lingers until the
eighteenth birthday" of their children. "At any time during
this period, the blade may fall and sever the parent-child
relationship ." 82 Although today there is a "gay-by boom"
among lesbians who are choosing to have children on their
own or with a woman partner, the practices of lesbian
mothers until very recently were based on keeping the
82Rhonda Rivera, “Legal Issues in Gay and Lesbian Parenting,” in Frederick W. Bozett,
ed.. Gay and Lesbian Parents, (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 199 .
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children of previous heterosexual rai fL i ° relationships. This
resulted in behaviors as well as a fi llr .n lu ry of research to
prove lesbian mothers are insiju t like other mothers, and their
children just like other children. This is an important part
experience of lesbian mothers, but moving beyond this
influence of the legal sphere reveals models in which
lesbian mothers engage in practices that are not only
different to white, middle-class norms but which challenge
those norms by questioning their assumptions and sources.
There is a dramatic absence in the literature on
lesbian mothers of "good" and "bad" mothers to teach who and
how to be. Even when the literature on lesbian mothers is
critical, it usually is critical of the way lesbianism is
practiced rather than the way motherhood is practiced. One
example this comes from Jeffner Allen, whose "Motherhood:
the Annihilation of Women" called for "an evacuation from
motherhood. Allen insisted that for women to create and
choose a non-patriarchal existence they would have to invoke
their power not to have children. But in a shift that
parallels the shift in feminist discourses from a politics
of nonmotherhood to a politics of motherhood, the more
recent literature assumes that, although it may be hard
sometimes, lesbians can be "good" mothers and that many
lesbians do and should want to be mothers. Rather, the
w
Jeffner Allen, “Motherhood: The Annihilation ofWomen” in Joyce Trebilcot, ed
,
Mothering
,
p.3 16.
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question is whethen nnr<c> 4-u
„
' °nCS they are “Others, they continue tobe good" lesbians — that is fr.v, or example, by continuing
them practice of being activrsts, by staying
-out, - or by
avoiding the practice of doing what is expedient in
childcare arrangements such as leaving their children with
heterosexual families
-of unknown politics." As one lesbian
mother put it, ”As the mother of a two-year-old, I
understand the difficulties of arranging child care. But I
also believe the perception that one's interest as a mother
supersedes one^s interestx u as a lesbian is politically
devastating .
"
84
The stories of lesbian mothers rely heavily on science
and narratives. The science tends to focus on custody law
and on reproductive technologies such as those that help
lesbians become pregnant. In the narratives, lesbian mothers
insist on representing themselves, telling their own
stories, identifying for themselves their place in the
world. Yet at the same time they often seek out
identification with all mothers, with some kind of universal
motherhood. They point out that the narratives of lesbian
mothers are in some ways remarkably similar to those of
heterosexual mothers, especially heterosexual single
mothers
.
84Nancy O. Polikoff, “Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families. Legal Obstacles, Legal
Challenges,” in Pollack and Vaughn, eds.. Politics of the Heart
,
p. 52 .
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The literature shows not onlv fhaf ™y t t manV lesbian mothers
tend, to frame their nsrr^t- Tr^arratives m similar ways to single
heterosexual mothers, thev also o-fr .n y often privilege motherhood
over nonmotherhood, and view motherhood as defining
womanhood even more than sexual orientation. But close
examination offers hints of what the motherhood practices of
the estimated three to four million lesbians mothers in the
United States today can offer other mothers. These include
raising children in a home with parents of potentially equal
power and privilege, as well as more egalitarian rather than
hierarchical relationships with children; independent models
of sex roles, which shape domestic life in ways that resist
gender limitations and avoid the infantilization that
marriage and heterosexuality can impose on women; question
assumptions about who is important to whom and why; and
exploit the positive aspects of being on the fringe of
society. These practices challenge the organization of
gender in American culture which conflates "woman" and
"mother," and have the potential to fulfill Lorde's hope for
difference as a creative force for change.
Lesbians are defined by the larger society largely in
terms of their sexuality. Until the late 1970s,
homosexuality was considered a mental illness, a sociopathic
x5 Sandra Pollack reports in Politics ofthe Heart: A Lesbian Parenting Anthology that
researchers estimate that 10 to 20 percent of adult women are lesbians, and 20 to 30
percent of lesbians are mothers - which would be a total of three to four million lesbian
mothers in the United States (p. 3 1 7).
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personality disorder, under the* ac.P e assumption that deviance
indicates pathology. » This assumption spawned the
homophobia that questxoned whether lesbians could be
-good"
mothers. While some lesbian mothers share the
characteristics of oppressed people who internalize
socialized hatred to their particular difference - feelings
of inferiority, lack of self-esteem and fear of rejection -
studies show others are stronger because of their
experiences as marginalized members of society.*? In fact,
studies have shown that lesbians compared with heterosexual
women apear to be healthrer; report higher levels of
assertiveness, autonomy and resiliency; demonstrate higher
levels of goal direction and self-acceptance.** Lesbians are
more likely to make a distinction between what they have
been taught is socially appropriate, and what might actually
be appropriate for them.® This is because lesbians already
perceive themselves as different and in distinction to
heterosexual women. This combination of characteristics puts
many lesbian mothers in a position to resist the dominant
norms of motherhood. Because of the lack of social
prescriptions aimed directly at lesbian mothers, as well as
the lack of role models, lesbian mother families can be more
*6Karen Lee Erhchman, “Lesbian Mothers: Ethical Issues in Social Work and Practice,” in
sther D. Rothblum and Ellen Cole, eds., Lesbianism: Affirming Nontraditional Roles(New York: Haworth press, 1989), p. 208.
87Erlichman, “Lesbian Mothers.”
88Erlichman, “Lesbian Mothers,” p. 209.
89Padesky, 1989: 145.
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creative in their parenting styles 90 Thl „Y - r s often results in
more opportunities for children +-to make decisions and solveproblems for themselves; female rnio ^ ,r ole models who are strong
independent, and nurturrng, that is, as "complete people who
can
-do anything; and the learned ability not to worry so
much about what other people think, so that they have the
Potential for being more self-reliant and self-confident. 9.
Lesbian mothers write about their concerns over many of
the same issues that face other mothers - from household
Chores, medical appointments and decisions about how much
television watching to allow, to social pressure to have a
baby. "Here these new lesbian mothers go, showing me up,
proving that the fact I'm a dyke is no excuse for my failure
to have a baby," as one lesbian put it, explaining her
"totally irrational feeling of betrayal" of her position not
to give birth in order to defy the expected womanly role. 92
As Jan Clausen said in a keynote speech at a lesbian
parenting conference in 1986, at the start of the lesbian
baby boom, sometimes known as the choosing children
movement.
As lesbians
oldest trap
motherhood,
we re not necessarily immune to the
there is -- the false consolation of
the notion that women can be
Saralie Bisnovich Pennington, “Children of Lesbian Mothers,” in Bozett ed Gay and
Lesbian Parents, p
.
65
.
’ ’’
^Pennington, “Children of Lesbian Mothers,” p. 65 -6 .92Jan Clausen, “To Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest: A Flommy Looks at
Lesbian Parenting,” in Pollack and Vaughn, eds.. Politics ofthe Heart
, p. 338 .
the^dul^world b^th^s
° f P°Wer 3nd standin9 in
over our chil^eX^ve?^.® flUen“ We Lact
But Clausen' s remarks illustrate how complex this
notion of motherhood is when she makes it clear that
lesbians also are not rmmune from essentialist views of
motherhood
.
We don't move bv ru]ps- ^
"™ rr ”
human, and in one sense T rhi n v +-u
S being
anoth
UbliCiZed interest in having babie^is
PUbliC
stretchi n7 e* les l) l an- feminist community has of
the f ^
9 3 new~found sense of its rights tofull range of human and female experience!94
1
In fact, Ellen Lewin points out in Lesbian Mothers:
Accounts of Gender in American Culture that at the same time
that lesbian mothers defy the logic that until recently
found the terms lesbian and mother contradictions, they
conform to societal standards for women.” Lewin
, an
anthropologist who started her study in an effort to
validate the existence of lesbian mothers and show they are
"good enough" to keep their children in custody fights,
ended by viewing motherhood as a strategy by both gay and
straight women for dealing with their devalued status.
Although her theory is more developed and her work more
i'Clausen, “To Live Outside the Law,” p. 339-40.
f4
Clausen. “To Live Outside the Law,” p. 339.
”Ellen Lewin, Lesbian Mothers: Accounts ofGender in American Culture (Ithaca NY
Cornell University Press, 1993).
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sophisticated than earlier accounts of lesbian mothers,
Lewin comes to similar conclusions: that lesbian mothers are
"
g°°d en°Ugh " bSCaUSe ^ -e jUst like other mothers. She
ys she expected to find a "lesbian-mother culture" full of
uniquely adaptive cultural forms, but found instead that
lesbian mothers share in the system of meaning that
surrounds motherhood in our culture. She concluded that
lesbian and heterosexual single mothers frame their
narratives similarlv — in -py m spite of concrete differences in
their daily experience — because of shared cultural
elements. Personal narratives, according to Lewin,
offer us a chance to see how women account forthemselves
, make sense of their situations and
thei
gn
tn f
th
r
mSelVeS
.
in rSlatl0n to °the?s'- how
i
act
' negotiate their identities inco laboration with or in opposition to prevailingcultural expectations
.
96 P
Lesbians draw their meanings from the same cultural
possibilities as heterosexual mothers, she found. Like other
mothers, lesbian mothers "select elements of their
narratives from a circumscribed repertoire, a language of
caring and nurturance, a language that makes motherhood
supersede and engulf other aspects of identity ." 97
But when lesbians defy the strictures that claim
lesbians and motherhood to be culturally if not biologically
96Lewin, Lesbian Mothers, p. 14.
97Lewin, Lesbian Mothers, p. 184
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incompatible, they challenge the organization of gender in
the culture which defines lesbians as neither women nor
In this sense, claiming the identity of lesbian
mother may be construed as an instance of resistance to
prevailing sexual politics," according to Lewin Yet when
lesbians become mothers they also join in the organization
of identity which follows mainstream gender ideology, she
says. It is not that lesbians become mothers as a response
to their stigma, in order to "regularize" their status,
according to Lewin. But she contends "that motherhood
indirectly enables women (whether lesbian or heterosexual)
to claim a specific location in the gender system. "» They
find that solutions to the problems generated by the
traditional cultural/gender system are located in that very
system.
On one level, to be sure, all mothers in our
society must operate under similar material
conditions; all mothers confront a range ofpowerful structural constraints to which they mustcraft strategic responses. But these strategies
are also articulated in a cultural context; they
represent the operation of a shared cultural
process, one that can be traced as easily in the
accounts of the lesbians as in those of theirheterosexual counterparts. Both lesbian and
heterosexual mothers participate in the
implementation of gender on the same basis,
constructing their identities from mutually
available elements and negotiating identity in
ways shared with us all . 109
98Lewin, Lesbian Mothers, p. 15.
"Lewin, Lesbian Mothers, p. 16.
100Lewin, Lesbian Mothers, p. 16-17.
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Lewin outlines the s imi l ^ -iSl ari ties m lesbian mothers'
coming-out stories anH ^ •
' d the dlVOrce stories of both lesbians
and heterosexual mothers, to underscore the cultural
contradiction that presents marriage as a special kind of
success for women, yet imposes a loss of autonomy and
personhood that threatens the individual's search for
accomplishment and individuality. Lesbian mothers and
divorced mothers both tell stories of rebirth, strength,
meeting challenges on their own, transformation into more
meaningful personal identities. What both categories of
confront is that marriage is supposed to define
successful femaleness, Lewin points out, but it also
undermines successful adult humanness
.
101
Intentional" lesbian mothers, those who become
pregnant by choice and outside of heterosexual
relationships, according to Lewin,
offer special insight into the underlying meaning
motherhood m the wider culture; as levels ofsocial approval are stripped away, we are leftwith a view of the goals that lesbian and other
unmarrred women see k to achieve through motherhoodd the strategies they employ in their
attempts
.
102
Yet intentional mothers are not more self-conscious about
their reasons for wanting children than other lesbian
101 Lewin, Lesbian Mothers, p. 44.
102Lewin, Lesbian Mothers, p. 51.
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mothers, reporting they "need" a child or always wanted
one, or see having a childC l as a to settle down, achieve
adulthood, achieve
"goodness" or spiritual benefits by beingclose to a child and contributing to its growth and
development, or transcend the uncertainty of their
lifestyles. According to Lewin, both childless lesbians and
other chadless women feel a distance from the kinds of
things "ordinary" women do.
When lesbians become mothers, they are negotiating the
formulation of their selves, bringing something good into
their lives without having to sacrifice autonomy or control,
but it is compliance at the same time that it is rebellion.
Motherhood also appears to offer lesbianssome resolution of the dileimnas inherent inmembership m a stigmatized category. On the one
action^f
°nal motherhood demands specificion ° some sort - a lesbian is, after allU
rn
lke
i
Y become Pregnant by chance. On the'other hand, to the extent that wanting to be amother is a profoundly natural desire, and is
politick
haVing nothing to do with cultural orP ltical choices, then achieving motherhoodimplies movement into a more natural or normal
status than a lesbian can ordinarily hope to
experience otherwise. But motherhood also requires
p arming and manipulation, and thus stands in
contrast to one's natural - that is,
unpremeditated - lesbian identity.
At the same time, however, a lesbian whobecomes a mother has effectively rejected the
equation of homosexuality with unnaturalness andthe exclusion of the lesbian from the ranks of
women." In this sense, finding a way to become a
mother constitutes a form of resistance to thegender limitations, and particularly to the
constructions of sexual orientation, that prevailin the wider culture. Curiously, though, this act
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conventional expectations B
hrough comPliance with
also be construed af a gLture”' S° “ may
accommodation. 103 y re of
In her interviews, Lewin found many lesbian mothers who
Viewed their position on the fringe of society as positive,
as a way to teach their children about possibilities,
acceptance, and diversity. Lesbian mothers she interviewed
tend to view their relationships with their children as
companionate rather than hierarchical and authoritarian
Yet Lewin found that motherhood was central to the
identities and characterized the friendships of lesbian
mothers, much the same as heterosexual single mothers. And
she warns that the continuing location of motherhood at the
defining edge of gender undermines the positive aspects of
changes in traditional family forms and conventional
limitations on sexuality, and fuels the trend to value
mothers more than childless women.
But Jeanne Vaughn points out that is not the mothers
who are valued but their role. Vaughn describes the way
society idealizes motherhood while isolating and
marginalizing mothering, in a classic demonstration of the
mystifying function of ideology ." 104 she targets the
fraudulent claims of the cultural images and lessons
103Lewin, Lesbian Mothers, p. 74.
104Jeanne Vaughn, “A Question of Survival,” in Pollack and
Heart
,
p. 25.
Vaughn, eds.. Politics of the
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surrounding motherhood, and insists
women of their individual identities
that motherhood robs all
Motherhood continues to be marketed as apersonalized experience. We're led to tel im raising our children "fhi b eve that
be different " ' ^
hlS tlme lfc ' s g°ing to
make a difference in the
U
world
r
"
C
What
ren, Can
A?th
iS
h
t
^
t motherh°od is the 'great leveler
^
itse?f
g
SiH:r“uf-“iL°a^rotW°0d rifestsdepending on what social class race^or^th 10113 'group you happen to belong to - in one wav th^
Presen?ed
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StlU pretty mUCh the same
-t t what we are taught is theopportumty of a lifetime to express our
cn
dl
H
ldUal
i
tY ' we . become faceless mommies who
to hea?
U
about ?
1()d01n9 thlngs that nob°dy else wants
The urge to point out similarities between lesbian and
heterosexual mothers, illustrated by Lewin and Vaughn, comes
at least in part form court experiences, in which it is
clear lesbians who portray themselves as close to the
heterosexual model of motherhood as possible have had a
greater chance of gaining custody of their children. "The
more we appear to be part of the mainstream, with
middle-class values, middle-of-the-road political beliefs,
repressed sexuality, and sex-role stereotyped behavior,"
lesbian, mother, and lawyer, Nancy Polikoff points out, "the
more likely we are to keep custody of our children ." 106
While she says she understands why many lesbian mothers feel
1(b Vaughn, “A Question of Survival,” p. 24
106
Polikoff, “Lesbian Mothers,” p. 324.
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compelled to portray themselves in this manner, P0li koff
insists that to do so amounts to a claim that lesbian
mothers pose no threat to the perpetuation of patriarchal
childrearing, when that is exactly what they should want to
do. Lesbians should resist the presumption of
heterosexuality that is associated with motherhood,
according to Polikoff, and take advantage of the opportunity
to raise children in a home with two parents of potentially
equal power.
The opportunity to grow up observing such egualitvin the home could have a lasting impact on
Y
children in lesbian families, and we need toembrace thnt possibility. If legal inequalitydiminishes or eliminates the experience of equalpower within the home, we are missing the changeto make what might be our biggest contribution tofuture generations
.
107
Polikof f and others make clear what their practices of
motherhood can do for their children, and for social change
One of the benefits, for example, comes in the independent
model of sex roles, which helps break down sexism and
sex-role stereotyping, in addition to helping eliminate
negative societal attitudes toward homosexuality most
strongly correlated with a commitment to traditional sex
roles and traditional attitudes toward women
.
108 Further,
children of lesbians tend to be more aware of their
1()7
Polikoff, “Lesbian Mothers,” p. 329
1()XPollack, “Lesbian Mothers,” p. 322.
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responsibilities for themselves and their own chorees.
Others point out that lesbian mothers offer children an
opportunity to witness an exchange of nurturance, rather
than one-way nurturance from mother to husbands/men and
children. I"*-1 Children of lesbians have a "greater
internalized sense of tolerance, justice, and the full
flexibility of human potential" than many of their peers. "0
In a study that compared child-rearing attitudes
between black lesbian mothers and black heterosexual
mothers, Majorie Hill found lesbian mothers to be more
tolerant and to demonstrate more flexibility in
child rearing rules; to be more tolerant of children's
sexuality and sex play, and to have a greater openness to
giving information about sexuality; to rate boys and girls
as being more similar than dissimilar; and to express more
traditionally masculine role expectations of their
daughters. Hill's recommendations included more study of
lesbian mothers' expectations of sons which might provide
new models or understandings of the development of sex-role
stereotyping in our society. Because lesbians represent an
10;Sara Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: TowardNew Value
,
(Palo Alto, CA Institute of
Lesbian Studies, 1988), p. 99.
1 1()Sally Crawford, “Lesbian Families: Psychosocial Stress and the Family-Building
Process,’’ in Boston Lesbian Psychologies Collective, ed., Lesbian Psychologies:
Explorations and Challenges, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 212 For
addressing social implications for children of lesbians, see Leslea Newman’s Heather Has
Two Mommies, (Boston: Alyson Publications, 1989).
1
1
'Majorie Hill, “Child-Rearing Attitudes of Black Lesbian Mothers,” in Boston Lesbian
Psychologies Collective, Lesbian Psychologies, p. 215-226.
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family structure, studying their mothering
Practices sheds new light on all social relationships,
according to Hill.
It becomes clear, however, that even when authors are
emphasizing the benefits of gay parenting, they often still
make great efforts to show sameness with heterosexuals.
avid A. Bapciste Jr., for example, extols the less rigid
sex role patterns of gay parents by describing them as
similar to egalitarian heterosexual couples. H 2
Kath Weston, whose Families We Choose: Lesbian
, Gays,
Kinship is typical of much of the literature on lesbian and
gay families in that it contains to only one part of one
chapter any discussion of what lesbians do once they have
children, notes that for lesbian parents who used
"alternative insemination" (in contrast to "artificial
insemination") the categories shifted from "the mother" to
"the one having the baby. ""3 Wes ton points out that lesbian
parents still define parental identities through difference,
but it is a difference organized in terms of biological
versus nonbiological parenthood rather than mother versus
father. In terms of parenting, this results in a new and
gender-neutral contrast, according to Weston. This
highlights a congruence rather than dissonance between
1 12David A. Batiste Jr., “The Gay and Lesbian Stepparent Family,” in Bozett ed Gov
cum Lesbian Parents, p 125
’ ’
113Kath Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship
,
(New York: Columbia
University Press, 1991) p. 174.
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procreative potential and iesbian identity< ^^
allows for the possibility of more than two parents. "4 For
lesbians who give birth, even biological ties are
consciously chosen and consistent with the metaphor of
choice that defines lesbian and gay families, according to
Weston
.
"We think rather than
lesbian mother as saying,
just go do," Weston quotes one
including thinking about how they
will raise their children. 115 This has resulted in
of arrangements which reinforce the belief that no
a variety
strict
models or codes guide lesbian and gay parenting, leaving
them freer than heterosexuals to experiment with alternative
childrearing methods and novel parenting agreements,
according to Weston.
In her work on the legal and social history of lesbian
and gay parents, Laura Benkov insists that although lesbian
and gay families exist in the shadow of traditional
families, they challenge that model at its core, raising
fundamental questions about the relation between gender and
parenting, the significance of biological and social
connections, and the role of the state in family life. 116
Benkov says the literature on lesbian and gay parents
begins only in the late 1970s. Most of the early literature
1 14Weston, Families We Choose
,
p. 174-5.
1
1
"’Weston, Families We Choose
,
p. 190-1
.
1 ,6Laura Benkov, Reinventing the Family: The Emerging Story ofLesbian and Gay
Parents
,
(New York: Crown Publishers, 1994), p. 6.
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focuses on custody battles ManyS
- judges castigated lesbian
mothers for their selfishness for declaring their own sexual
identities and then pursuing fulfillment of their own needs
and desires to be mothers. The implication of this,
according to Benkov, is that lesbians act in opposite to
the needs of their children. The selfishness is contrasted
to the selflessness of "proper" motherhood.W But what
Dudges and much of society saw as selfishness, might instead
be seen as assertion of self and an effort or desire for
motherhood to be one distinct aspect of identity, although
Benkov does not pursue this line in inquiry, being more
concerned with the construction of families than the
construction of self, lesbian mothers in this sense can be
seen as resisting rather than conforming to the hegemonic
ideal of motherhood. Although they pay a high price — often
belonging neither to the world of lesbians which often
excludes children, nor the world of parents which usually
excludes homosexuals -- they offer models of both resistance
and alternative practices of motherhood. They insist on
defining their own needs, and then construct their
identities and shape their practices to be consistent with
those needs.
Lesbian and gay parents especially reinvent the family
as a pluralistic phenomenon, self-consciously constructing a
variety of family types that do not conform to the
117Benkov, Reinventing the Family
,
p. 25
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tional structure, according to Benkov. when they do
this they tend to be more conscious and deliberate than
heterosexual couples, according to Benkov, which makes a
ence in relationship intensity, responsibility and
power. This is true at many levels, including the effort
to address questions of language rather than accept the
imposition of words on the most intimate experiences and
relationships, words that position them in relation not just
to each other but also to society. When they do this they
become a force for cultural change, she says.
But before lesbians can capitalize on the advantages of
lesbian mothering, they must ask some hard questions,
according to Polikoff, who says she is surprised that in a
movement built on the premise that the personal is
political, there is "so little analysis of our choices to
have children and all the decisions that flow from that
choice. she is critical that the practice of lesbian
childrearing as an avenue for political action and change is
not a prominent part of lesbian discussions about whether to
have children. Motherhood is an institution that functions
as an integral part of patriarchal society to maintain and
promote patriarchy, according to Polikoff. "Our lesbianism
does not negate or transform the institution of motherhood,"
she says. If lesbians fail to ask personal guestions such as
1 18Benkov, Reinventing the Family
,
p. 146.
1
1
'’Polikoff, “Lesbian Mothers,” p. 48.
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why they want children, "we essentially 0 Kembrace not only the
personal experience of mothering but the institution of
motherhood as well." 120
In fact, Sandra Pollack warns that it is futile to seek
safety in the argument that mothers are all the same, even
if their lives are similar superficially. This obscures the
important threat that lesbian mothers pose to patriarchal
institutions, according to Pollack. 121 This threat comes in
part from the practices of motherhood that stress
egalitarianism and reject traditional sex roles. She and
Polikoff argue against the point of view that the courtroom
is not the place in which to affirm pride in lesbian
sexuality or advocate alternative childrearing designed to
produce strong, independent women.
Pollack and Jeanne Vaughn, in the introduction to the
lesbian parenting anthology they edited, compare the
confused images of black and lesbian mothers and blame the
welfare system. Welfare policies confuse the economic issue
of how to support a family with the personal issues of
sexuality and procreation, they say. This shapes the
perception that the problems of both black female-headed
households and lesbian households is that they lack men or
the presence of male models, while the real problem is that
they lack the money provided by males' incomes. 122
12()
Polikoff, “Lesbian Mothers,” p. 54.
12 Pollack, “Lesbian Mothers,” p. 318 .
l22Pollack and Vaughn, Politics of the Heart
,
p. 14.
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Until recently, courts have been unanimous in their
conclusion that parents are limited to being either mother
or father; child cannot have two mothers by adoption or
female parent must be mother. As Ruthann Robson
Points out, even absent a lesbian mother, the legal category
of mother operates restrictively and punitively
.
123 Llke the
legal category of marriage, according to Robson, the legal
category of mother or parent or even family i s
-too stifling
for our lesbian imaginations and relationships." She urges
challenging the categories.
Thus lesbian mothers may be said to illustrate the
distinction Diane Richardson makes between nonsexist
childrearing and antisexist childrearing
.
124 m nonsexist
childrearing, parents perceive the problem as the way girls
are socialized, so they try to bring their daughters up with
equal access to experiences and situations so they may
choose to do things traditionally dominated by boys or men.
In Richardson's view, this implies that access is all that
matters, what she calls a kind of equal opportunity
perspective. But anti-sexist childrearing is concerned with
the power relations that structure the way girls are treated
and affect the outcome of girls' experiences. That is, there
is no assumption here that equal opportunities will yield
123 Ruthann Robson, Lesbian (Out) Law: Surviving Under the Rule ofLaw, (Ithaca, NY
Firebrand Books, 1992), p. 139.
124 .
*
Diane Richardson, Women, Motherhood and Childrearing, (New York. St. Martin’s
Press, 1993).
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equal outcomes. The problem is male power and privilege,
according to Richardson, not just girls' limited access to
certain types of experiences. The problem in anti-sexist
childrearing is in translating this political claim into
practice by encouraging children to be conscious of the way
male power and privilege operates in society, according to
Richardson
.
125
Many lesbian mothers live out this political claim, and
so show by example that male power and privilege can be
contested. By insisting on defining their roles within their
families, by constructing their relationships, even
inventing relationships, they engage in anti-sexist
childrearing. An important part of that is that the roles
and relationships they construct locate motherhood as only
one part of their identities.
Resisting the Messages
When the discourses of feminist mothers, black mothers,
and lesbians mothers resist the cultural hegemony that
imposes scripts for motherhood, they are resisting messages
that there is only one way to be a mother, that any other
ways are inferior. They provide examples of resistance to
what Sandra Lee Bartky calls "psychological oppression" or
the "internalization of intimations of inferiority ." 126
125Richardson, Women, Motherhood and Childrearing, $ 143.
i26Sandra Lee Bartky, “On Psychological Oppression,” in S. Bishop and M. Weinzweig,
eds.. Philosophy and Women
,
(Belmont. Wadsworth Press, 1979), p. 34.
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Cultural scripts for mothers come in the three categories
Bartky identifies as experiences of oppression:
stereotyping, cultural domination, and sexual
objectification, all of which "can deliver terrible messages
of inferiority even to those who may enjoy material
benefits, threatening self-determination and so
subjectivity
.
127 This process clearly takes place in many
mothers as they are estranged from some aspects of their
identities in order to take on the identity of mother as
defined by the discourses of experts who claim to be the
only ones able to define and solve the problems of
motherhood. The targets of the oppression begin to believe
they lack the capacity to define themselves and their needs,
according to Bartky, and they become psychically alienated.
It is psychologically oppressive to believe a
contradiction," according to Bartky. That is, "to believe
and at the same time not believe that one is inferior ." 128
When one takes one's oppression to be an inherent flaw of
birth or of psychology, it results in what Marxists call a
false consciousness," a systematic deception about the
nature and origin of one's unhappiness, according to Bartky.
This leads to a struggle directed inward on the self rather
than outward on those social forces responsible for the
I27Bartky, “On Psychological Oppression,” p. 34.
1
^Bartky, “On Psychological Oppression,” p. 39.
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predicament This diminishes rather than expands
subjectivity.
While the discourses of feminist, black, and lesbian
others discussed here represent a continuing struggle, they
also illustrate that is is possible to direct the struggles
motherhood in different ways. When we consider the
practices of these mothers in their own historical and
material contexts, we can see how they have come to think of
themselves as they do. We can see the ways in which their
practices are historically linked to particular forms of
power and social control. When feminist mothers engage in
practices of dual parenting and of turning away from
medicalized births to midwives, African American mothers
engage m practices of cooperative and collective mothering,
and lesbian mothers engage in egalitarian practices within
their families, they are responding to these forms of power
and social control, including trying to represent and define
their own needs and how those needs should be satisfied.
These efforts construct them into certain sorts of bodies
with particular kinds of power and capacities. They rebuff
efforts to make them believe the oppressions of motherhood
are their own fault. To a greater or lesser extent, they
direct the struggle of motherhood outward on the social
forces responsible for their predicament rather than inward
on themselves. When they do this, they become living
129Bartky, “On Psychological Oppression,” p. 40.
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examples that there is mnrpe than one way to mother, that
there is more than one set of practices that can be
successful, that there are some real choices to be made in
constructing and reconstructing their subjectivities so that
motherhood can be but one aspect of their identities.
The mothers discussed in this chapter show two
important points about motherhood today — that it is
prevalent and promoted even among women marginalized by
politics, race, color and class; and that the practices of
marginalized groups illustrate some of the ways in which the
dominant discourses on motherhood are contestable. That is,
if we can think of motherhood as a series of practices
prescribed by cultural scripts that structure the lives of
mothers, these mothers show the scripts are subject to
change. They show the ways in which difference has the
potential to be a creative force for that change. As we will
see in the next chapter, when motherhood is viewed as a
scripted performance of disciplinary practices, the
experiences of the mothers here imply a gap between the
script and the mother/ actors which offers an indication of
which parts of the domiant cultural script are most ripe for
interruption and help create space for rewriting the script.
CHAPTER V
RETHINKING MATERNAL SUBJECTIVITIES
When Luce Irigaray urges women to refuse to go to
market, she means not just refuse to be commodities and
refuse to select from choices defined and limited according
to a male model, as we saw in Chapter Two. She has two
additional meanings: that women refuse the cultural roles
that call for them to deny their specificities, including
their bodily rhythms and temporality, and that they refuse
to become space or place for men at their own expense.
Social forms and norms call for women to pretend they have
no bodily specificity different to men when they are in
public. But there is nothing neutral, sexually or otherwise,
about such things as the distinct parts of monthly menstrual
cycles, or pregnancy, or about the cultural scripts that
call for mothers to sacrifice themselves for their children
and the men in their lives. Because of this, as we have
seen, motherhood tends to be either a stigma as mothers are
forced to compete on abstractly "equal" terms with others,
as if they were the same as others, or is seen to represent
s. special condition in need of protection.
This final chapter uses the more detailed understanding
of the scripted practices of motherhood developed in the
first four chapters to consider how we might reinvent the
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positions of
.others from unequal and inferior
, from^
or specral condition in need of protection, from the
assumption that their bodies are obstacles to their access
to subjectivity — to subjects whose identities encompass
more than just motherhood. Because subjectivities are
ymb ic and social positions, changing or reinventing these
positions requires both symbolic and social transformations
- that is, changes that establish new representations of
mothers in the symbolic order that take into account the
material variety of embodiment among mothers, as well as new
relationships between mothers and others.
Theorizing these transformations requires a theory of
differences; the conditions necessary to act, that is, the
freedom and the will to change; and intersubjective
recognition between women, and between women and men.
Practicing these transformations requires an understanding
of these, as well as rights specific to the three body
concepts. Central to such theory and practice are the
notions of time and space, which are ubiquitous influences
on the practices through which mothers are governed and come
to govern themselves. Time and space encompass such crucial
questions as when, where, and how to live, and set the
conditions that determine whether women are able to act. The
task is to rethink maternal subjectivities -- that is, the
positions of mothers in the world — so that mothers may
answer the questions for themselves, so that the conditions
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necessary for them to act may be established. What would be
made possible then is the existence of mothers as desiring
subjects — that is, as subjects who can know their own
sexual and other desires, who can resist disciplinary
powers, who can create their own subjectivities.
New Representations in the Symbolic Order
We need new representations in the symbolic order not
because women do not exist who model the expanded
possibilities of subjectivities that we seek. We saw in
Chapter Four, for example, that such women indeed exist —
models of alternative practices of motherhood, practices
that for many are transformative as they create their
subjectivities. But these real women leading real lives who
contest the cultural scripts are virtually unrepresented in
the symbolic order where meanings, knowledges, and power
relations are established. They are virtually unrepresented
m the cultural images that shape our lives. The discourses
and the social practices of such mothers are important, but
until they are included in the structures of representations
and meanings, they will remain what they are today: locked
in a constant struggle against hegemonic discourses of
motherhood, more isolated than not, more prevalent among
mothers most privileged or most deprived in social status.
In order to be affirmed and made attainable on a wider
scale, images of these and other mothers must be represented
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in the symbolic order where shared meanings are established,
where power produces effects at the levels of knowledge and
desire
.
The symbolic order, the order of representation,
governs culture as the basis of law, language, and the
scripts that regulate exchange as well as the positions of
individuals. That is, as we have seen in earlier chapters,
discourses and representations are powerful controls over
mothers' bodies, identities and subjectivities, as well as
their practices, their ways of being. Or, in Foucauldian
terms, motherhood may be seen as a set of effects produced
by technologies of power and representations, as well as
technologies of the self. The discourses mothers internalize
that dictate expectations and define possibilities, also
generate knowledges and subjectivities. Recalling part of
the definition of identity offered in Chapter Two -- as the
multiple and changing orientations of the self according to
powerful cultural categories and images which are
internalized or incorporated into the structure of the self
we can see that changing and expanding these images will
allow mothers to think and be differently. Because identity
also makes up a part of the process of becoming a subject —
the process in which a sense of self develops and changes
over time as individuals interact with others and their
culture — new representations of mothers have the potential
to change the future.
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Irigaray's call for a revolution in the symbolic order
is based on her view that identrty is formed by identifying
with images and representations in the symbolic order. Power
relations also are internalized in the daily experiences of
omen in this way. This is why she believes women should
move out of the existing systems of symbolic exchange to
reorganize it into a system in which they can take an active
part. That is, women now do not have access to sharing,
exchanging, or coining symbols
.
1 Irigaray believes the
symbolic order can and should be reorganized to create a new
shape for language, culture, and discourse, a new social
architecture. The proof of this need, she says, is that
although women have made some gains in social status and
power, no new values have been established. Women remain
undifferentiated from men, their specificities given no
value or negative value. Because it is on the basis of
negative social meanings, and lack of value or no value
given to their bodies, that women have been oppressed, new
positive social meanings and values must be established that
recognize their specificity. Thus Irigaray puts her focus on
the cultural system rather than the individual
.
A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if
the work of sexual difference is to take place. We
need to reinterpret everything concerning the
relations between subject and discourse, the
1
Irigaray, An Kthics ofSexual Difference
,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) p
114.
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Women, as mothers, are the unacknowledged foundation of
the social order. Their sacrifice of selfhood is the
foundation of society. This foundation is made possible when
men deny their debt to the maternal, when they insist they
are self-made and insist on making the conceptual and
material world according to their images. This is part of
what Ingaray believes has not changed. But the sacrifice of
women is not the only foundation possible. According to
Ingaray, when women live in worlds constructed by men, they
are m effect homeless, left in what she calls dereliction
an intentional or conscious neglect. Both women and men
are born homeless since both lose their original home, their
mothers ' wombs. But men provide a new home or space for
themselves at the expense of women. According to Irigaray,
this results m a time and space created by and for men, a
place where women for the most part must live and work
according to masculine notions of time and space which do
not take into account women's specificities.
2Luce Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 6.
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Time and Space: Home and Work
Thus the revolution in the symbolic order can begin
the notions of time and space. New representations of
time and space can make possible new relationships between
women and men and make space for the self-representation of
women. When we examine what this means for the three female
body concepts, we can see clear hardships from the more
obvious issues of premenstrual syndrome, menstruation, and
pregnancy, to the less obvious but just as compelling issues
of school and daycare locations and schedules, and
responsibilities for childcare and housework. Although the
former issues clearly are bodily ones, the latter issues
also have to do with women's bodies as women race around
with their children, and as they make decisions and choose
practices around their motherhood. School locations and
schedules, for example, rarely have any influence on work
locations and schedules; and paid employment rarely takes
into account the burdens of household duties for women or
men. Studies show that mothers tend to deal with these
difficulties by choosing jobs close to home with flexible
hours, and being more efficient in their cooking and
cleaning practices.^ In other words, mothers have to try
harder and sometimes give up higher paychecks to get jobs
that allow them to minimize daycare costs or be home for
'5
See, for example, Susan Hanson and Geraldine Pratt, Gender, Work, and Space
,
(New
York: Routledge, 1995:185-221), discussed later in this chapter.
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their children after school hours, and they have to work
harder and be more organized at home.
Insistently and consistently, Irigaray says each sex
must have a time and space of their own if they each are to
be subjects and recognize each other as subjects, each
located in time and space, and eventually sharing time and
space. Until women as well as men have a time and space of
their own, women will have to deny their specificities. Some
cultures have taken steps to take into account the
specificities of some of their members, such as the elderly,
those in wheelchairs, those who cannot hear or speak or see.
Taking into account the specificity of mothers, as we will
see in more detail later, includes such aspects of space and
time as locating daycare centers, jobs, and residences near
each other; scheduling school hours that look like work
hours, or vice versa; not penalizing mothers or fathers
(though at this point it usually is mothers) who work part
time or who take advantage of flex time; paying part-time
workers not a fraction of what they would make if they
worked full time but rather a pro-rated amount with
pro-rated benefits.
Irigaray s understandings of bodies and subjectivities
include the concepts of time and space, in part because
embodiment exists in the contexts of time and space and
provides the basis for their perception and representation.
She asserts that time and space are among the concepts
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established by masculine interests yet presented as neutral
and with universal status. This has implications for women
m the social and symbolic order because, just like other
aspects of culture presented as neutral, the concepts of
time and space tend to be oppressive to women. That is,
using the time and space concerns listed above, for example,
mothers often make decisions about work around their
children, which means they will make less money than
nonmothers if they choose part-time work or work close to
home to save travel time or transportation costs. Mothers
who choose full-time work often travel longer distances to
work, and make more money than those who work part time; in
return they pay greater child care costs and have less time
to spend with their children. Similar time and space issues
are of concern to some men, of course, but men still are not
expected to make decisions around their children. And even
when "family friendly" policies are offered to mothers and
fathers, studies show most do not take advantage of them
.
4
This fact illustrates that more than policies or even laws
are required to take space and time issues for mothers into
account. Thus, as we elaborate the three body concepts of
sexual, pregnant, and maternal in the effort to rethink
maternal subjectivity, we necessarily must include
See, for example, Arlie Hochschild s The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and
Home Becomes Work
,
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), discussed later in this
chapter.
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rethinking the locations and relationships of the three body
concepts to time, place, and space.
Irigaray complains about the impact on people of the
rapid pace of contemporary life, and suggests we propose
simple and effective cultural changes that give us what she
calls a chance to live. That is, "Living requires knowing
how to stop, reflect, and even contemplate, so that we can
become capable of situating ourselves individually and
collectively." 5 Her suggestions precede, but seem to respond
to, a recent study by Arlie Hochschild in which she spent
three years interviewing employees at all levels, and
studying the so-called "family friendly" policies offered,
at a Fortune 500 company. In The Time Bind: When Work
Becomes Home and Home Become Work, Hochschild reports her
findings that few employees took advantage of the policies.
She found that mothers from two-income families, like
generations of fathers before them, are fleeing the
pressures of home for the relief of work. Hochschild reports
that working mothers now face not two shifts — as she
reported in a previous book, The Second Shift: Working
Parents and the Revolution at Home — but three shifts: one
at work, a second at home, and a third trying to recover
from the first two. 6
Nrigaray, Thinking the Difference For a Peaceful Revolution, (New York Routledge
1994), p. 34.
6Arlie Hochschild, with Anne Machung, The Second Shift: Working Parents and the
Revolution at Home, (London: the Penguin Group, 1989).
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igaray suggests that instead of creating the kind of
pace that requires that recovery shift, „e cultivate women's
temporality. She insists that we can make regulations in
keeping with the rhythms associated with women's bodily
specificity. This means that men's rhythms should not be
seen as the norm
.
7 For example, women should have the right
to work and earn wages as civil persons, rather than as
neutral or neuter beings - that is, pretending they are not
different to men. This means, for example, that work and
wages should take into account pregnancy and childrearing
without penalizing those engaged in them.
Once again, Irigaray calls for women to say no, since
without their yes, the world of men cannot continue to
develop or subsist ." 8 In order to know when, why, and how to
say no, women must become familiar with the
subjectivity-objectivity relationship -- « a learning
experience that women are particularly lacking as a result
of their cultural past of identification with the object of
desire ." 9 To do this women must distance themselves both
from the authority that imposes its laws on them, and from
themselves as listening and speaking subjects. Irigaray
recommends learning how to analyze a discourse and to
identify the sex of the person speaking and that person's
relationship to the other sex and to the world. Such
7
Irigaray, Thinking the Difference
,
p. 62.
8
Irigaray, Thinking the Difference
,
p. 26.
9
Irigaray, Thinking the Difference
,
p. 26.
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distancing and analyzing are at the heart of this
dissertation.
Irigaray says that man's work includes taking from
woman her relation to space in order to conduct "the endless
construction of a number of substitutes for his prenatal
home. "10 But woman needs a relation to space in order to
create a space for herself, according to Irigaray, and to
provide a place for the other.
Again and again, taking from the feminine thetissue or texture of spatiality. In exchange - but
^ i
Sn
1_
t a real one “ he buVs her a house, even
shuts her up in it, places limits on her that arethe opposite of the unlimited site in which he
unwittingly situates her. He contains or envelopesher with walls while enveloping himself and histhings with her flesh. The nature of these
envelopes is not the same: on the one hand,invisibly alive, but with barely perceivable
limits; on the other, visibly limiting or
sheltering, but at the risk of being prison-like
or murderous if the threshold is not left open. 11
The mother remains a place, but not her own place —
that is, deprived of her own place — yet a place of the
other who cannot separate himself from her. "Without her
knowledge or volition, then, she threatens by what she
lacks: a 'proper' place." 12 To have her own place she would
1(irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 11.
1
1
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 11.
'“Irigaray, “Sexual Difference,” in Margaret Whitford, ed.. The Irigaray Reader,
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991) p. 169.
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have to envelop herself both as a woman and as a mother,
which would entail a complete change in conceptions of time
and space. This would change the relationship between form
and matter, which, as we will see later in this chapter, has
implications for desire.
Irigaray, time is interior and masculine, while
space is exterior (to men) and feminine. >3 Time means
inferiority of a subject who is introspective. For Irigaray,
men inhabit while women perceive. 14 As such, man searches
for, builds, creates homes for himself everywhere —
"caves,
huts, women, cities, language, concepts, theory, and so
on. in contrast, woman is always attuned to the outside,
to the world, but seldom participates in the building.
I was your house. And, when you leave, abandoningthis dwelling place, I do not know what to do withthese walls of mine. Have I ever had a body otherthan the one which you constructed according toyour idea of it? Have I ever experienced a skin
other than the one which you wanted me to dwell
within. 10
Space means not just room or place for self-
representation for women, but also arrangements and
locations of housing, jobs, child care, stores, public
transit, and so on. Other aspects of life, such as defining
the professions, the goals of work, working conditions, and
13
Irigaray
,
An Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 7.
1
4
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
, p 141.
1
^Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 141.
16
Irigaray, Elemental Passions, (New York: Routledge, 1992:), p. 49.
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production techniques, also encompass elements of both time
and space. For the most part these arrangements are made by
men without regard for the needs of women, let alone the
differences among sexual, pregnant, and maternal women. The
consequences are political, social, and cultural, and tend
to affirm the cultural scripts for mothers: either they
contain mothers in certain spheres, or penalize them, or
worse, make them invisible, in other spheres. For the most
part these arrangements define the lives of women. Yet women
have not made these arrangements.
If traditionally, and as a mother, woman
regresents place for men, such a limit means that
she becomes a thing, with some possibility of
change from one historical period to another. Shefinds herself delineated as a thing. Moreover, the
maternal- feminine also serves as an envelope, a
container, the stating point from which man limitshis things. w
The consequence is that the maternal-feminine is
separated from its own place, lacking its own place. As
such, it becomes a threat. Women are separated from their
mothers, isolated from one another, and deprived of a
culture of their own. ^ This is not theory, but the practice
of mothers, as illustrated by the following authors who are
among those who study the links between the organization of
time and space, and the organization of society and the
substance of public policies.
1
7
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 1 0.
Ix lrigaray, Sexes and Genealogies
,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 192
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Time and Space: Social and Political
Delores Hayden in Redesigning the American Dream shows
the ways in which the organization of time and space, such
as housing and services, work schedules and locations,
defines women's lives - in terms of both gender divisions
and experiences, in what amounts to a concrete social
planning strategy. « Hayden insists that the United States
has chosen a housing model that is antithetical to the needs
of most women, and which is part of a spatial design that
reinforces the gendered division of labor. She says that
most housing in the United States is based on the assumption
that the house is a haven for the male worker and his family
almost three-quarters of the housing built since 1940
when this model emerged. Cities have been transformed to fit
this model despite its particular social, economic and
environmental shortcomings, according to Hayden.
For example, the houses usually are suburban, without
access to public transportation, far from job opportunities,
schools, and daycare. The model may have fit white middle
class families of the 1950s and 1960s whose male heads of
households made a family wage though this is arguable,
since the housewives in that group still were isolated in
the suburbs without access to transportation, and even
isolated from each other as they went about doing household
*
^Delores Hayden, Redesigning the American Dream: The Future ofHousing
,
Work, and
Family Life, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1986).
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chores individually. But the model never fit the majority of
women, and no longer fits the lives of even white,
middle-class women, which means that most women are forced
to shape their lives to fit the model.» What this means is
that employed mothers often go in one direction to take
children to school or daycare, another direction to work, go
out of their way to buy groceries, and then have to prepare
a meal and do housework at the end of a long day. Thus the
model hurts women because it contributes to the double
shift, occupational segregation as women try to "choose"
jobs close to home, and unequal pay as women "choose" jobs
with part-time or flexible schedules that work around
children.
The model also has hurt men because, with its
assumption of a wife at home, it put stiff pressure on men
to earn enough to support the family, and left them little
family time. Because most mothers now have to work for
financial reasons, some of that pressure on fathers has been
released. This may make it appear that the major issue with
this housing model is an economic one. But because those
same working mothers bear the brunt of the second and third
shifts described by Hochschild, the issue also goes beyond
economics. In fact, Elizabeth Wilson in The Sphinx in the
City: Urban Life, the Control of Disorder
,
and Women, says
that male/female differences such as those inscribed on this
2()Hayden, Redesigning
,
p. 12.
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housing model have been inscribed on
structurally and socially.
cities both
The city as experience, environment, concept -is constructed by means of multiple contrasts-natural, unnatural; monolithic, fragmented;
secret, public, pitiless, enveloping; rich^ poor-sublime, beautiful. Behind all these lies the
'
ultimate and major contrast: male, female-
culture, nature; city, country, in saying" this Iam not arguing (as do some feminists) that
male-female difference creates the deepest andmost fundamental of all political divisions. Noram I arguing that the male/female stereotypes towhich I refer accurately reflect the nature ofactual, individual men and women. In theindustrial period, nonetheless, that particulardivision became inscribed on urban life anddetermined
_ the development and planning of cities
o a surprising degree and in an extraordinarily
unremarked way . 21
Gender and women's disadvantages are pervasive and
institutionalized dynamics of the construction of urban
places, according to Wilson. It is also true of suburban
places that social relations are reproduced over space.
Although there are examples of housing and communities
constructed with the needs of working mothers, and not just
working fathers, in mind, Hayden says these are not only
scarce but also relatively unknown. Those that no longer
exist, such as the community of Vanport City, Oregon, that
served a shipyard during World War II, are largely
2
'Elizabeth Wilson, The Sphinx in the City: Urban Life, the Control ofDisorder, and
Women
,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 8.
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forgotten.
affordable
political
But they are proof that not only the need for
housing, but more importantly that the design and
questions that surround housing, are not new
issues
.
Vanport City was the most ambitious attempt ever made
m the United States to shape space for employed women and
their families — including proximity of home, work,
schools, and daycare centers open on the same 24-hour-a-day
schedule as the shipyards. Also included were "cooked food
services so mothers [could] pick up hot casseroles along
with their children." 23 Every aspect was designed to make
the lives of the employed women who lived there more
efficient, more pleasant, and easier. Hayden's research
shows that both Vanport City and the model that became
popular right after the war and eventually won out -- with
its rows of identical houses with look-alike picket fences
220ther examples of alternative visions of space, especially public space, include those of
the poet Walt Whitman and Frederick Law Olmsted, the founder of landscape
architecture, according to Hayden. Whitman envisioned a democratic space offering equal
access to public space and public office without regard to sex, race, class, or sexual
preference. Olmsted envisioned space that fostered relations among all citizens, and gave
public heating of homes and public kitchens the same priority as public sidewalks. Both
found it possible to value the traditional family but still recognize the independent needs of
women and children, according to Hayden. Later, feminist visions of space came from
such women and Melusina Fay Peirce and Jane Addams. Peirce gave priority to
women-created spaces such as kitchenless houses and socialized daycare which she
considered first steps to women becoming equal members of society. Although such
women forced change, the reforms of the Progressive movement set the stage for
ministers, politicians, planners and social workers, mostly men, to take over control of
such issues and shape their evolution, according to Hayden (Redesigning n. 24-32)
2
"’Hayden, Redesigning
,
p. 4.
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and green lawns - both had great appeals as solutions to
housing needs of American families, and both made their
developers lots of money. The main differences between these
models are the assumptions involved.
In the case of Vanport City, the three underlying
assumptions were that women would work and therefore family
needs should be addressed as public problems; the population
would be diverse in terms of race, age, family form and
size; and that efficiency is important. In contrast, the
main underlying assumptions of the model that eventually
emerged as dominant were that women would be home, family
needs would be their responsibilities, that is, addressed as
private problems; the population would be homogeneous; and
people would live in self-contained homes where efficiency
would not be important. That is, the emphasis in the latter
model was on privacy, private lives and private space. When
this model won out, the developer of Vanport City simply
switched over to take advantage of the federal subsidies
available there, according to Hayden. Manufacturers liked
the model because it helped create the domestic markets for
goods, and kept women at home to spend money for such goods.
Labor unions liked the model because it supported their
causes of family wage and keeping wives and children out of
the workforce . 24 But according to Hayden, the losers were
the "white female and minority male and female workers, who
24Hayden, Redesigning
,
p. 33.
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lost their wartime jobs to returning white male veterans and
found there were no postwar housing subsidies designed to
P them find new jobs, new homes, and mortgages with easy
terms The private, single-family housing model was about
more than economics; it was about making space for certain
people who lived their lives in a certain way.
And that model became the national goal. Hayden calls
this suburban housing model an "architecture of gender,"
spaces built for women who serviced men and children. Such
houses "provide settings for women and girls to be effective
social status achievers, desirable sex objects, and skillful
domestic servants, and for men and boys to be executive
breadwinners, successful home handy men, and adept car
mechanics ." 26 She calls for a redesign of the "American
Dream" so that it meets the needs of the majority: employed
women and their families.
One result of the suburban model of housing is that
women tend to blame their miseries on personal problems,
such as lack of time and money, when in fact such
difficulties are caused by social problems in the
organization of time and space. If women were closer to
work, if they did not have to go in several directions twice
each day, if everyone could afford safe neighborhoods -- all
of which can be accomplished by design — their problems
Hayden, Redesigning
,
p. 8-9.
26Hayden, Redesigning
,
p. 17.
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would be on their way to being solved. "Together, space,
time, and money intersect to establish the physical settings
where all the events of life will be staged,” according to
Hayden
-
27 Aesthetic, social, and economic messages are
conveyed in housing and other planning of space, she says,
which means a misfit between a society and its housing stock
and organization "can create profound unrest and
disorientation which she sees in contemporary conflicts of
sex, class, and race. 2* The "spatial prescription for
married suburban bliss that emphasized gender as the most
salient feature of every citizen's experience and
aspirations” hid the segregation by age, race and class that
took place . 29
Ecologists and feminists have offered strong critigues
of the single-family housing model, according to Hayden, but
none has succeeded in reconceptualizing the private home and
its gendered division of space, nor its location in relation
to other aspects of women's lives. She calls for the
reconstruction of domestic space to support women's and
men s participation in unpaid labor associated with
housekeeping and childcare on an equal basis, as well as
changes in economic policies and public spaces that support
women and men's participation in paid labor on an equal
basis. Such changes have implications that could mean
27Hayden, Redesigning
,
p. 39.
28Hayden, Redesigning
,
p. 40.
29Hayden, Redesigning
,
p. 42.
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dramatic reduction in the stressfui time and space demands
m women's lives, changes that could take into account the
three female body concepts
.
Other authors such as Clara Greed in her Women and
Planning: Creating Gendered Realities, have shown how gender
bias in the philosophy and practice of urban and suburban
planning is responsible for the gendered nature of space. 30
Greed insists that space is not only physical, but also
social and ideological. She says the planning profession is
made up of technicians, policy makers, and philosopher
kings, and has long been linked to population planning,
eugenics, and colonialism. 3 ' The profession is involved in
an activity that is both political and ideological, since
the spatial end product cannot be separated from the social
and economic processes that shape it and then shape the
lives and experiences of the population. For example,
although 80 percent of women in England live in urban areas
many urban planners there see women as a minority and so
plan for them accordingly. That means such issues as
pedestrian access, steps and lighting, planting and play
areas are minimized, and land-use zoning policies
30
~ Clara H Greed, Women and Planning: Creating Gendered Realities, (New York:
Routledge, 1994). Greed’s book focuses on Great Britain, where she studied and works,
but she draws parallels with the planning profession in the United States and other western
countries.
3
’Greed, Women and Planning
,
p. 29, 61. Greed says that in Britain, for example,
planners strongly espoused population control measures which endorsed the emigration of
working-class people to Australia, tried to impose western gender roles on ethnic minority
women, and has urged similar control programs in Third World countries.
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emphasizing decentralization and dispersal take into account
the daily lives of men and their needs, but not of women and
ChUdren ^ needS
‘ While Hayden suggests spatial and
social changes take place together. Greed believes what she
calls the aspatial or social structure must change first. 32
One way in which the influence of space on women's
lives is revealed is pursued by authors who show the ways in
which gender practices are created and recreated differently
from one location to another, even one neighborhood to
another. Susan Hanson and Geraldine Pratt, in their study of
women and work in Worcester, Mass., show that although there
may be a dominant cultural model or script to be followed,
m fact subcultures exist and can be found with some effort.
In their study, for example, they found that the acquisition
of gender identity is a geographical process, at least
partially structured by local context. 33 Hanson and Pratt
studied, among other factors, how employment and services
vary from neighborhood to neighborhood in ways that affect
women's occupations, the organization of work within
households, and gender relations. They conclude that place
structures opportunities and decisions for women that create
their lifestyles and work patterns -- not only in terms of
what is available, but also what is judged possible
.
34
l2
Greed, Women and Planning, p. 116.
3 Susan Hanson and Geraldine Pratt, Gender, Work, and Space, (New York Routledae
1995:185-221).
34Hanson and Pratt, Gender, Work, and Space, p. 185 (italics mine).
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These authors argue that gender, like class, is
constructed in and through place, according to expectations
of what is appropriate and based on hegemonic standards for
the particular space
.
36
Moreover, that the gendered division of time, like that
of space, is linked to the male model can be seen not only
m workday schedules that ignore school vacations and daily
hours, beginning before school starts and ending long after
school gets out. It also can be seen in interpretations in
35Hanson and Pratt, Gender, Work, and Space, p. 186.
l6Hanson and Pratt, Gender, Work, and Space, p. 186. Other studies have shown that
place dnves even the practice of medicine. According to a study by Dartmouth Medical
School, each community has its own way of dealing with medical problems and its doctors
fall in line, sometimes without even realizing it. One example: the rate of back surgery per
1,000 Medicare patients in 1993 was as high as 7.2 in Provo, Utah, and as low as 1.22 in
New York City. The doctor conducting the study concluded that “medicine is a highly
culture-driven enterprise.” (Gina Kolata, “In US., All Medicine is Local,” The New York
Times, Feb. 4, 1996, p. E5
.) That physicians trained in a wide variety of locations could
vary their practices so widely depending on where they practice, suggests the power of
place on all practices, attitudes, and thinking.
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employment and public policies. As Nancy Fraser points out
m her chapter on the interpretation of needs in the welfare
system in Unruly Practices : Power
, Discourse and Gender in
Contemporary Social Theory, welfare and other policies are
based on the same common core of assumptions as Hayden,
Greed and others have found in spatial planning
.
37 These
include the persistent assumption of a sexual division of
labor in the family between domestic and nondomestic, which
does not reflect real lives since only about seven percent
of American families with children have a mother at home and
father employed
.
38 Yet the separate and unequal "separate
spheres norms has determined the structure of the welfare
system, according to Fraser, which hurts women and children.
That is, programs geared to men such as social insurance
schemes position recipients as bearers of rights and
purchasing consumers; programs geared to women such as
relief schemes position recipients not as bearers of rights
but rather as receivers of public charity, stigmatized as
cheats, deviants, and failures. This constructs women
exclusively as mothers, according to Fraser, and so
interprets their needs as maternal and their sphere as the
Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social
Theory
,
(Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
38Fraser uses the estimate of 15 percent (1989: 149), but later figures place this at 7
percent or below. See Daphne Spain and Suzanne M. Bianchi, Balancing Act:
Motherhood, Marriage, and Employment Among American Women
,
(New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1996).
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family. They must be, yet cannot be, normative mothers. 39
Fraser insists that the identities and needs of the
recipients assumed in the welfare system are just one
possible interpretation and therefore are contestable. The
interpretations are political, she says, and so subject to
dispute; yet the system executes political policy in a way
that appears nonpolitical and tends to be depoliticizing .40
The connection between the organization of space and
the organization of society clearly is a strong one. The
gender stereotypes that permeate architecture, structural
design and graphic design in public spaces serve to keep
women out, and either to keep them isolated at home or
scrambling for time to deal with the burdens of second
shifts. Although changing the organization of time and space
alone will not change social relations, thinking about time
and space in these ways, distancing and analyzing them,
helps make the familiar practices associated with time and
space concerns strange. It offers them as issues to be
considered in support of recognition of differences and
accommodations specific to the variety of body concepts and
their needs. Thus time and space provide a starting point
for the examination of other possible roles and other
possible representations in the symbolic order, and for
symbolic and social transformations.
l9
Fraser, Unruly Practices, p. 153.
40
Fraser, Unruly Practices, p. 154.
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Theorizing the Transformations
In order to theorize these kinds of social and symbolic
transformations, we need a theory of differences,
intersubjective recognition, and freedom to change.
Difference here does not mean from the established male
norm; it does not mean a single difference from any other
single norm or category. Thus, the plural. Difference here
is an assertion of elements or factors that distinguishes
individuals not other, but another who defines self for
self. A theory of differences allows us to question the
source of the model of the norm, recognize differences in
others and in conceptions such as of time and space, and see
possibilities for change. Recognizing differences includes
recognizing the positions of the variety of mothers, since
these depend in large measure on their individual
differences
.
A theory of differences acknowledges the differences in
the subjectivities, positions, needs and desires of the
three body concepts, considered in their intersections with
aspects of race, class, and other specificities.
Acknowledging differences is important to achieve the goal
of equal worth on the symbolic, material, and juridical
levels based on identity rather than equality -- an
achievement with the potential to change social meanings and
values. This is important because, as we saw in Chapter Two,
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11 18 thS S°Cial meanin9s and values given to women's bodies
that must change because it is on the basis of those
meanings that women have been oppressed. The goal is to
develop identities as subjects in which the account of
subjectivity recognizes specificities.
Sex and sexed bodies, as well as other differences, are
inextricably linked to social norms. Elaboration of the
three female body concepts has offered a richer
understanding of the links between differences and social
norms, a clearer view of the cultural injustices that
result, as well as a possible direction from which to
recognize the subject positions of mothers.
Audre Lorde warns against what she calls the errors of
ignoring and misnaming difference, and urges us to develop
tools for using human differences as a springboard for
creative change within our lives. 41 The alternative is to
follow past practice of responding to human differences with
fear and loathing, she says: ignoring them, copying them if
they are dominant or hegemonic, or destroying them if they
are subordinate. She warns against "historical amnesia"
enforced by the "generation gap" that becomes a social tool
for repression. 42 "We find ourselves having to repeat and
Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference,” in Russell
Ferguson, Martha Gever, Trinh T. Minh-ha, and Cornel West, eds.. Out there:
Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures
,
(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute
of Technology Press, 1990), p. 282.
42Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex,” p. 283.
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relearn the same old lessons over and over that our
-others
did because we do not pass on what we have learned, or
because we are unable to listen ."43
Lorde, who describes herself as "a forty-nine year old
Black lesbian feminist socialist mother of two, including
one boy, and a member of an inter-racial couple," describes
being encouraged to single out one aspect of her identity to
present as the whole, which would mean denying other aspects
of her identity.
But this is a destructive and fragmenting way tolive. My fullest concentration of energy is
available to me only when I integrate all theparts of who I am, openly, allowing power from
f^w C f lar i SOUfces of mV living to flow back andorth freely through all my different selves,
without the restrictions of externally imposeddefinition. Only then can I bring myself and my
energies as a whole to the service of those
struggles which I embrace as part of my living
.
44
It is not the differences of race, age, and sex that
separate people but their "refusal to recognize those
differences, and to examine the distortions which result
from our misnaming them and their effects upon human
behavior and expectation ."45 Lorde suggests that one reason
white women have difficulty reading the work of women of
color is because it makes them feel guilty to have to view
43Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex,” p. 283.
44Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex,” p. 285.
4 Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex,” p. 282.
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women of color as women and different to white women
prevents women from working together.
This
The literatures of all women of Color recreate the*ex ures of our lives, and many white women areheavily invested in ignoring the real differencesor as long as any difference between us means one
anv diff
S 6 inferior
' then the recognition ofy erence must be fraught with guilt. Toallow women of color to step out of stereotypestoo guilt provoking, for it threatens the
complacency of those women who view oppressiononly in terms of sex . 46
is
Recognizing maternal difference has meant that mothers
must be inferior, and so recognizing maternal difference
also is fraught with guilt. To address this inferiority and
the oppression that accompanies it, we need to acknowledge
maternal difference without categorizing it as inferior.
When mothers deny their specificities, deny other aspects of
their identity in order to fit the restrictions of cultural
definitions, they live limited lives, unequal and inferior,
oppressed. But making space for mothers to represent
themselves, changing physical and organizational space, can
provide support for the notion of the maternal having its
own place. This would be included in "a possible place for
each sex, body, and flesh to inhabit ,
"
a place with limits
that requires that the other have an invitation or
permission to penetrate, one which recognizes differences
.
47
46Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex,” p. 283.
47
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 17-18.
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To create such a place requlres both ^ ^^ __^
which accounts for a connection of the present with both
memory of the past and hope for, and therefore a conception
of, the future; space which recognizes and provides for each
body concept. That is, women must construct a world for
themselves, not just for the other as they have been asked
to do in the past.
What Irigaray calls "love of same" -- "love of
indifferentiation from the earth-mother, the first dwelling
place" — is really "love of other" that does not recognize
itself as such
.
48 if man were to differentiate woman and
mother, he would lose his substance. "This sameness,
womblike and maternal, serves forever and for free
, unknown
and forgotten.
... This sameness is the maternal-feminine
which has been assimilated before any perception of
difference ." 49 It is from this that man creates himself.
Thus, according to Irigaray, "this same, and the Other's
relation to it, is priceless" and "poses the greatest danger
we face today ." 50 it is love of sameness that allows man to
organize time and space, always dependent on the maternal,
destroying the love between mother and daughter and
preventing love between sisters and among women.
48
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 97-8
49
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 98.
5()
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 99.
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f®rtility of the 9reat cosmice dan9er we incur when weorget what we have received from the body, ourebt toward that which gives and renews life. Whenwe forget our gratitude toward the living beingthat man is at every instant. 51 y
For Irigaray, "denying that women and men are different
in the name of some hypothetical social equality is a
delusion, a bias in favor of a split - an impossible split -
between private life and social identity." 52 This split is
impossible because it means that we suddenly become
unisexual or asexual out of bed or away from home.
Place and Recognition
Irigaray traces the lack of intersub j ective recognition
between women, beginning with between mother and daughter,
to her assertion that woman is place. This emphasizes the
importance of reconceiving place.
Since the mother has a unique place, to become a
mother would supposedly be to occupy that place.
3
1
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 100.
52
Irigaray, Thinking the Difference
,
p. viii.
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wifrhOTt having any relationship to the mother inthat place. The economy, here, would be either theone woman or the other, either her or i-me . ?hisrivalry in regard to place and the maternal
™f‘ons 'the only functions for women that arevalued m the West) is ruled by man's relation tothe maternal and by the lack of a female ?den?ityIf we are to be desired and loved by men, we must"abandon our mothers, substitute for them,
elimrnete them in order to be same. All of which
h S°
YS
v^
P°ssibilitY of a love between motherand daughter. The two become at once accomplicesand rivals m order to move into the singlepossible position in the desire of man.
.
,
Thls comPetition equally paralyzes love amongsister women. Because they strive to achieve the
P° S
ht°
f th
3^
UDlqUe °ne: the mother of mothers, one
When women compare "quantitative estimates" of love
they receive, it interferes with the possibility that they
might love one another, according to Irigaray. They situate
themselves "on the edges of the other in order to 'exist'
As proofs of love, these comparatives eliminate the
possibility of a place among women ." 54 When they do this,
they value each other by standards not their own and which
they allow to occupy the potential place of their identity.
They unwittingly destroy whatever it is that differentiates
them from other women, and thus constitute an instrument of
their oppression. They reduce themselves "to a sameness that
is not their own ." 55 Any love involved is not for another
woman but for the place or space she creates and occupies;
53
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 1 02.
54
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 103.
55Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 104.
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the place generates envy rather than respect, separation
rather than exchange. It is this place or space that must be
reconceived so that women can break out of this routine, so
that women can love each other which is the prerequisite to
loving men. In Irigaray's words, there can be "no love of
other without love of same ."56
Women live their lives as a threshold that ensures that
Ofnienguaggi batWeaBsiwSmefiiotAtytsnflrtKSasiotitKeutbsltyypem
m effect depriving them of speech.
If this threshold (this ground that is no ground)is ever to be lived for women's benefit, they needlanguage, some language. This linguistic home that
man has managed to substitute even for hisdwelling in a body, whether his own body or
another s, has used women as construction
material, but (therefore?) it is not available toher
.
Again, Irigaray goes back to the mother-daughter
relationship, now unsymbolized, unrepresented in the
symbolic order, which makes it virtually impossible for
women to have an identity distinct from the maternal
function. Thus symbolizing that relationship is a priority.
That is, if woman is mother is a place, daughter can have no
relationship with her; daughter can only take her place, be
a place. If mother is a subject and daughter is a subject,
56
Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 1 04.
^Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 1 07.
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they can recognize each other, other women, men, as
subjects, as different. They can have relationships and
those relationships can be symbolized.
Perhaps the most important aspect of a theory of
differences is that it makes it possible for women to
recognize aspects about their identities and the identities
of others, which in turn makes possible that they know their
desires which allows them to will change. That is, for women
to have freedom, their identities must be complete rather
than partial as they are when they consist only of the
maternal function. Recognizing the differences that make up
the aspects of their identities opens up possibilities,
including the freedom to change, by providing the symbolic
representations that not only grant recognition to women'
s
existing ways of being and doing but also provide images of
other ways of being and doing. The freedom to change is
provided by the images of other possibilities; the will to
change is provided by the recognition of other
possibilities
.
Although Irigaray seems interested only in power in
terms of the power of discourse, her analysis suggests links
between power and desire. In her response to guestions about
hysteria in This Sex Which is Not One, she says that because
women lack language they cannot elaborate the same system of
psychosis as men. But she sees hysteria as signifying "that
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something else is being held back, kept in reserve. This
something is a reserve of power, repressed because of the
subordination of discourses and desires. It is "a cultural
reserve," which, when released, may hold the key to the
representation of women by women and to the symbolization of
feminine desire. She is not recommending that women become
hysterical, but attempts to show the reserves of power women
hold and their direct link to the symbolic order.
Desires are inextricably linked to specificity and
representation. As women's specificities are elaborated, and
represented m the symbolic, the possibility opens for women
to know their desires. As unsymbolized, women are mothers,
are left trapped in the role of satisfying the needs and
desires of others without knowing their own needs and
desires. As described in Chapter Two, desires here means not
sexual desire which is a lack to be filled, but positive
forces of production that link objects and are linked to
power and resistance. Desires refer to sexual as well as
other desires. Power, through discourse for example, shapes
desires as it constitutes individuals. That is, discourse is
transformed into desires. And where there is desire — not
only sexual desire but the desire to have a child, or the
desire to be a "good" mother -- the power relation is
already present . 59 In order to become subjects of desire,
58Irigaray, This Sex, p. 138.
-^Michel Foucault, The History ofSexuality, Vol. 1
,
(New York: Random House, 1978),
p. 81, also see Chapter Two, p. 29.
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desiring subjects, women must be able to recognize
themselves and others, love themselves and others, recognrze
the debt to the maternal. This allows them to recognize the
mother as more than mother, as a sexual being and a desiring
subject — which makes it possible for the daughter to
recognize herself as a separate and specific sexual being
and desiring subject. Thus in order to have access to their
own desires, women must first be able to locate themselves
m relation to their mothers. They must challenge and
reinterpret their inherited identities and values.
If we consider the ways in which Foucault and Irigaray
intersect on desire — as a positive and creative force
linked to power and resistance — we can trace its
importance at the level of the social as well as at the
level of the subject. It is at these levels that access to
desire is crucial to the freedom or will to change. That is,
the conditions created by new representations in the
symbolic order that recognize differences are also the
conditions under which women may act, under which women may
enter into relations of exchange as subjects of exchange
rather than merely its objects, under which women may have
access to the creative force of desire.
In Irigaray' s Elemental Passions
,
the elements that
make up the world and the individuals in it are rediscovered
by male and female subjects
.
60 The most powerful of the
6()
Irigaray, Elemental Passions
,
(New York: Routledge, 1992).
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passions, love, which is creative rather than destructive,
takes place between male and female subjects who each see
the other as autonomous, independent, able to give and take.
Desires: Creating Something New
In her essay, "He risks who risks life itself,"
Irigaray elaborates on love and desire
.
61 Desire is
"unpredictable, uncoerceable
. Free of domination - in itself
or m the other ."62 Access to desire, and its release, comes
from taking the total risk, the risk necessary for love
between male and female subjects who each see the other as
autonomous and independent, the risk of leaving shelter,
escaping representation.
In her essay "Sexual Difference," Irigaray elaborates
on desire as unpredictable
.
63 Desire requires a sense of
attraction, a change in the relationship between man and
woman. Just as fertility for Irigaray means not only
procreation but also other kinds of creation, "the
production of a new age of thought, art, poetry and
language ,"64 so desire means not only filling a lack but
also creating something new. Desire occupies the place
between matter and form, so that new representations in the
’ Irigaray, “He risks who risks life itself” in Margaret Whitford, ed., The Irigaray
Reader
,
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
6
^ Irigaray, “He risks who risks life itself” p. 215.
6
Irigaray, Sexual Difference,” in Whitford, ed.. The Irigaray Reader.
64
Irigaray, “Sexual Difference,” p. 165.
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symbolic order will
form and thus what
Access to desire is
guardians of men's
place, not of their
mean new relations between matter and
Irigaray calls a new economy of desire.
denied to women now because women are
bodies, which requires they stay in one
own, while desire is movement
.
65
°h k Id96 ' whlch ls often felt to be the one inwhich the problem of desire has been brought tothe fore, frequently theorizes about this desireon the basis of certain observations about a
moment of tension, situated in historical time
whereas desire ought to be thought of as a dynamicforce whose changing form can be traced in thepast and occasionally the present, but never
predicted
.
66
She makes clear the need for a new system of desire, a
system in which women also would have access to desire.
. . . woman always tends towards something else
without ever turning to herself as the site of a
positive element. In terms of contemporary
physics, we could say that she remains on the side
of the electron, with all that this implies for
her, for man, and for an encounter between the
two. If there is no double desire, the positive
and negative poles divide themselves among the two
sexes instead of creating a chiasmus or double
loop in which each can move out towards the other
and back to itself.
If these positive and negative elements are
not present in both, the same pole will always
attract, while the other remains in motion but
possesses no 'proper' place. There is no
attraction and support that excludes
disintegration or rejection, no double pole of
attraction and decomposition that would replace
65 lrigaray, “Women-mothers, the silent substratum,” in Whitford, ed., The Irigaray
Reader
,
p. 49.
66
Irigaray, “Sexual Difference,” p. 167.
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the separation that articulates all encounters andgives rise to speech, promises and alliances!®?
But before there can be the desire of love between the
sexes, women must have access to their own desire, their
desire for each other, their desire to speak. As usual,
Ingaray takes the question at hand back to the
mother-daughter relationship, if motherhood could be but one
aspect of a woman's identity, if mothers could be women,
then there would be a whole mode of a relationship of
desiring speech between daughter and mother ."68
For Irigaray, desire also is connected to madness. But
because man's desires have the force of law, and have
assigned to man wisdom, moderation, and truth, woman is left
"to bear the burden of the madness [he] did not want to
attribute to [himself]
, recognize in [himself ]
,
69 In her
essay, "The Bodily Encounter with the Mother," Irigaray
argues that because the relationship between desire and
madness is articulated in the relationship with the mother,
when man denies his debt to the mother he leaves madness to
her and to all women.
The relationship with the mother is a mad desire,
because it is the 'dark continent' par excellence .
It remains in the shadows of our culture; it is
its night and its hell. But men can no more, or
rather no less, do without it than can women. And
if there is now such a polarization over the
67lrigaray, “Sexual Difference,” p. 168.
68lrigaray, “Women-mothers, the silent substratum,” p. 52.
69
Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter with the Mother,” in Whitford, ed., The Irigaray
Reader
,
p. 35.
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that
ab° rtion and contraception, isn't
of f h
° m°re Way of voiding the question: what
th^ntb
maq±na
lu
and symbolic relationship withmother, with the woman-mother? What of thatwoman outside her social and material role as
labor^power ? 0^
35 “
-producer of
It is the maternal function that sustains both the
social order and the order of desire, yet the desires of the
mother are kept in a dimension of need and so nullified. The
law of the desire forbids desire for and of the mother.
Ingaray says that the murder of the father that Freud
theorizes and describes in Totem and Taboo
, the murder as
founding the primal horde, was preceded by the murder of the
mother which was required in order to establish a certain
order in the polis, one linked to private property, to the
transmission of goods from father to son, to the
establishment of social organizations open to and designed
for men only
.
71 in Freud's tale, he hypothesizes a
prehistoric event in which the sons killed the father,
triggering a primal guilt then used by the superego to
enforce the rules of civilization.
But Irigaray insists that the murder of the mother came
first. She illustrates her point with the story of the
murder of Clytemnestra in Aeschylus' Greek tragedy Oresteia.
In Irigaray' s interpretation, Clytemnestra is a passionate
70
Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter,” p. 35.
71
Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter,” p. 36; Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, p. 192;
Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points ofAgreement between the Mental Lives
ofSamges and Neurotics, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1950).
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lover, preceding the Christian image of the virgin mother.
After Clytemnestra kills her husband for, among other
transgressions, sacrificing their daughter Iphegnia to
conflicts between men, Clytemnestra must be killed by her
son so that the Father may rule and appropriate the powers
of the mother. When the son, Orestes, kills the mother, he
and his other sister, Electra, go mad. Orestes goes
unpunished and is saved from madness to establish the
patriarchal order, but Electra remains mad to establish the
burial of women in madness
.
72
With the story of Oedipus, it was the myth of the death
of the father that won and thus patriarchy ruled. Yet, after
he has sex with his mother, Oedipus is re-enacting the
madness of Orestes, according to Irigaray. The most
important point is that when he learns that the woman he had
sex with is his mother, he is afraid of her. "His primal
crime comes back to him like an echo, he fears and detests
his act, and the woman who was its object ." 73 Of lesser
importance is the fact that Oedipus has broken the law of
the father. Irigaray insists that Freud misrecognizes, in
f^ct disavows, the woman who was torn apart between son and
father, between sons," when he tells the story of the father
being torn to pieces by the sons of the primal horde . 74
Freud speaks only to borrowing the place of the father, to
72
Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter,” p. 36-38.
73
Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter,” p. 38.
74
Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter,” p. 38.
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the symbolic murder of the father. Another interpretation,
such as her interpretation, is possible but never happens,
Irigaray insists. The social order of patriarchy calls for
the exclusion of the mother, for the father to forbid the
bodily encounter with the mother. But, "all desire become an
abyss if the sojourn in utero is censored and if our
separations from that first home and the first nurse remain
uninterpreted, unthought in their losses and scars ." 75
Irigaray wants to tell her interpretation of the story
of the mother, of Clytemnestra, to illustrate the struggle
that preceded Freud's myth, as well as to make possible the
mother m the symbolic order. If women are not to be
accomplices in the murder of the mother, of Clytemnestra,
they must assert that there is a genealogy of women and
situate themselves in it to keep their identity. They must
not be persuaded to give up love for their mother, because
to give up that love is to uproot themselves from their
identities and subjectivities. For Irigaray, refusing to
give up love for the mother becomes possible when the
mother-daughter relationship is brought into the symbolic —
by (re) interpreting the substance of philosophy and culture.
The new symbolic redistribution she calls for, rather than
allocating only the body to women, would allow women to be
both flesh and spirit. That is, the conditions that allow
the women to become subjects are the conditions that allow
7:,
Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter,” p. 40
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women to become divine - both possibilities that patriarchy
allows only to men. 76 when there ±s a distinctlon between
mother and woman, women may achieve this. That is, when the
mother becomes more than either phallic mother or castrated
mother, she will have access to a subject position that
takes into account more than the maternal function. She can
have a relationship with the daughter as a woman in all the
aspects of her identity rather than only as a mother who
fills needs. Then a woman can become a subject without
abandoning the mother. Irigaray suggests that if women were
able to become divine, then they could insert new
representations of sexual difference, of women's
specificity, and of time and space, into the symbolic
order
.
77
That is, the divine provides a horizon for identity and
the substance of the cultural scripts that govern women's
lives. The idea is not to make adjustments in that horizon,
but change the very substance of it — which includes making
new values. When women are able to represent themselves from
their own space, then they will be able to encounter and
enter into exchange with men. That is, for women to truly
encounter men as different, women must first exist. They
must be symbolized. For such symbolizations, Irigaray looks
'7/
m
’Irigaray s work on the divine is both complicated and controversial. I include references
to it here mainly to illustrate the depth of the rethinking she believes must be achieved in
order to make symbolic changes.
77
Irigaray, An Elhics ofSexual Difference
,
p. 7.
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to religious and civil myths. Although we tend to think such
myths represent secondary realities, she insists, they are
one of the key ways in which society is ordered at any
particular time
.
78
To consider the meaning of mythical
concomitant "'"tn
3 ° f reality as merel V incidental isto repressing and destroying certaincultural dimensions that relate to the economy ofdifference between the sexes. Such an approach
so leads to a partial, reductive, and fruitlessconception of History
.
79
Irigaray wants to create a symbolic mother-daughter
relationship in the present so that there can be a different
future. In one example of a step toward symbolic support
which is absent in most myths and images that accompany
them, Irigaray suggests that if we care about social justice
we should put up posters in public places showing beautiful
images of that natural and spiritual couple, the
mother-daughter," which "is always being thrust into the
background, even when some honor is paid it ." 80 Such images
are conspicuously absent from public places, indicating a
cultural injustice. But we can remedy this, and do it before
the more difficult and lengthy task of reforming language,
in order to "heal a loss of individual and collective
identity for women." 8 * New analyses and interpretations, and
78
Irigaray, ye, tu, nous
,
(New York. Routledge, 1993), p 23-24.
79
Irigaray, ye, tu, nous
,
p. 24.
80
Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, p. 189.
8
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new myths with their accompanying images, have the potential
to change the social order.
Practicing the Transformations
In order to practice the kinds of social and symbolic
transformations discussed in this chapter, mothers must not
only recognize differences, come to know their desires as
their own rather than those outlined in cultural scripts for
mothers, and have access to their will to act on those
desires. Mothers also must shape and then take advantage of
rights specific to the three body concepts. That is, once
conditions are established that allow mothers to know their
own desires and act on them, more mothers will be able to
change the practices that have contributed to their
positions of inequality and inferiority. More mothers will
become subjects rather than have their subjectivities
diminished and restricted.
We have Irigaray's argument that patriarchy, through
its domination of time and space, language, and so on, has
separated women from their mothers, isolated them from one
another, and deprived them of a culture of their own. In
order to create a culture, according to Irigaray, women must
have "the right to assemble, to speak together, to organize
freely and independently of economic, legal, and religious
293
To be full citizens, women need rights that go
beyond contraception and abortion, fragile as those rights
are today, to legal protection for women in cases of rape
and other violence inflicted on women by men in private and
public
.
That is, once mothers insist on determining and
interpreting their own needs, according the variety of
material embodiment of mothers, those needs must be
translated into rights specific and appropriate to the three
body concepts. That means making laws that take into account
women s bodily rhythms and temporality, and address their
positions in the private and public worlds. That means
taking into account time and space issues that affect
mothers
' daily lives. Because their specificities, their
positions or status, vary according to which body concept
they embody, it is crucial that rights take the all bodily
concepts into account. This goes not just for the three
female body concepts but also to the variety of other body
concepts of women and men.
In fact, Irigaray' s focus on sexual specificity is
aimed in part on achieving sexuate or equivalent rights --
that is, rights specific to the bodies and subjects they
cover. For Irigaray, it is important that written law be one
aspect of any strategy for women to have identities that go
beyond motherhood. Her analysis suggests that with rights,
82
Irigaray, Sexes ami Genealogies
,
p. 192 .
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wxth recognition of women- s specificity on both the symbolic
and juridical level, will come social transformations
including more power for mothers. But the recognition of
specificity and the attendant rights must take place first.
That is, Irigaray's goal is for equal worth on the
symbolic, material, and juridical levels, through what she
calls equal subjective rights based on the specificities
located in embodied selves. By this she means, as we saw in
Chapter Two, "equal obviously meaning different but of equal
value, subjective implying equivalent rights in exchange
systems. Her emphasis is on the difference of rights
between male and female subjects required to offer
equivalent rights or status - that is, meaning appropriate
to the gender. No single set of rights will offer equivalent
status to the various embodied subjects they cover, and
certainly not to the three female body concepts and their
subjectivities discussed here. As needs and experiences and
possibilities vary, so do appropriate rights. Thus,
Irigaray's insistence in calling for an entire rethinking of
civil law to take into account embodied specificities.
Otherwise, women' s rights will come and go, vary by time,
advance or backtrack, but no real change will take place.
Sexuate rights would be part of a sexuate culture —
providing not only new rights to protect women's lives,
their desires and their needs, but also new scripts.
83 Irigaray, /e, tu, nous
,
p. 68.
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Recognition that there are different rights for each sex,
and legislating those rights, are early steps toward
equality of social status.
Ingaray s later essays concerning rights are more
concrete and straight-forward than those in her earlier
work. For example, in "How to Define Sexuate Rights" she
says," Women and men are not equal, find the equality
strategy, when it exists, should always aim at the
recognition of difference."** This is not to protect women
or mothers, but to take into account their specificity so
that they do not end up disadvantaged by laws claiming
everyone is equal. This also explains why equality
strategies that focus on equal numbers are flawed, while
strategies based on sexual difference are preferable. She
says, "the contemporary social order, including the order
defining the professions, is not neutral from the point of
view of the difference between the sexes
.
She explains further that,
. . . what has to be defined as rights for women is
what the people of men, of men-amongst-themselves,
has appropriated as its property, including that
which concerns women's bodies, children's bodies,
as well as natural space, dwelling places, the
economy of signs and images, social and religious
representational ity . 86
Ingaray, How to Define Sexuate Rights^ in Whitford, ed.. The Irivaray Reader n
206.
85
Irigaray, “How to Define Sexuate Rights?” p. 206,
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Then she lists rights, numbers them, elaborates on them in
concrete terms consistent with but unlike her earlier work.
She makes it clear that she is talking about rights for not
just two sexes, though that is the starting point, but for
differences among them. Included in her advice is,
Define eieme^airy rights concerning the life of
^nfh
lndlV1
^
U
^
ls: women and men, girls and boysot ers and fathers, male and female citizensmale and female workers, etc nrr • '
and men nr , . , -' starti g with womeno , o at least keeping that difference as ahorizon, should strategy dictate otherpriorities
.
87
She lists among the rights that she believes should be
asserted as women's rights the right to human dignity which
includes prohibiting the commercial use of women's bodies
and images, halting what she calls the exploitation of
motherhood by civil and religious powers, and providing
positive representations of women in action, words, and
images m all public places; the right to human identity
which includes physical and moral integrity not reducible to
money, the right to motherhood as a component rather than a
priority of female identity; civil law definitions of the
mutual obligations of mothers-children; the right to defend
their own and their children's lives, their living space,
traditions and religions from decisions by male law; tax
laws that are fair to women; the right to eguivalent
87
Irigaray, “How to Define Sexuate Rights?” p 211
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exchange for men and women through revisions of systems of
exchange, such as linguistic exchange; and the right to
representation in equal numbers in civil and religious
decision-making bodies, since religion also represents civil
authority.
Although laws cannot solve the problems women face,
they can make up one component that helps make people aware
of the problems and set priorities for addressing them in
the public arena. Rights based on the three female body
concepts would consider all the specificities of those
bodies, providing not just protection for their lives but
also provisions that include, but are not limited to, the
conditions necessary for them all to choose whether to be
mothers or not, define their own needs and how to satisfy
them, decide for themselves what kinds of mothers to be, and
work in paid employment without having to pretend to be
someone they are not.
Rethinking Mothers as Subjects
I have been arguing that the cultural representations
of and scripts for mothers as nurturing, selfless, and
always available to whoever needs them, are crucial aspects
of the process by which mothers constitute their selves and
their lives and come to establish goals, aspirations and
relationships. These goals and aspirations may appear
personal but in fact are shaped by the imaginary and
298
symbolic meanings that create and regulate society and
culture. This puts the focus on the symbolic order, the
order of representation, as well as on the process by which
a culture produces a practice and the link between maternal
bodies and maternal subjectivities. That is, I link the
cultural representations of mothers to the practical lives
of mothers, to maternal practices. These practices change
mothers' experiences of their bodies, their subjectivities,
and their possibilities. The practices are linked to
particular forms of power and social control, which govern
time and space, and shape behavior and attitudes.
By considering the work of Luce Irigaray and Michel
Foucault, Chapter Two problematizes the dualism that often
defines bodies and differences. Using a redefined notion of
bodies and embodied subjectivities in the material form of
sexual, pregnant, and nonpregnant maternal bodies, Chapter
Three explores the images and representations in the
cultural scripts for mothers. That chapter shows how the
representations and images transmit ideological assumptions
and contradictions which encourage mothers to become
subjects by imagining themselves as objects of experts'
prescriptions. Motherhood scripts colonize many mothers'
minds and bodies, positioning them as needing training by
experts, as needing to be self-sacrificing and
self-controlled in order to be "good" mothers. Further,
women who are pregnant, and nonpregnant mothers, are
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encouraged to pretend they are not, until and unless that is
no longer possible, in the interest of competing on
abstractly "equal" terms with others as if they were the
same as others. This denies who women are; it denies
maternal differences as anything but disadvantages. This
shapes the ways mothers go about their lives and how they
think of themselves and their possibilities. It diminishes
rather than develops mothers' subjectivities. However,
Chapter Four shows that these scripts are subject to change,
and that they have been contested by feminist, black, and
lesbian mothers.
The final chapter suggests we might provide new,
expanded scripts. It suggests we might reinvent the
positions of mothers from unequal and inferior, from stigma
or special condition in need of protection, through a theory
of differences, freedom to change and a source of a will to
change, mtersub j ective recognition, and rights based on the
specificities of individuals. The goal is for women to be
able to find a value in being women and not just in being
mothers — which requires rethinking and transforming social
and cultural values. This can begin with acknowledging
differences, specificities -- beginning with the three
female body concepts, their needs and desires, the subject
positions to which they might aspire, their representations
of themselves as well as their own time and space. Women, no
longer homeless, can become subjects without disavowing
300
their mothers. Mothers, without rejecting children, can be
women, can be subjects with equal worth who can enter into
exchange with other women and with men, with reciprocity in
communication, with neither sex dominant.
As we saw in Chapter Two, subjectivity is important
because it is a key to women speaking in an active voice and
taking responsibility and defining themselves for
themselves. Speaking in a passive voice is like living in a
free market economy in that we are surrounded by choices
which makes us feel secure. We think we are free to make
choices but it is a false sense of security. Many mothers
still are constrained and controlled, because the choices
are limited to those in the cultural scripts and in the
advice from "experts." When mothers refuse to go to market
refuse to be commodities, refuse to select from choices
defined and limited according to a male model, refuse the
cultural roles that call for them to deny their specificity,
and refuse to become space or place for men at their own
expense -- when mothers do this, they will move from objects
to subjects. They will represent themselves, define their
own needs and desires, rewrite the cultural scripts,
reinscribe bodies, reinvent the positions of mothers from
unequal and inferior, from stigma or special condition in
need of protection, to subjects possessing both equality and
difference, to subjects whose identities encompass more than
motherhood
.
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